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THE MORALITY OF MUSICAL IMITATION 
IN JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis analyses the relation between Rousseau's musical writings and 
elements of his moral, social and linguistic philosophy. In particular, I am 
concerned to demonstrate: (i. ) how the core of Rousseau's theory of musical 
imitation is grounded in the same analysis of the nature of man which 
governs his moral and social philosophy; (ii. ) how this grounding does not 
extend to the stylistic prescriptions the justification of which Rousseau 
intended his musical writings to offer. The central argument draws on 
Rousseau's analysis of the origin of man as distinctively human. This 
origin extends to the awareness of moral and aesthetic value, and to 
communication in speech and song. Rousseau's moral analyses of social 
and political life usually take the form of relating contemporary practice to 
the original structure in which man's awareness of his own good is 
commensurate with that of the good of others. The analysis of music 
follows a similar model: music is to be considered good in so far as it 
replicates, or faithfully reflects, the original model of communication. The 
value of music is thereby understood to extend to moral as well as aesthetic 
goodness. Given the subtlety of Rousseau"s understanding of the 'origin', I 
argue that this analysis of music's aesthetic value is powerful and far- 
reaching in its relevance for contemporary musical aesthetics. However, I 
also argue that while the analysis in general is good in this way, it does not 
entail the specific kind of musical-stylistic preferences which Rousseau 
sought to use it to advance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Le pr6mier de mes besoins, le plus grand, le plus fort, le plus inextinguible, 6tait tout 
entier clans mon. cceur: c'6toit le besoin d'une soci&6 intime et aussi intime qu'elle 
pouvait 1'&tre ... Ce besoin singulier 6toit tel que la plus 6troite union des corps ne 
pouvait encore y suffire: il m'aurait fallu deux ames dans le m&me corps; sans cela je 
sentois toujours le vide. 1 
The confession of a search for intimacy is one of Rousseau's most familiar 
gestures. The almost impossible conception he held of such intimacy - be it 
construed in psychological, social, or more abstract metaphysical terms - 
underpins his work as both its muse and its measure. From the fading star 
of the Jean-Jacques of the autobiographical writings to the basic coinage of 
mutual trust on which the system of government developed in the Contrat 
Social is built, and whether deployed as a complex moral norm in the 
fictional landscape of two lovers in La nolivcllc H&i*sc or as kind of 
epistemological and moral measure in the Essai slir Voriginc dcs langues, the 
idea of minds united in a common desire exercises considerable 
gravitational force across the disparate spheres in which Rousseau found 
himself working. Finding the looked-for'soci6te intime' absent from both 
his personal life and the life of the society in which he lived, Rousseau's 
oeuvre may be characterised as the attempt to write such a state of being 
into existence. 
What does this state of being, introduced here under the guise of 
intimacy, amount to? In one sense, we receive a different answer 
depending on which area of Rousseau's work is consulted. In another 
sense, however, and despite the enormous variety of its form and function 
in Rousseau's ociivrc, the notion looks surprisingly uniform. Thus 'in the 
second Dzscoiirs, we would find it manifest in the concept of the state of 
I Coiifiessio? is, OC 1, p. 414. The P16iade edition of Rousseau's works follows the original 
orthography. This has been kept in my quotations throughout. 
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nature; an arrangement in which the economy of need and desire is 
balanced so that the self-interest of individual beings is subsumed in the 
interest of the community. The psychological concept of intimacy is thus 
translated into a metaphysical, almost Leibnizian ideal, where Rousseau's 
'deux ames dans le meme corps' becomes almost literally the case, so 
attuned is the individual being to its corporate identity. In the Contrat 
Social, we would find a system of social organisation entirely geared 
toward producing a civic replication of the natural economy of the second 
Discours. Nor does anything dissimilar, on this structural level at least, 
obtain in the educational programme of Emile. Merely, it is the application 
that differs; where individuality is sacrificed for a reconciled society in the 
Contrat Social, in Emile individual consciousness is not so much diminished 
as its power enhanced for the purpose of reconciling itself to its natural 
environment and protecting itself from its social surroundings. 
In Rousseau's epistolary novel, jidle, ou la nouvelle Hýloi'se, the terms and 
psychological language in which the state of being with which we are 
concerned is expressed is even more clearly related to the notion of 'soci6te 
intime' with which we began. For here the guiding notion, manifestly one 
of being together, of love, is nonetheless bound up with the reconciliation 
of this desire to the world which nourishes it. Love's first kiss results not in 
defiant bliss but in an apparent catastrophe - born of the impropriety and 
mistaken spirit of the act - which results in the physical separation of the 
lovers .2 It is 
here, in the familiar tale of the 'star-crossed lovers', that the 
utopian flavour of the "societe intime" is at its clearest, for the union is 
never achieved; the story differs from the trope mainly because the 
separation and renunciation is self-imposed. It is here, too, that the 
epistolary form of the work comes into its own, for it is in the intimate 
space of the letter that the genuine spiritual proximity of Saint-Preux and 
Julie is forged, written into being at the expense of physical presence. 
2 For the letter in which the catastrophe is narrated, see Julie, ou la nouvelle HýIoise, 1, XIV, 
OC 11, pp. 63-5. 
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For Rousseau, the art of writing comes into its own as this utopian 
project. Although there are many occasions where the idea of writing is 
castigated, 3held responsible for the sapping of some kind of primal 
expressive force from language as a breeding ground of artifice, it is also 
characterised as a refuge and the sole recourse to repairing the utopian 
dream. just as Julie and Saint-Preux retreat from the physical to the literary 
in order to live out their love story, so too does Rousseau retreat from the 
spoken commerce of society in the hope of repairing it with writing. ' It is 
in this way that writing, so long as it is conceived in the service of 
goodness, remains true to the more general origin of communication that 
Rousseau narrates. For the work on music and language, Rousseau's 
primal communicative media, is no less concerned with the'soci6te intime' 
than the fictional, autobiographical and political works cited above. 
Indeed, in Rousseau's understanding, music and language are born 
together in an act of love; both are a function of a state of being referred to 
here as the 'societe intime', just the function of both is also to restore it, to 
reinvigorate it, to work it back into life. 
*** 
A central feature of the state of being I have been discussing is its 
connection with goodness. Indeed, perhaps it is best to say that Rousseau's 
conception of goodness consists, more or less, in what I have been 
describing in terms of the 'societe intime' and its various extensions and 
translations. The connection with goodness is perhaps most easily grasped 
in the overtly political and moral-philosophical writings, such as the first 
Discours, the Contrat Social and Enille. The concern with virtue is clear 'in 
these cases, just as his use of the term seems relatively unproblematic and 
tied clearly to traditional and prevalent notions of virtue such as sincerity 
3 The prime example is chapter V of the Essai sur Vorigine des langites, OC V, pp. 384-8. 
4 See his own account of this in the Confessions, OC 1, pp. I] 6ff 
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and citizenship. In the second Discours, where we are concerned with a 
state of nature that is, as Rousseau makes clear, at one remove from the 
sphere of vice and virtue, it is nonetheless clear that the state of nature is 
still intended to provide humanity with a model of its own good. The 
situation described is one in which the psychological malaise of false pride, 
or 'amour propre, and its social equivalent of unjust inequality - these 
being the roots of evil in mankind for Rousseau - are prevented from 
occurring. 
In so far as language and music are concerned, however, the connection 
with goodness is no less essential but distinctly more troublesome. If there 
is a norm for the good in music and in language, which Rousseau seems 
quite sure about in both cases, and if, as I have suggested, it relates 
squarely to the political, educational and moral norms described, is it still 
possible to determine its instantiation in the same way? To be sure, there is 
an obvious sense in which it may be decided whether language is 
conceived in a spirit of goodness or not, and thus to determine whether it is 
authentic in the sense of reflecting its origin. This is the sense in which 
language may be employed to describe goodness, or some means of 
acquiring it - and Rousseau would have conceived of much of his own 
writing in precisely this way. There is another sense, however, in which 
the determination of this kind of authenticity is distinctly problematic. 
And this problem is one that, in modem terminology, may be described in 
5 
terms of a difference between an aesthetic good and a moral good. 
It is clear that the two are firmly intermingled in the idea of the 'socik6 
intime'. The notion extends, as we have seen, to love, to spiritual pleasure, 
and to spheres that nowadays would be called purely aesthetic. As is also 
clear, however, perhaps most obviously from the quandary faced by Julie 
and Saint-Preux, the separation of pleasure from moral good is catastrophic 
and Rousseau is consistent elsewhere about the idea that beauty should be 
5 The problems of applying this distinction too rigidly to Rousseau's conception of value is 
discussed in Chapter I below. See pp. 57-63. 
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in the service of goodness. The condemnation of intellectual or physical 
pleasure devoid of moral content is one of the most prominent themes in 
Rousseau, from the early essays on taste and eloquence to the more 
extended considerations of his maturity. 6 
If the problems we face in determining the authenticity of language in 
this respect - where we have, that is to say, recourse to a determination of 
what such language is describing, suggesting or requesting - what of the 
problems concerning music in the same respect? For in the musical case we 
have, at least in no obvious sense, no such recourse. There is, to be sure, 
the significant fact that Rousseau's interest in music was primarily in vocal 
and operatic music. Music's authenticity might, in this sense, simply be 
tied to the particular literary or dramatic end achieved by a mixture of 
gestural, verbal and musical means, and in this sense be linked to some 
determinate moral content. But even here, as Rousseau is at pains to argue, 
the vehicle for the dramatic or literary evocation of something good is by 
no means necessarily good itself. 7 The attempt to sidestep the question of 
music's own authenticity in this way would be a mere feint. 
The question of the morality of music goes to the heart of Rousseau's 
thought about music - and by extension to Rousseau's thought in general - 
and not simply for the oft-cited' anecdotal reasons concerning the 
supposed ironies of man, perceived as the scourge of the world of 'bon 
gout' taking himself off to compose an opera. It goes to the heart of his 
musical thought because Rousseau employed, in writing about music, 
many of the same kinds of arguments that he used in his more overtly 
political and moral writings; and he deployed precisely the same model of 
what we have called the *soci6te intime' as both its origin and object. 
6See the early f ragments'Sur YEloquence', OC 11, p. 43, and 'Sur le Gocit', OC V, pp. 482-3; 
the Lettre ý d'Aleti&ert, OC V, pp. 9-125; and, for a somewhat more obscure treatment, the 
second preface to lidie, OC 11, pp. 11-30. 
7 Indeed, it is rather the reverse in Rousseau's understanding. The argument is made in 
the Lettre ý d'Aleiiibert. 
8 By Rousseau himself, among many others. 
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However, where it might seem relatively unproblematic to relate, as 
Rousseau does, the musical styles of his contemporaries to a normative 
conception of music as born of some kind of originary act of love for the 
other, it still remains problematic as to how the adequacy of any such 
music to this norm might be determined. Even if, that is to say, we could 
agree that the birth of music is a good thing, the admission of Rousseau's 
terms does not necessarily provide us with the means of determining 
whether this birth is well imitated or not. And without this, the idea is, in a 
sense, lost; for the idea of the 'societe intime' is nothing if its connection 
with goodness is not intact. 
The question upon which the present thesis is centred, then, concerns 
precisely this relation between music and morality in Rousseau's writing. 
To what extent can Rousseau be said to have provided something like a 
moral philosophy of music; an account of music, that is, in which norms of 
musical taste may be said to demonstrate a relation to moral norms? Is it 
possible to say that Rousseau demonstrated, to some extent at least, a 
connection between what is good in music and what is good for mankind? 
*** 
The nature of the principal question in this thesis is such that an 
interdisciplinary mode of enquiry is necessary. In virtue of this, the modes 
of argumentation I employ comprise a mixture of historical, interpretative 
and more systematic theoretical discussion. For, to ask to what extent 
Rousseau understood his music theory to constitute a genuine moral 
philosophy of music is an undertaking of a primarily historical and 
interpretative nature. To ask further, on the other hand, what his success In 
this amounts to requires a more straightforwardly philosophical enquiry. 
Granting this, however, the more philosophical aspects of my enquiry are 
not isolated within that discipline. Rather, my intention is to construe this 
research in such a way that its relevance to historical musicological 
concerns is paramount. For while it has not been my purpose to assess the 
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influence of this area of Rousseau's thought on the music and music theory 
of his contemporaries and intellectual descendants, it has very much been 
my intention to provide a basis for understanding where Rousseau's 
musical thought is relevant to musicology for purely historical reasons, and 
where its relevance extends further to musicology's institutional aims. 
Academic musicology has, over the past few decades, witnessed a 
burgeoning of scholarly activity concentrating on the project of relating 
musical practice to the moral and social spheres. ' The importance of 
Rousseau's thought to this project is unquestionable, and our 
understanding of it - so I would argue - can only be deepened by an 
enquiry such as the present one that aims to provide some justification of 
Rousseau's position. 
The first of the three chapters that follow is intended to provide an 
extended contextual and theoretical introduction to the central question of 
music's morality. Questions in Rousseau, however systematically they 
may be put, rarely permit of straightforward answers regardless of 
whether they relate to interpretative, historical or philosophical matters. 
Rather, they usually demand a somewhat discursive approach, one that 
attends to the peculiarly literary nature of Rousseau's philosophical project 
and to the spread of similar concerns across a diversity of genres and 
apparent subject matter. The first chapter, then, aims to open the debate in 
a number of areas. First, it is asked to what extent Rousseau's music theory 
entails philosophical commitments, and whether we may understand his 
music theoretical output to provide, in some sense of the term, a 
philosophy of music in tune with his more general moral philosophy. 
Second, I explore some of the issues connected with Rousseau's 
understanding of artistic imitation and its relation to the idea of moral 
presence, that which music is, in Rousseau's analysis, thought ultimately to 
be imitating. Other concerns discussed in the chapter relate to the 
9 The enormous increase of interest in the work of Theodor Adorno is an obvious case in 
point here. 
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relevance of Plato's understanding of artistic imitation, the place of music 
in Rousseau's autobiographical writings, and the relation between morality 
and the aesthetic. 
In the second chapter, I begin by providing analyses of two key texts in 
which elements of Rousseau's theory of musical imitation is presented: the 
Lettre sur la musiquefranpise, and the article onMusique' from the 
Dictionnaire de Musique. My focus in these discussions is on the structures 
Rousseau deploys in support of the normative notions and evaluative 
judgements that control his music-theoretical enterprise. While the Lettre is 
shown, in some respects, to lack the kind of analysis of musical imitation 
required, I argue that the analysis given in the 'Musique' article also seems 
to ask more questions than it answers. These questions centre around the 
problem of what it is that causes what Rousseau calls the 'effets moraux' of 
imitative music, and also around the idea that imitative music must 
somehow resist immediacy or remain the object of perception. 
These questions prompt the investigations undertaken in the second half 
of the chapter. First, I give a comparative discussion of a passage from 
Wittgenstein and some passages from two of the key influences on 
Rousseau's musical thought, d'Alembert and Condillac. The purpose of 
this is twofold: to deepen our understanding of the eighteenth-century idea 
of the " signe na turel' by comparing it to a twentieth-century account of 
signification, and to provide some context for the feature of Rousseau's 
account that seems to require that the imitative musical signifier be opaque. 
In the final part of the chapter, we will look at Diderot's contribution to the 
debate in the form of his fictional dialogue, Le Neveli de Rameau. My 
reading of this concentrates on the radical extent to which Diderot ironises 
music-theoretical discourse, and questions asked about what should be the 
proper object of musical imitation. The answers found constitute, I argue, a 
significant challenge for Rousseau's account. 
The third chapter attempts to piece together Rousseau's putative moral 
philosophy of music by examinmg the extent towhich the precepts of his 
mature understanding of imitation are grounded in the account of the 
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origin of man provided in the second Discours and the Essai sur Vorigine des 
langues. The first task is to establish the theoretical reach of the distinction 
between imitative and non-imitative music, for upon this distinction, my 
account seeks to show, depends the evaluative and prescriptive strata of 
Rousseau's music theory. Following this, I trace a path back from the 
account of imitative music - and the moral effects which distinguish it as 
such from non-imitative music - to the idea on which Rousseau tries to 
ground these moral effects; namely, the notion of human presence. 
Rousseau's conception of presence, and the basis of its evaluative 
deployment in the music- theoretical writing, is developed from his account 
of man's emergence from the state of nature given in the Discours and the 
Essai. In my reading of these texts, Rousseau's account is shown to lead to 
a powerful analysis of the relation between the aesthetic and moral spheres 
as two sides of the same coin. In this analysis, the idea of presence comes 
to be situated in relation to its aesthetic and moral function, and need not, I 
argue, sustain the epistemological and ontological burden that Rousseau, 
with varying degrees of uncertainty, would place upon it. Our re-situation 
of presence in this way, however, does not leave Rousseau's deployment of 
it unaffected. For although we can derive a philosophy of music from 
Rousseau that is far-reaching in its relevance to contemporary concerns, the 
basis for his specific aesthetic prescriptions is forfeit. 
The chapter concludes with an analysis of Rousseau's melodrama, 
Pygmalion. This curious work, I suggest, provides an apposite illustration 
of, and commentary upon, the philosophy of music and art left to us by the 
Discours and Essai. For, far from merely offering a contemporary retelling 
of Ovid's famous tale of a statue's coming to life, Rousseau's Pygniallon 
unfolds an intricate and skilfully dramatised fable about the difficulties 
involved in taking art's putative representation of moral presence 
seriously. 
*** 
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Musicologists, though mostly only privately, often express disappointment 
at the notion that much philosophy of music seems to lack the music- 
technical literacy that would confer for them a greater authority upon it. In 
this light, Rousseau can be seen to provide a promise of the looked-for 
marriage of a deep musical passion and a genuine practical and technical 
facility with a systematic and integrated view of the workings of the world 
and its occupants. In our own time, two philosophers must be singled out 
as having 'raised the stakes' of musical literacy in the contemporary 
philosophy of music, these being Peter Kivy and Roger Scruton. Yet for 
both Kivy and Scruton, as well as for most others working in anglo- 
american music philosophy, 10 Rousseau is a marginal figure in both the 
history and contemporary practice of the philosophy of music. As Scruton 
puts it in his preface to The Aesthetics of Music, Rousseau's 'writings on 
music, for all their verve and interest, provide no philosophy of the subject, 
and are now of largely historical interest. "' Despite Rousseau"s position, 
therefore, as possibly the first philosopher to centre his musical thought 
away from the metaphysics that had always held sway, and towards what 
has since come to be called Aesthetics -a distinctly modern epochal turn in 
other words - Scruton finds that Rousseau, in common with other more 
recent figures such as Nietzsche and Adorno, has'little to say about the 
problems which I believe to be central to the discipline: the relation 
between sound and tone, the analysis of musical meaning, and the nature 
of the purely musical experience! 12 
As I hope this thesis will be able to show, it is precisely these 'central 
problems' of contemporary musical aesthetics that Rousseau's musical 
writings are designed to account for. Moreover, they demonstrate, in 
10 The exception is Lydia Goehr, although her position within the anglo-american 
mainstream is slightly controversial. For her most detailed account of Rousseau's musical 
thought, see Goehr (1998) pp. 98-106. 
11 Scruton (1997), p. vii. I have found this opinion echoed in conversation with a number of 
analytic philosophers of music. 
12 Scruton (1997), p. vii. 
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common particularly with Adorno, a peculiarly unbending focus on the 
idea that the questions of the aesthetics of music may not be approached 
independently of a theory of society and the moral value of social practices. 
Given that this is one of the major insights and institutional assumptions of 
much contemporary musicology, the contemporary study of Rousseau's 
philosophy of music may be said to offer a timely opportunity to marry the 
concerns of both musicologists and philosophical aestheticians. 
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CHAPTER 1 
WRITING BETWEEN MUSIC AND PHILOSOPHY 
I 
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS 
IN ROUSSEAUS MUSICAL WRITINGS 
A. BORN FOR MUSIC 
J. J. 6toit n6 pour la Musique; non pour y payer de sa personne dans Yexecution, mais 
pour en hAter les progr&s et y faire des decouvertes. 13 
Jean-Jacques, born for music, was yet never quite simply at home there. He 
14 was often, in his own phrase, "hors de son diapason. His early first 
attempt at making a profession of music - `[m]e voila maitre ý chanter sans 
savoir dechiffrer un air'15- prompted his first major attempt to reinvent 
himself, his first auto-fiction, as it were. Arriving in Lausanne in 1732 
under the pretence of having come from Paris, Rousseau took the name 
Vaussore de Villeneuve; ' I his first 'composition' as a musician, one might 
suggest, being thereby not a work of music but a concoction of his mangled 
surname and that of another young man whose musical and social facility 
was everything the young Rousseau lacked. Later, when he had acquired 
sufficient expertise to give music lessons to the young ladies of Chambery, 
the doors that he felt opening were, at least in so far as the episode is 
presented in the Confessions, social as much as musical, 17 and the departure 
13 Deiixiýnie Dialogiie, OC 1, p. 872. 
14 Confessions, OC 1, p. 148. 
15 Confessions, OC 1, p. 148. 
16'Vaussore' is an anagram of Rousseau. 
17 See Confessions, OC 1, pp. 188 ff. Note that the description of pupils folloivs the order of 
both the youthful and the elder Rousseau's social preference for the women of the 
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for Paris with his treatise on musical notation is compared by the older 
Rousseau to another journey: je part's de Savoie avec mon Systerne de 
musique, comme autrefois j"etois parti de Turin avec ma fontaine de 
Heron. "' A treatise, that is to say, filled with "idees magnifiques qui me 
Favoient inspiree'19 is compared with the Confessions' last word on the 
extravagant folly of Rousseau's many tentative but enthusiastic flights into 
the unknown. 
Of course, the tone of these descriptions is intended to satirise his 
youthful ineptitude more than question the depth of his musical 
commitment. The fond and intentionally humorous irony of so many of 
the passages in the Confessions that deal with Rousseau"s musical career 
and experiences is by no means the only narrative mode that he employs. 
The -other world' to which music is shown to open doors is as often 
construed either in terms of the bliss of an early childhood locked safely 
away beyond language and memory or, alternatively but similarly, of some 
kind of future utopia; and there is no gainsaying the sincerity of the report 
that 'J. J. ' was bom for music. 
Throughout the autobiographical writings and correspondence, 
references to the widely successful and enduring Devin du village are fairly 
consistently made with a proud tone, 10 and the honest respectability to 
which he felt his auxiliary profession as a music copyist entitled him was 
zealously guarded and maintained. The Venetian playwright Carlo 
Goldoni records his 'indignation' at finding the internationally acclaimed 
author of Emile engaged in such a lowly activity and reports that he'could 
aristocracy over those of the bourgeoisie. See also OC 1, p. 134. For more on Rousseau's 
general sense of allegiance to, on the one hand, the nobility and, on the other, the peasant 
classes, see Cranston (1991a), and esp. (1991b), p. 160. 
18 Confessions, OC 1, p. 272. The'fontaine de 1-16ron' was a trick water fountain with which 
Rousseau and his companion B5cle set off from Turin in 1728. Under his friend's 
influence, Rousseau believed the fountain would provide fame and fortune as well as 
sustenance. The episode is narrated in Book 3 of the ConfessiOns, OC 1, pp. 101 ff. 
19 OC 1, P. 272. 
20See especially, Confessions, OC 1, pp. 377-8, and Dialogues, OC 1, pp. 870ff. 
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neither conceal my astonishment nor my pain . 121 Rousseau, perceiving the 
source of his visitor's embarrassment, is said to have replied proudly, 
What! (... ) you pity me because I am employed in copying? You imagine that I should 
be better employed in composing books for people incapable of reading them, and 
supplying articles to unprincipled journalists? You are mistaken; I am passionately 
fond of music; I copy from excellent originals; this enables me to live and serves to 
amuse me; and what more should I have? 22 
The anecdote, while serving as a strong reminder of the artisanal pride that 
Rousseau took in his secondary but nonetheless most constant profession, 
also provides a glimpse of the structure of non- communication that 
characterises his late thought about writing and reading. Rousseau first 
took on work as a music copyist in order to supply himself with honest 
bread, uncompromised by any entanglement with the literary market 
place. His aim, as is well known, was to write books in which he need not 
shy away from what he felt must be said. However, as his remark to 
Goldoni suggests, here we find that the hack work apparently eclipses its 
original raison ditre in constituting an activity more worthwhile than the 
one it was intended to facilitate. It is as if Rousseau, having finally 
abandoned his life-long search for the transparency between self and other 
which he came to feel could only be achieved through writing, 23 was 
content to exchange this for a surer transparency between text and text; the 
artisanal process of music copying entailed, at least in theory, no occasion 
for interpretation, and hence none for duplicity. 
The ambivalence between irony and sincerity which marks the musical 
passages of the autobiographical writing is also to be found in the musical 
21 Goldoni (1926), p. 418. The visit was made in the Autumn of 1772. 
22'Goldoni (1926), p. 419. 
23As the Confessiotis puts it, 'J'aimerois la societ6 comme un autre, si je n'6tois sur de m'y 
montrer non seulement ý mon desavantage, mais tout autre que je ne suls. Le parti que j'al 
pris d'6crire et de me cacher est pr6cis6ment celui qui me convenoit. ' OC 1, p. 116. 
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writings of Rousseau's maturity. For a writer one of whose central and 
revolutionary hallmarks was the proud disclosure of authorship, the more 
prevalent use of anonymity in the musical texts from the early polemics on 
French and Italian music to the twilight Rýponse du pebtfaisetir is not 
without a certain significance. 24 The important exceptions, among the 
works published during Rousseau"s lifetime, 25are the Lettre sur la Musiqiie 
Franpise and the Dictionnaire de Musique. Yet here, the rather 
condescendingly aloof tone that mixes with the genuine and demonstrable 
musical passion of the former is replaced in the latter by something of an 
apologetic tone. A good example is a purposively provocative but 
nevertheless deeply felt remark in the publication notice to the Lettre. This 
affirms quite clearly that Rousseau, in admitting his authorship to the 
polemical essay, is at the same time drawing attention to the gap both 
between himself and his intended readership, and between his readers as 
they are and as they ought to be: 
[JI'avoue que j'aurols fort mauvaise opinion d'un Peuple qui donneroit ý des Chansons 
une importance ridicule; qui feroit plus de cas de ses Musiciens que de ses Philosophes, 
et chez lequel il faudroit parler de Musique avec plus de circonspection que des plus 
graves sujets de morale. 26 
In the considerably more modest preface to the Dictionnaire, on the other 
hand, the tone goes some way beyond the boundaries of the customary 
apologia in introducing substantial autobiographical detail and even 
suggesting that the enniil'of the lexicographer's task got the better of him: 
24 On the extent to which Rousseau's insistence on naming himself as author was both 
revolutionary and troublesome in the eyes of his contemporaries (for no-one more 
powerfully than for the persistently anonymous Voltaire), as well as on the substantial 
literary-historical importance of this tendency, see Kelly (2003), esp. pp. 8-28. 
25 It should be noted however, that his plans to publish the Exanzen des deiix principes and 
the Essat sitr lorigine des latigiies, early in the 1760s, included placing his name on the title- 
page. 
21, Lettre stir la niusiqucfranýotse, OC V, p. 289. 
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Enfin, d6sesp6rant d'&tre jamais 6 port6e de mieux faire, et voulant quitter pour 
toujours des Wes dont mon esprit s'61oigne de plus en plus, je suis occup6 ... 
6 
rassembler ce que j'avois fait 2i Paris et ý Montmorenci; et, de cet amas indigeste, est 
sorti Yespke de Dictionnaire qu'onVoit iCi. 27 
More than a passage of years and a contrast In rhetorical context separates 
these two quotations. For despite the moral distance that Rousseau 
observes in the former between himself and his musically literate 
readership, there is in fact relatively little sense that the ideas - the main 
ones at least - treated in the Lettre are in any sense "eloign6es' from his 
'esprit'. It is perhaps as if, in the Dictionnalre, Rousseau, having tried to 
cross the gap in himself between the musician he is and the citizen he ought 
to be, is forced to contemplate the partial failure of the journey. 
B. A PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC 
These introductory observations are not made with the intention of 
suggesting that the various instances of ambivalence displayed by 
Rousseau ý propos the subject of music should be taken so seriously as to 
28 question the importance of his contribution to music theory. Rather, my 
deployment of them from the outset is intended to open out a discussion 
around the following question: namely, what would be the nature of the 
music-theoretical text with which Rousseau's authorial identification could 
be unequivocal? Or - perhaps better - with what kind of music-theoretical 
text could Rousseau have signed himself 'Citoyen de Geneve? Given that 
27Dictionnaire de Miisiqiic, OC V, pp. 606-7. Recalling the period of composition referred to 
here, the Confessions describes the Dictionnaire as a work'qui Wavoit pour objet qu'un 
prodLiit p6cuniaire. ' OC 1, p. 516. 
28 Especially since it is the case that similar stories can be told about pretty much every 
area of Rousseau's endeavour. 
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music was more consistently than any other topic his subject during a long 
and varied career as a writer and thinker, and given too that music 
remained his most faithful 'consolation" during the real (and imagined) 
hardships of his career, " what is it that Rousseau would have liked to say 
about this companionable diversion of which he was so'passionately fond', 
and, of course, the 'veritable empire du cceur 
130 to be found in pursuing it? 
The answer to this question, as well as some account of the possible 
reasons as to why Rousseau might have felt this desired account ultimately 
to have remained lacking from his musical writings, is what I hope the 
present thesis will be able to provide in some measure. The primary 
direction of my enquiry, then, lies M the investigation of the extent to 
which Rousseau's musical writing provides, in combination with his more 
obviously philosophical output, a coherent philosophy of music. More 
specifically, I am concerned to ask whether there is to be found in Rousseau 
a genuine moral philosophy of musical imitation where the central tenets 
of his music theory are understood to be answerable to the principles of his 
(predominantly) moral philosophy; and, further, to ask why his search for 
such an account seems, to a certain extent, to have faltered. 
Recent scholarship has established beyond debate the importance of 
Rousseau"s musical writings both in terms of his own cuuvre and the history 
of European music. " In general, too, scholarship on eighteenth-century 
music theory, for a long time the domain of specialist enquiry, has opened 
up to the questions surrounding its interaction with the philosophical and 
other discourses which it both influenced and was influenced by - the 
twentieth century returning, as it were, to the inter- disciplinary model 
21) In addition to the opening quotation from the Dialogiies, see also ConfessiOns, OC 1, p. 181: 
'll faut assur6ment que je sois n6 pour cet art, puisque j'ai commence de Faimer d&s mon 
enfance et qu'll est le seul que j'aye aim6 constarnment clans tous les tems. ' 
30'Musique', EncyclopMze, X, p. 901. 
31 See especially Duchez (1974) and (1982), Kintzler (1979), O'Dea (1995), and Wokler 
(I 987b) - 
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which informed the eighteenth- century conception of learning. " For 
example, Downing Thomas' work on Music and the Origins of Language 
provides detailed support of the claim that French eighteenth- century 
music theory, and in particular that of Rousseau's great enemy, Jean- 
Phillipe Rameau, provided much of the basis of both the structure and 
content of the period's major philosophical theories of knowledge and 
language. According to Thomas, as the secularising impetus of the 
eighteenth century sought to eradicate theological explanations from the 
area of knowledge in which they were the most deeply entrenched - that is 
to say, the "science of man" - music came to provide the 'anthropological 
"missing link" in the 
attempt to trace serniosis to its origin, to pinpoint the serniotic moment which separates 
culture from nature, and human beings from animals. Through its natural link to the 
passions (for as a natural sign, music already represents the passions), music is the 
triggering mechanism of representation itself - the origin of the origin of culture, as it 
were. My contention is that what these writers described as a proto-music forms a 
crucial stage in their history of knowledge and society. As a signifying practice which 
is nonetheless still part of the natural world, a primordial system of musical tones sets 
the stage for conventional language and the culture that exists within language. 
Because of the crucial place music occupies in the narratives used to imagine the origin 
and history of culture, it will afford insight into the eighteenth century's conception of 
and attitude toward knowledge, representation, and meaning. 33 
In the analysis of eighteenth-century epistemology that follows, Thomas" 
contention about the newly acquired philosophical value of music and its 
theory is amply bom out. And yet, if it seems certain that the idea of music 
and its origins In the "cri de la nature' unlocked for the French 
Enlightenment part of the secret identity of man, providing both 
consolation for the forfeit theological certainty of being made in God's 
32See especially Cannone (1990), Christensen (1993), Didier (1985a), Thomas (1995) and 
Verba (1993). 
33Thomas (1995), pp. 9-10. For a more general, non-musically oriented analysis of this 
intellectual paradigm-shift, see Labio (2004). 
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image and some humanist grounding for its replacement, there remains a 
question about the music itself. For, regardless of the extent to which 
eighteenth-century musical theory was responsible for opening up new 
ways of thinking about man's place and being in the increasingly secular 
world, it does not necessarily follow from this use of the idea of music that 
the theory of music thereby gains philosophical validation. To be sure, 
such a question would not have troubled the first of Thomas' main 
subjects, Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, whose work on the origin of human 
knowledge made neither descriptive nor prescriptive claims in respect of 
musical practice; but for Rousseau, Thomas' other main subject, the matter 
lay differently. For it was precisely Rousseau's purpose, in part at least, to 
write about the music, about the comparative merits and demerits of its 
compositional styles both past and present, about its beauty and about the 
vital moral significance of the music he considered thus beautiful or not. 
There is simply no possibility, in a text such as the Essai sur Vorigine des 
langues, of making a concrete separation between, on the one hand, the 
work's anthropological and epistemological orientation, and, on the other, 
its value-laden and agenda-driven music-theoretical ambitions. And if the 
work of Thomas and others, such as Robert Wokler and Michael O'Dea to 
name merely the most prominent anglophone contributors to this area of 
scholarship, has shown the extent to which Rousseau's musical thought 
may be considered an active participant in the genesis and functioning of 
his philosophical wuvre, and if too such a participation was partially 
Rousseau's concern in formulating it, there remains the fact that Rousseau's 
aim in writing philosophically about music was to provide proper 
philosophical grounding for the music theory these writings expound. 
C. THE GOOD OF MUSIC 
The text in which Rousseau's music- philosophical motivation is both most 
prominent and most positively articulated is the Lettre sur la iiiiisiqlic 
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ftanqoise. A confident semi-paraphrase from Plato's Laws near the outset 
establishes the sense that the previous armoury of the 'coin de la Reine' in 
the Querelle des Bouffons may now be dispensed with; for here, Rousseau 
seems to announce the coming of certainty, presented in an unassailable 
mixture of ironic humour and proud wisdom. Clearly, then, he is anxious 
to draw his authority more from his fame as the author of the polemical 
and widely read Premier discours than his reputation as the competent hack 
compiler of the music articles for the EncyclopMie, 34 or the composer of the 
successful and not uncontroversial Devin. 
Je voudrois [dans cette lettre] tächer d'&ablir quelques principes, sur lesquels, en 
attendant qu'on en trouve de meilleurs, ]es Maitres de l'Art, ou pHität les Philosophes 
pussent diriger leurs recherches : car, disoit autrefois un Sage, c'est au Poý; te ä faire de 
la Poiýsie, et au Musicien ä faire de la Musique; mais il Wappartient qu'au Philosophe 
de bien parler de Fune et de l'autre. 35 
The reference here is to the Platonic conception of the essentially blind 
praxis of artistic poiesis. Both in the passage referred to and elsewhere in the 
Laws, and perhaps more eloquently and forcefully in the Ion 36 and of course 
most famously in the Repliblic, Plato was concerned to demonstrate that 
artists, however great their mastery of their material, forfeit any claim to be 
competent judges in respect of the real value of their works . 37 As Socrates 
340nly the first two volumes of this had appeared by the time the Lettre was published in 
November 1753. 
35Lettre, OC V, pp. 291-2. 
36Another text with which Rousseau had recently been concerned with in the same 
connection. See the (anonymously published) Lettre ý M. Grinim of 1752, OC V, p. 274. 
37 In terms of music theory, this Platonic scheme remained partially intact up to the 
modern era through the Boethian and traditional medieval characterisation of the 1111isicils, 
a kind of geometer of sound and the niusica intindana, taking precedence over the 
practitioners of mere imisica instninientallS. Needless to say, Rousseau's main opponent in 
the fall-out of the qtierelle, Rameau, was, in his own attempts to provide a philosophical 
grounding for his music theory, much closer to the Boethian conception of the nzilsicils 
than Rousseau. The clash between them was, as we shall see, as much a clash between 
two differing world conceptions as one between defenders of contrasting musical styles. 
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puts it In the Republic, 'the imitator will neither know scientifically, nor 
entertain correct opinions with reference to the beauty or badness of the 
things which he imitates . '31 This cognitive limitation is, for Plato, entailed 
by the concept of mimesis that governed his understanding of artistic 
practice. And it was precisely such claims that constituted the theoretical 
matter under discussion in the querelle. 
The substance of the music-philosophical 'principes' established in the 
Lettre will be discussed in the following chapter. Suffice it to note, 
however, that the theory of musical imitation that Rousseau named as the 
principle of 'unite de melodie', and which the Lettre is the first text to 
introduce as such, 39 remained fixed in its essence and position as the central 
music-aesthetic tenet of all Rousseau's music theory. The philosophical 
grounding of the principle, on the other hand, was not so stable in 
Rousseau's judgement. The conception of nature, and of the relationship 
between music and language on which it and its supporting tenet of the 
priority of melody over harmony drew their authority, were to change 
radically during the course of the decade. What is particularly striking to 
note at this point, however, is that in the music-theoretical text which stood 
best to benefit from this philosophical re-thinking and thereby to provide 
See Kintzler (1979), Verba (1993) and Christensen (1993). For the limited survival of the 
Boethian/Platonic scheme into the eighteenth-century, see Christensen (2002). See also the 
article 'Musicien' in the Dictionnaire, OC V, p. 915: 'les Musiciens de nos jours, bom6s, pour 
la plOpart, ý la pratique des Notes et de quelques tours de Chant, ne seront gu6re offens6s, 
je pense, quand on ne les tiendra pour de grands Philosophes. ' Plato's discussion of 
imitation will be dealt with more fully in the following section of this chapter. 
38Plato (1879), Book X, §602b. 
3') Although elements of the principle are evident in the earlier anonymous contributions 
by Rousseau to the Qiierelle, the Lettre ý M. Grinini (OC V, pp. 261-274) and, in particular, 
the Lettre d'iin Syniplionistc de IAcad6nie Royale de Mitsique (OC V, pp. 277-285). More 
surprisingly, some elements are present in the much earlier ([1744-5]) Lettre [h M. Mal)lyj 
siir Vopfta italien etfranCais (OC V, pp. 247-257), although here, interestingly, the 
Rousseauan scheme by which Italian opera is privileged over French in terms of its acting 
on the heart (the sine qlia non feature of 'unit6 de m6lodie') is reversed, as it were, to the 
advantage of French opera. 
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authentic grounding to the principle of 'unite de melodie', the Dictionnal . re 
de musique, it is no longer the philosopher but the practicing musician who 
justly arbitrates its claim to validity. The proud 'discovery' of the principle 
in the Lettre is replaced by considerable deference to the same 'Maitres de 
Fart' previously accorded with such blindness in matters of judgement. 
Lorsque j'eus d6couvert ce principe, je voulus, avant de le proposer, en essayer 
I'application par moi-m&me; cet essai produisit le Devin du Village; apr&s le succ&s, 1'en 
parlai dans ma Lettre sur la Musique Franpise. Cest aux Maltres de Yart 6 juger si le 
principe est bon, et si j'ai bien suivi les r6gles qui en d6coulent. 40 
In the Lettre, the principle of "unite de melodie' had been presented as 
theoretically self-sufficient and its practical deployment in the latter parts 
of the text - in the context of a technical discussion of 'Enfm il est en ma 
puissance" from Lully's Armldc - had not so much the character of a 
validation of the idea so much as the 'icing on the cake', as it were. By 
strong contrast, however, the theory as it is presented in the Dictionnaire 
seems politely to request a purely empirical proof. 
There is, of course, a sense in which the more modest and less strident 
tone of the Dictionnaire simply reflects the generic difference between the 
two texts, the one a polemical essay, the other a dictionary for practical use 
and one, moreover, specifically intended for the use of French musicians. 
The financial motivations that played a greater or lesser part in bringing 
the Dictionnaire to completion would have prompted Rousseau to tone 
down elements, particularly in the Preface, that might put off his 
readership. In addition, his manoeuvres of distancing himself from the 
40 'Unit6 de m6lodie', Dictionnaire, OC V, p. 1146. It is possible to speculate, of course, that 
Rousseau's deferential tone is an ironic pretence. However, Rousseau's use of this kind of 
irony is usually more clearly sign-posted. Also, the fact that Rousseau indicates that his 
first employment of his'discovery' was in a compositional rather than theoretical context 
suggests that he is being sincere in claiming the measure to be a music-aesthetic rather 
than philosophical one. 
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argument of the Lettre 41 may well have been owing to the recognition that, 
at least in so far as its technical discussions were concerned, Rameau's 
point-for-point response to the analysis of the Armide monologue, 
published in 1754, had got the better of him: 'Si les grands principes 
echappent ý Mr. Rameau', Rousseau noted at the time, 'javoue qu'il releve 
attentivement et habilement les petites fautes, et j'aurai soin de profiter de 
ses corrections. 142 
Notwithstanding all this, however, it must be recognised that the 
Dictionnaire - which was intended to be a work that would combine'la 
commodit6 d"un Dictionnaire' with 'Favantage d'un Traite 143 - provides 
evidence of very few attempts to excise the polemical aspects of its author's 
thought. Moreover, and as Rousseau must have been well aware, it was 
precisely his philosophical rather than music-theoretical competence that 
constituted his primary means of waging war on the celebrated author of 
the TraW de 1'harmonie. 44 The Lettre, despite winning Rousseau numerous 
enemies, none more bitter than Rameau, as well as getting him barred from 
attending performances at the Opýra "45nevertheless gave him a popular 
cause and a well-defined comer to fight from. Yet the numerous attempts 
at providing a response to Rameau's attacks on both the Lettre and the 
EncyclopMie articles that had reached the public ultimately never reached 
the printers. Interestingly, too, in the one text dating from this period that 
was both considered by Rousseau to be fit for publication (although several 
4]Which text, it may be noted, is tacitly referred to in the preface to the DictiOnnaire by the 
phrase 'Si quelquefois j'ai plaisant6'. See OC V, p. 610. 
12From a fragment connected to the Examen de deiix principes, OC V, p. 370. Although 
Rousseau's discussion of 'Enfin il est en ma puissance' is competent, Rameau's is, in my 
judgement at least, considerably more accurate and apposite. See Rameau, 'Observations 
sur notre instinct pour la musique et sur son principe' (1754), CTW, pp. 300-329. 
Amusingly, too, Rameau makes a neat play on the phrase'enfin il est en ma puissance' 
suggesting that, now Rousseau has committed himself at last to some real detail, he, 
Rameau, has Rousseau exactly where he wants him. 
11 Dictionnalre, OC V, p. 608. 
44C. f. Verba (1993), pp. 9-12. 
45 See ConfesslOns, OC 1, p. 384-6. 
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years later) and was explicitly focused on replying to Rameau, the Exanzen 
de deux principes avancýs par M. Rameau, pretty much all the philosophical 
argumentation that was present in earlier drafts of the response was 
excised. 46 It was as if, for some reason, Rousseau felt a nagging suspicion 
that the moral and anthropological 'systeme' that these years had seen him 
developing - and which, as Wokler's work shows very clearly, received 
much of its theoretical impetus from the perceived need to provide 
coherent philosophical backing to the ideas presented in the Lettre 47 - was 
ultimately not up to the music-theoretical part of its job. 
Instead, we find Rousseau appealing to the future publication of the 
Dictionnaire as the work which would provide Rameau and the rest of the 
doubting public with the confirmation that they needed. 48 Certainly, in any 
case, it is clear that Rousseau's concern with music during these years 
shifted away from the polemical environment of the Lettre and towards its 
role in the moral and social philosophical systeM49 which, during these 
years, and in particular following his retreat from Parisian society in 1755, 
came to form his primary preoccupation. As Jean-Jacques Eigeldinger 
writes, in his introduction to the Pleiade edition of the Dictionnaire, 
Manifestement Rousseau se d6sint6resse de la pol6mique qui ne cesse de s'envenimer 
entre Rameau et les 6diteurs de VEncylopMie... Nul indice ne donne ý penser qu'il ait 
46The full draft reponse bore the title'Principe de la M61odie ou R6ponse aux Erreurs sur la 
Musique [de M. Rameau]'. 
47See Wokler (1987b), esp. pp. 286ff. See also Duchez (1974). 
48Even if, at this early point, Rousseau envisaged that the Dictionnaire would be published 
as early as 1756 (See the letter to his publisher in Amsterdam, M. -M. Rey on January 1755, 
CC, 111, p. 86). The text was not, of course, published until over a decade later in 
November 1767. 
49Rousseau is clear that he considered the philosophical works of the 1750s and early 
1760s, that is to say from the Preniier discoiirs (published 1750) to Enzile and the Contrat 
Social (published 1762), to form a coherent 'syst&me' unified by 'un grand principe'. See 
Dialogiie TroisiMie, OC 1, pp. 934ff. The principle in question was that'la nature a fait 
I'homme heureux et bon mais ... ]a soci6t6 
le deprave et le rend miserable' (p. 934). 
Rousseau's assessment that his work was unified around this notion has been defended at 
length in Melzer (1990). 
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pris ]a peine d'6tudier la Suite des Erreurs (privil&ge du 3 mars 1756), o6 est attaqu6 son 
article <, Enharmonique),. Cest qu'il s'adonne ý la composition d'oeuvres majeures oij 
s'affirme NnA6 de sa pens6e. 50 
The precise reasons, then, for Rousseau"s withdrawal from the 
philosophical ambitions of the Lettre are likely to relate to his more general 
withdrawal from society as a whole. And despite the problematic 
occasional ambivalence about the subject of music, during the years 
leading up to and succeeding the publication of the Dictionnalre, Rousseau, 
as we have seen, renounced neither his deep and sustained passionate 
interest in the subject of music, nor his efforts to explain and justify this in 
terms of some coherent philosophical account of music. For, as he makes 
clear in the preface to the Dictionnaire, his self-avowed failure to produce 
such an account was due solely to the contingencies of his own abilities and 
interests . 51 The question remains, therefore, as to what 
kind of a 
philosophy of music would have been adequate, in Rousseau"s 
judgement, 51 to the task of grounding a genuine musical interest in a 
morally oriented analysis of the human world. 
50jean-jacques Eigeldinger in OC V, p. cclxxvi. Eigeldinger also cites an amusing remark 
of Rousseau's, recorded on the sketches for the Preface of the Dictionnalre, to the effect that 
'j'aimerois mieux cent fois jetter ce dictionnaire au feu que de refire de ma vie une seule 
page de cet auteur avec Fobligation de la comprendre. ' 
51 See OC V, p. 605: 's'il [le Dictionnairel est mauvais, ce West ni par choix de sujet, ni par la 
forme de Youvrage. ' 
52And we must not ignore the contingency that Rousseau's judgement in this respect may 
have been incorrect, and certainly, the question I am asking here does not present a 
problem for every commentator. In the main, however, there is something of a consensus 
surrounding Catherine Kintzler's judgement to the effect that, ']a pens6e musicale et 
esth6tique de Rousseau Wexiste pas, ý vrai dire, sous une forme isol6e: elle est une pi&ce, 
un 616ment de sa philosophie, en relation avec une th6orie du droit, une th6orie de 
1'6motion, une th6orie du langage, avec une conception de Yhomme et du monde. ' 
Kintzler (1988), pp. 129-130. As to whether this diffusion of the'pens6e musicale' yields 
something that can accurately be described as a philosophy of music, as opposed to a 
philosophy that operates with the advantage of musically-literate discussion, remains to 
be seen. 
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11 
ARTISTIC IMITATION AND MORAL PRESENCE 
1111 importe d'observer qu'll entre du moral dans tout ce qui tient ý Firnitation : ainsi 
Yon explique des beaut6s qui paroissent physiques et qui ne le sont r6element point. 53 
A. THE IMITATION OF PRESENCE 
Rousseau's philosophy of music, if one is to be found, must centre 
primarily around his theory of musical imitation. 54 The concept of 
imitation provided him with a strongly normative precept according to 
which the effect of music on its audience could be explained and the music 
itself valued. It is clear, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, 
that, for Rousseau, music should be imitative in order to be true to itself: all 
music which failed to display this character, 'toute Musique qui West 
qu'Harmonieuse' as he writes in the article on'Musique' in the Dictionnairc, 
'ne porte point ses impressions jusqu'au cceur, et ne peut donner que des 
sensations plus ou moins agr6ables. '15 Properly imitative music, on the 
other hand, 
53Einile, OC IV, p. 672. After the word 'imitation', Rousseau inserts a footnote which 
reads: 'Cela est prouv6 dans un essai sur le principe de n0odle qu'on trouvera dans le 
recueil de mes 6crits. ' 
54Despite the fact that details of this theory participated in the later music-historical 
process by which the concept of imitation was eventually denied relevance to music and 
excised from the music aesthetics of the nineteenth century. For the most extensive 
analysis of the shift from imitation to expression, see Neubauer (1983). It is important to 
remember however, somewhat against Neubauer's reading, that Rousseau's theory, for all 
its strong prefiguring of expressivist accounts of music, remains firmly centred around an 
eighteenth-century concept of imitation Ný,, hich he in no sense could be said to have 
attempted to abandon. 
51 The opposition between the'merely' pleasing and the'morally' significant, so important 
in Rousseau, has origins in both Plato and Descartes and is employed by a great many 
eighteenth-century writers on music and issues of taste in general (notably by Rameau 
who uses it against Rousseau). Most famously, of course, it was to re-emerge at the end of 
the century as one of the distinctions fundamental to Kant's analysis of the judgement of 
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par des inflexions vives accentu6es, et, pour ainsi dire, parlantes, exprime toutes les 
passions, peint tous les tableaux, rend tous les objets, sournet la nature enti6re ý ses 
Savantes imitations, et porte ainsi jusqu'au cceur de Yhomme des sentimens propres 
1'6mouvoir. 56 
The value of this aspect of Rousseau's theory, so prominent in all the 
passages that deal with imitation in music and art, lies not so much in the 
originality of the connection established between the object of imitation 
and the 'cceur de Fhomme', although there is no doubt that his treatment of 
this connection goes some significant distance beyond that presented by 
d'Alembert in his Discours prMminaire to the EncyclopMie. 57 Rather, the 
main significance of Rousseau's treatment of the subject lies in the extent to 
which the 'sentimens propres ý Femouvoir [le cceur de Fhomme]' are the 
same emotions that provide man with his proper identity and with the 
basis for the moral duty entailed in his being human. 
The conclusion of Thomas' commentary on Rousseau touches on what I 
consider to be the essence of this feature: 
If Rousseau is interested in music as discourse, it is not primarily because that 
discourse represents something; rather, it is because music leads the listener to a self- 
consciousness that is defined as the awareness of the presence of another being. 58 
taste. But here, equally famously, all music lies on the side of the'merely' pleasing. For a 
discussion of the difference between Rousseau and Kant on music in this and other 
respects, see Hobson (1980). 
56 'Musique', Dictionnaire, OC V, p. 918. 
57Rousseau's understanding of the subject is heavily indebted to d'Alembert's treatment of 
it in the Discotirs. See Rousseau's letter to d'Alembert of 26 June, 1751: 'Pour ce qui 
concerne ma partie, je trouve votre id6e sur limitation musicale trýs juste et trbs neuve. 
En effet, et ý un tr&s petit nombre de choses pr&s, Yart du musicien ne consiste point ý 
peindre imm6diatement les objets, mais ý mettre Yime dans une disposition semblable 
celle o6 la mettrait leur pr6sence. ' CC 11, p. 160. This is the first mention in Rousseau's 
writing of the term imitation in the context of artistic niiniests. In the EncyclopMie, 
Rousseau's article on 'Imitation' concerns only the practice of contrapuntal imitation; the 
article on imitation as iiwiicýýis was written by Jaucourt. 
'ý, ', 'Thomas (1995), p. 142. 
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The stress laid by Rousseau on understanding music in terms of some kind 
of representational structure is not, in other words, directed towards a 
theory of imitation that would explain musical significance in terms of the 
representation of the external world. Rather, music's imitative power is 
rooted in its opening of an awareness of the presence of another human 
being. Or, as Rousseau puts it in the Essal sur Vorigine des langues, 
strengthening the connection between the cry of nature - in which 
Rousseau locates the origin both of aesthetic and moral awareness, and 
knowledge of the world - and imitative music: 
[S]It6t que des signes vocaux frapent v6tre oreille, ils vous annoncent un kre semblable 
ý vous, ils sont, pour ainsi dire, les organes de Yame, et s'ils vous peignenent aussi la 
solitude ils vous disent que vous n'y kes pas seul. Les oiseaux sifflent, Yhornme seul 
chante, et Fon ne peut entendre ni chant ni simphome sans se dire ý l'instant; un autre 
kre sensible est ici. 59 
It is this capacity to act as a sign of human presence that provides 
Rousseau with the yardstick by which he seeks to measure contemporary 
musical practice. It is this faculty, in other words, of awakening the 
/unnatural instinct"O of being human that separates genuinely imitative 
musical activity from the twittering of birds. As will be shown more 
comprehensively in further chapters, this model by which contemporary 
musical practice is judged according to its perceived proximity to an origin 
- which, besides unlocking both song and speech in man, simultaneously 
59 Essin, OC V, p. 421. 
60 In the analysis of human pre-history developed in the Discoiirs sitr VznýgalW, it is shown 
that the instinct of 'perfectibilit6' distinguishes man from the animals in prompting man 
always to exceed the boundaries implicit in natural and, later, social consciousness. It is in 
this sense that 'perfectibilit6', in being both natural to man and contrary to the state of 
nature, provides a model for man as'naturally unnatural', as it were. Rousseau's 
seemingly oxymoronic characterisation of the origin of man in inequality, and the 
relationship of this to his concept of pity, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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brings into being the dynamic relationship with other "semblables' that 
allows for the mixed blessings of moral awareness, society and knowledge 
- rests on a concept of man as locked in a double movement both away 
from and towards his natural state. For the origin, in as much as it brings 
humanity into a state of being marked by alienation from a nature which, 
at the same time, continues to provide man with his concept of the good, is 
both a closing and an opening of the world and its contents. That is to say, 
it closes off from man the possibility of a reconciliation with the state of 
nature which nevertheless continues to provide for hhrn his feeling of 
goodness; and, conversely, it opens human consciousness to the knowledge 
of the good in itself as lying beyond its reach. 
In this way, the good of music which Rousseau attempted in eamest to 
locate in finding a way to 'speak well of music' owes as much to what 
music can never accomplish - namely, redemption - as to what it is 
understood by Rousseau to provide in reacquainting man with himself and 
his image of the naturally good. The privileged link with the origin - 
which imitative music was shown to display in greater degree than either 
the questionable significance of 'musique naturelle', or, alternatively, a 
discourse whose reference showed greater 'risk" of determinacy - did not 
thereby endow it, for Rousseau, with a genuine redemptive potential. It 
did not do so for the reason that music was understood to owe its very 
existence to a journey that was unrepeatable, the journey made when the 
first call to be loved6l was properly answered: 'la nature humaine ne 
retrograde pas et jamais on ne remonte vers les tems dinnocence et 
d"egalite quand une fois on sen est eloigne I. 
62 
61 The characterisation of song and speech as originating in genuine love for others is one 
of the central tenets of the Essai. 
62Dialogue Troisiýme, OC 1, p. 935. 
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B. THE IMITATION OF NATURE AND THE IDEA OF PITY 
The concept of imitation in Rousseau partly owes its complexity to the 
ambiguity surrounding the usage of the term in eighteenth-century theory. 
As Edward Nye rather refreshingly points out, part of the reason for 
twentieth-century scholarship's ostensibly fragile grip on the idea owes as 
much to eighteenth-century confusion as it does to the absence, or rather 
concealment, of the notion in contemporary aesthetic theory and 
approaches to artistic production and consumption: 'Enormous intellectual 
energy is spent by [eighteenth-century writers] on the subject of imitation, 
because they find that it stubbornly resists the best attempts to define what 
it iS. '63 And if the notion was somewhat blurred in relation to the literary 
and visual arts, in the then relatively recent treatment of music as one of 
the mimetic arts the problem was doubly problematic. For even if in 
painting and poetry the various concepts of 'la belle nature' that 
constituted the proper object of imitation were in flux, then at least the 
principle of physical resemblance was still intelligible. In music, on the 
other hand, the luxury of such a convenient resting principle was withheld. 
As Belinda Cannone writes, "[s]i Yon considerait que la Musique a pour 
seul but de representer les objets sonores, la theorie de I"imitation en serait 
'64 fort simplifiee. And despite the fact that a good deal of eighteenth 
century French literature deals with precisely this kind of representation, 
the majority does not. Following the model of imitation more or less 
inaugurated by d'Alembert (and developed most extensively by Rousseau), 
the second half of the century saw something of a consensus surrounding 
the idea that, if the theory of musical imitation were to make any sense, it 
63 Nye (2000), p. 2. See also R6my Saisselin who states that imitation is one of the'abstract 
words of an ambiguous nature which could mean one thing to the painter and poet, 
another thing to the public, and still something else to the philosopher. ' Saisselin (1965), p. 
97. 
64Cannone (1990), p. 80. 
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would require a theory of the passions with which it could go hand in 
hand. 65 
According to this model, therefore, to the extent to which the object of 
imitation effectively disappears from view, 66 the theory of musical imitation 
thus began to resemble a theory of signification; a theory, that is to say, 
designed to account for the relation between perceptible correlations 
67 between sounds, physical objects and ideas. For this reason, just as much 
as music came to be linked with the passions so too did the basis of the 
analogy between music and language thereby become strengthened. 'La 
musique est une langue', Grimm was able to write in his EncyclopMle article 
on the "Poeme lyrique': "Imaginez un peuple d'inspires et denthousiastes 
dont la tete serait toujours exaltee, dont Fame serait toujours dans Fivresse 
et dans 1extase ... un tel peuple chanterait au lieu 
de parler. 168 
While this sentiment is obviously one that Rousseau would have been 
able to identify with, it is important to recognise that Rousseau's 
conception of music as an imitative 'langage des passions" differed in 
important respects from many of the other contemporary formulations of 
the idea. The reasons for these differences are numerous. Firstly, unlike 
both the Cartesian and the contrasting materialist conception of the 
passions, Rousseau's theory of emotion does not draw on a gamut-style 
arrangement in which each passion, with which man is naturally endowed, 
is understood as a stable entity with fixed and determinable relations with 
behaviour. Rather, the (very modern) understanding that emerges from 
Rousseau's writings is one in which emotions are dynamic and historically 
65Despite the ongoing debate in analytic philosophy about exactly what emotions are and 
whether they have the same affective content as passions, I will work on the assumption 
that'passions' is simply the old word for'emotions'. I do not wish to commit myself to 
any particular philosophical view about the relation between the two terms. 
66 It becomes 'Imitation without resemblance'in the phrase of Jeremiah Alberg. See Alberg 
(2004). 
67Sylvain Auroux writes of the ternary conception which characterised the French 
eighteen th-cen tu ry conception of the sign. See Auroux (1979), esp. pp. 41ff. 
wS Grimm, Toýme Lyrique', EncyclopMie XII, p. 824a. 
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contingent entities figured by the connections between desire and 
imagination. The'passions morales' with which Rousseau is concerned, 
and which are said to provide music and vocal language with both their 
origin and destiny, centre around the emotion of pity; that is to say, they 
owe their dynamism to an intrinsically reflexive structure whose 'essence' 
is defined precisely by its lack of anything essential. For the idea of pity 
consists, at bottom, simply in being able to imagine the feeling of others. 69 
One needs to refer to one's own feelings before this structure becomes 
intelligible; but as Rousseau"s contribution to this area of thought displays 
most clearly, almost painfully so at times, the ability to refer to one's own 
feelings as objects of thought - or the ability to represent them to oneself, to 
adopt a more Kantian expression of the idea - required access to a sphere 
of otherness that only the workings of the imagination could provide. As 
with all Rousseauan origins, the origin of human emotion in pity 
constitutes a kind of chicken-and-egg paradox. We must shelve for the 
time-being our analysis of this central feature of Rousseau's thought about 
the nature of man. 70 It is important to recognise for now, however, that the 
fact that Rousseau's theory of emotion as a whole centres around a 
structure which is defined by its orientation towards the other is both 
remarkable in itself, and is also what to a large extent enables the analysis 
of musical imitation in terms of the presence of others. 
A second reason for the distinctiveness of Rousseau's conception of the 
'langage des passions' lies with the degree of refinement of his 
understanding of the idea of the sign which he takes, with various 
important revisions, more or less straight from Condillac's firmly sign- 
centred account of human consciousness and knowledge. For while it was 
obviously central to his theory to relate music to language, or rather to its 
69See for example the analysis of pity in the Essai, OC V, pp. 395-6. The apparent disparity 
between Rousseau's understanding of pity in the second Discours and in the Essal will be 
examined further in Chapter 3. 
70 The concept of pity in Rousseau xvill be one of the main subjects of Chapter 3 below. 
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origin in the vocal sign of moral passion, music for Rousseau never became 
a pure sign; or, that is to say, music, although its raison d-Wre consisted in its 
providing connections betweencauses' and "effets moraux' '71 never 
becomes immaterial. The musical signifier, to adopt the more modem but 
nevertheless appropriate terminology of serniology, never became subject 
to the purely transparent status which the French eighteenth-century 
deemed proper to the idea and destiny of verbal signification. 72 When he 
writes, in the Essai that 'sensations... nous affectent point seulenient comme 
sensation mais comme signes ou images, et que leurs effets moraux ont 
aussides causes morales', 73 his point was that the sign whose object is 
human passion may be considered neither purely in terms of sensation, nor 
purely in terms of symbolic convention. Instead, as we shall see in more 
detail in the following chapters, the 'moral'74 causal structure exemplified 
by musical imitation - in so far as Rousseau was concerned at any rate - is 
defined by being rooted neither purely in convention nor purely in nature. 
Stuck, as it were, between Condillac"s'signe naturel' and 'signe de 
convention', the essential indeterminacy of the musical sign lay for 
Rousseau in its being an imitation of precisely the same indeterminacy 
characteristic of moral passion. 
To summarise, musical significance, for Rousseau, is no more to be 
reduced to purely natural terms than is emotion when conceived in terms 
of the awareness of others. Instead, cause, effect and material are all 
irreducibly cultural-historical in origin. This central tenet of Rousseau's 
musical and moral thought accounts for its often troublesome complexity, 
as it does also for its equally often astonishing modernity. The ideas of 
immediacy of communication and transparency of understanding that 
71 See Essai, OC V, p. 412. 
72 Certainly, this was Condillac's understanding of where language was aiming: 'If we 
were to substitute the ideas in place of the words, we would soon find that we differed 
only in the waý 7 x, ý, e expressed ourselves! Condillac (2001), p. 172. 
73 OC V, p. 412 (mý 
7 emphasis). 
74Rousseau's use of the term 'moral' will be discussed in the following section. 
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Rousseau is so often credited with placing at the centre of his evaluation of 
artistic and social practice, while they play an important role his thought, 
should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that his conception of the moral 
and aesthetic good entails a relational structure which cannot be construed 
m the terms of immediacy. 
C. THE PROBLEM OF IMITATING PRESENCE 
It is in this connection that a severe difficulty arises for Rousseau's account, 
right at the heart, as it were, of his theory. The problem may be expressed 
as follows. The authority conferred upon the cry of nature (in respect of its 
being considered the proper object of musical imitation) follows from the 
simple fact of its being a natural rather than conventional sign of human 
passion. Its utterance is understood by Rousseau, following Condillac's 
analySiS, 7 1 not to be marked by an act of will: the form of the cry is not 
chosen, but rather its adequacy to its object is given by a natural connection 
between it and the passion that causes it to arise. In the same way, the 
response it elicits in its hearer is similarly immediate and unchosen; there is 
no space, or rather time - since we are speaking of a form of consciousness 
or at least sentience - in the model for the possibility of misinterpretation. 
This natural model, then, provides the means by which the 'langage des 
passions' is typically understood. 
A problem for Rousseau emerges, however, when we consider the fact 
that the cry may only be understood as the origin of human institutions to 
the extent that it ceases to be purely a natural cry; to the extent, that is to 
say, that it comes to participate in an awareness of otherness which the 
paradigmatic solipsism of the state of nature precludes. The 'cri de la 
nature', in other words, in which Rousseau attempts to locate the joint 
75See Condillac (1947), esp. pp. 19ff. 
Writing Between Nlu,, ic and Philosophy -39- Artistic Imitation and Moral Presence 
origin of speech and song, does not of itself permit of reduction to purely 
natural causes. For the moral desire (as opposed to purely physical need), 
to which the cry is supposed to give expression in Rousseau"s account, is 
not given to man in the state of nature any more than is the mechanism by 
which it elicits the necessary use of imagination and the effort, central to la 
pitiý, to 's'identifier " 76 'avec Yetre souffrant: 77as Rousseau reflects, 'Celui 
qui na jamais reflechi ne peut etre ni clement ni juste ni pitoyable. " 78 
Toutes les Connoissances qui demandent de la r6flexion ... semblent kre tout-ý-fait 
hors de la port6e de Yhomme Sauvage, faute de communication avec ses semblables, 
Cest-ý-dire, faute de Yinstrument qui sert ý cette communication, et des besoins qui la 
renclent n6cessaire. 79 
In this way Rousseau's origin of music and language - in precisely the 
same way as the origin of pity discussed just nOW80 - requires to be 
considered as always already human; and hence as something marked by 
the possibility of imagination, interpretation, misinterpretation, deceit and 
by the qualities of being good and bad. And in as much as this 
requirement opens up the full richness of Rousseau's account of musical 
imitation and the evaluative measure found in the idea of proximity to the 
origin, so too does the 'cri de la nature' lose its natural status and therefore 
the claim to authenticity that such a status would confer upon it. 
This problem lies clearly on the surface of Rousseau's attempt to anchor 
his music-aesthetic prescriptions to his analysis of the unnatural nature of 
7t, Rousseau does in fact employ this term in this way in his analysis of the state of nature, 
but there the reflexivity is so immediate or'Infiniment plus 6troite' that it precludes 
awareness of Tanimal souffrant' as other. See the Deiixiýnze Discoiirs, OC 111, p. 155. This 
difference relates to the important relationship, which will be discussed at length in 
Chapter 3, between the natural instinct for species or same-preservation and human pity. 
77Essai, OC V, p. 395. 
7, s Essai, OC V, p. 395. 
79Discoiirs siir VinýgalW, Note VI, OC 111, p. 199. 
80 For they are, it should be clear, one and the same origin. 
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man. As we shall see in the following chapter, the argument in the Lettre 
makes a somewhat disingenuous supporting reference to music's natural 
status. And later, when his understanding of the complex relationship 
between the nature of man and the nature of nature, as it were, this 
problematic buttress is still deployed with a similar, if more sophisticated, 
confidence. The final comments on the degeneration of music in the Essai 
concludes as follows: 
Voila comment le chant devint par degr6s un art enti6rement s6par6 de la parole dont il 
tire son origine, comment les harmoniques des sons firent oublier les infl6xions de la 
voix, et comment enfin, born6e ý Yeffet purement phisique du concours des vibrations, 
la musique se trouva priv6e des effets moraux qu'elle avoit produits quand elle 6toit 
doublement la voix de la nature. 81 
The 'doublement' emphasised in the last sentence ostensibly refers to the 
double origin that both music and language share in the 'voix de la nature, 
and in this sense the conception of nature employed to condemn modem 
practice runs into the problem we are concerned with here. However, the 
term allows for a more subtle interpretation. As Jeremiah Alberg puts it, 
"by "doublement" Rousseau means that the cry of nature was first the voice 
of human nature, and when humans imitated the accents of that cry, they 
had, in a sense, doubled it. "" This reading in some sense avoids the 
problem, since the suggestion is that Rousseau is speaking only of human 
nature. 'Doublement' would therefore refer to the doubling of imitation. 
To my mind, however, the interpretation is somewhat forced . 83 If the 
deployment of the idea of nature admits of some ambiguity, which it 
assuredly does, then it is only this ambiguity which relieves Rousseau of 
the responsibility to distinguish clearly between the two conceptions of 
81 Essai, OC V, p. 427 (my emphasis). 
82A]berg (2004). 
83Partly in following closely Derrida's troublesome analysis of the term. See Derrida 
(1976). 
,, 
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nature. Failing any such clarity, the problematic moral authority of the 
origin remains troublingly present throughout. 
The problem of nature lies at the heart of the present thesis. In 
contradistinction to Condillac (and indeed most others contemplating the 
subject in the eighteenth century)84 whose conception of the state of nature 
is one of an imperfection that required the progress of human history to 
perfect it, for Rousseau the state of nature is already the measure of 
perfection. The problem for Rousseau, in other words, was not that which 
in nature required human agency and understanding to perfect it, but how 
the natural equilibrium ever came to be sufficiently disrupted in order to 
give birth to the lack of which human consciousness and history is so 
coherent an expression. For the only thing which nature lacked, as far as 
Rousseau was concerned, was the sense of otherness on which the being 
and institutions of man are contingent. The only lack of nature, in other 
words, was inequality, or the sense of lacking itself. 
Our problem may therefore be expressed as follows. In what way is it 
possible to understand the origin as the measure of both moral and 
aesthetic good when the origin is consistently analysed by Rousseau to 
arise from a state of affairs in which neither moral nor aesthetic goodness 
existed? The key to understanding Rousseau's partial attempt, and partial 
failure, to come to terms with the problem lies, in my view, with the 
realisation that the state of nature never ceased to provide Rousseau with 
his model of goodness in itself. If there is no actual awareness of goodness 
in the state of nature, such goodness nonetheless still remains the law 
according to which the state of nature retains its balance and equilibrium: it 
is good, in other words, because it works perfectly. Despite the fact that 
this happy state is precisely what is forfeit in the original moment, the 
origin still provides a structure in which properly human consciousness is 
most closely related to nature. In the original moment, that is to say, the 
84Condorcet's Esquisst, d'un TaWeau Historique des Progres de VEsprit Huniain being a 
prominent example. 
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instinctive sense of the good of oneself and one's community still operates 
with sufficient force to limit the damage caused by man's awareness, 
central to human nature, of his alienation from his community and his 
sense of the common good. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The complexities of the idea of imitation, then, are only compounded by 
the broad scope of issues brought to bear upon it by Rousseau. For if the 
understanding of and value attributed to Nature as the ultimate object of 
artistic imitation was subject to constant shifting throughout the century, in 
Rousseau, for whom the valorisation of the idea of Nature reaches an 
extreme point, this initial complexity is exacerbated. Similarly, if the idea 
of representing the passions had always been problematic, how much 
worse do these problems become in Rousseau where the passions are 
themselves understood in terms of representation. 
One of the most intractable problems arises when one asks what is 
meant by 'presence. What is it, after all, for others to be present to us, and 
how can something like the psychological and moral proximity implied by 
the idea be used to ground something like imitation in which what seems 
to be present is, after all, a signifier rather than a signified? " Imitation 
exists, to put the matter simply, to compensate for the absence of the object 
it seeks to imitate. Furthermore, if what the object of imitation brings into 
presence is to be considered in terms of its otherness, one must confront the 
difficult problem implied by the fact that such otherness demands 
primarily to be characterised in terms of being present only through its 
currently being absent. 
The problematics of the idea of presence in Rousseau have been 
examined most famously by Jacques Derrida in his 1967 text De la 
S5 Especially when, as Derrida observes, '[alccording to a general rule ... attention to the 
signifier has the paradoxical effect of reducing it. ' Derrjda (1976), p. 208. 
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grammatologle. Here, Derrida ultimately finds Rousseau to be at fault in 
placing the idea of human presence at the core of his theory of language 
and art. Such a reliance on the idea of presence is problematic for Derrida 
because, according to the scheme of negative difference which Rousseau 
himself places at the heart of all communication, there are no relata that 
may be coherently characterised in terms of presence. Whether Derrida 
and Rousseau may be understood to refer to precisely the same 
phenomenon when each speaks of presence - each pursuing their 
particular agenda '86 it must also be recognised - will be exam Mied in 
Chapter 3. However, it is important to reflect upon the fact that the end 
term, as it were, of Rousseau's philosophical and musical thought is far 
from being unproblematic, and a proper understanding of Derrida's critical 
examination of it will be indispensable in the process of arriving at an 
understanding whether or not the notion can be expected to do the work 
allotted it in Rousseau's often extravagant version of events. 
86 In Derrida's case: 'to make enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words 
"proximity", "immediacy", "presence" ... is my 
final aim in the book. ' Derrida (1976), p. 
70. 
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III 
IMITATING THE GOOD AND THE TRUE: 
THE INFLUENCE OF PLATO ON ROUSSEAU'S 
THEORY OF IMITATION 
Vitam impendere vero. 87 
A. THE PROBLEM OF IMITATION IN PLATO 
One further reason for the manifold complexities of Rousseau's concept of 
imitation, which becomes relevant when we move to consider his 
understanding of truth, stems from the fact that Rousseau's thought on the 
subject owed more to Plato than to the eighteenth century's traditional 
source of wisdom on the subject, namely Aristotle. The centrality of Plato's 
political thought to Rousseau's own seems to be generally accepted, in 
outline if not in precise detail, " as is the notion that Rousseau's use of Plato 
was itself a determining factor in bringing the unfashionable ancient 
philosopher's political thought back into circulation. As Ernest Barker 
concluded, JI]t is with Rousseau that Plato's political theory begins to 
exercise that steady influence on thought which it has exercised ever 
since. '19 It is clear, too, both from the numerous references in the Prenlier 
Discolirs, as well as from some of the arguments against the theatre in the 
Lcttre ý d'Aleiiibert, that Plato"s moral-political considerations about art were 
an important source of information and authority for Rousseau. 91 
87juvenal Satires IV, v. 91, rendered in personal form by Rousseau as'Sainte et pure v6rit6 
6 qui j'ai consacr6 ma vie', Lettre ý d'Alcii&ert, OC V, p. 120. 
`ýs See the discussion in Silverthorne (1973), pp. 235-7. 
19 Barker (1951), p. 388. Cited by Silverthorne (1973), p. 235. 
90 A sense of the importance Rousseau attributed to this area of Plato's thought may also 
be gained from considering the care with which he assembled his selective paraphrase and 
translation of Plato in'De Yin-iftation th6trale'. See OC V, Appendix 1, pp. 1195-1211. 
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Perhaps the single most decisive influence which Plato's thought on this 
subject exercised on Rousseau was Plato's refusal to deal with the concept 
of imitation in artistic practice in isolation from its moral, political and 
more general metaphysical ramifications. Although Plato does deploy 
what later became the traditional moralist objection to the arts - namely, 
that art's primary appeal to the emotive rather than the purely intellectual 
faculties constitutes a potential ethical problem" - both this and the various 
other objections raised in respect of (specifically) ]'Imitative poetry draw 
upon a metaphysical argument. As is well known, this takes the form of 
the claim that artistic imitation, in being an imitation of something that is 
already itself an imitation - that is to say, the objects we encounter in the 
world are themselves mere imitations of their Forms - is therefore at two 
removes from the truth. And whereas the objects produced by the humble 
craftsman enjoy (although not unproblematically) the status of imitating 
something the essence of which is intelligible, or can be known in itself, 
those produced by the imitative artist imitate nothing essential. Rather, 
they are concerned exclusively with the appearance of such objects. In 
Rousseau"s summary, Plato has it of the painter that: 
Non-seulement il n'imite dans ses tableaux que les images des choses; sýavoir, les 
productions sensibles de la nature, et les ouvrages des Artistes; il ne cherche pas mýme 
ý rendre exactement la v6rit6 de l'objet, mais I'apparence : il le peint tel qu'il paroit kre, 
et non pas tel qu'il est. 91 
91 C. f. Schaper (1968), esp. pp. 37-38. 
92 'De Vimitation th65trale', OC V, p. 1197. Summary of Republic X, §597. Note that this 
passage is a summary which amplifies the claim, albeit faithfully, and not a 
direct 
quotation. In thus further highlighting Plato's argument about art's imitative relation to 
mere appearance, it seems likely that Rousseau was pursuing his own agenda about the 
confusion of paraitre and Hre. While this Rousseauan scheme obviously 
has Platonic roots, 
there is a deep problem concerning the extent to which Plato's conception of something 
essence, namelv its Form, and Rousseau's are compatible. The relevant aspect of this 
problem, as it occurs in relation to the theory of imitation, will 
be discussed shortly. 
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The problem, then, for Plato, lies in the fact that there is no intelligible 
principle according to which artistic imitation may be judged good or bad 
independently of the success - marked by sensuous pleasure - it enjoys 
among its audience. The principle of imitation, in other words, is not 
subject to scientific knowledge: there is no Form of imitation, since the 
guiding principle for its practice lies not in knowledge per se but in a 
mixture of blind practice and unreflective (so far as Plato was concerned) 
evaluation of that which was considered worthy of imitation. 
Concealed within this epistemological criticism of mimesis is also a 
criticism of contemporary morality. For to act without understanding the 
nature of one's action is not to act well, according to Plato. That is to say, if 
the basis of one's action - regardless of whether its ends are judged good or 
bad - lies in one's imitating a model about which one has no independent 
judgement, one's action is in consequence not virtuous because no actual 
knowledge of virtue enters the decision to act. Of course, this 
understanding of imitation as the basis for human action was not 
something Plato could subject to criticism in toto; it played too essential a 
part in the educational methods that both he and Athenian society in 
general espoused. 93Where such a model may be admitted, however, was 
limited to cases when the exemplar being imitated was himself of such a 
nature to understand in what the virtue of his actions consisted; an obvious 
example of the admissible case, then, being the education of children. 
Plato's strong objection against poetry - and specifically imitative (or 
dramatic) poetry - requires thus to be understood against the background 
of the common understanding, prevalent in Plato's Athens (no less than in 
Rousseau's Paris), that the content of poetry was valuable in so far as it 
displayed exemplary characters with which its audience could seek to 
identify themselves, and so gain some part of the golden-age virtues that 
had once made Athens so great, as it were. In this way, the ethical 
93 C. f. Schaper ('1968), esp. pp. 45-6. 
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application of Plato's metaphysical objection may easily be understood 
where this model of learning through art is concerned. For since it is 
precisely the fact - according to Plato - that the poets, however excellent 
their imitation, present exemplars in such a way as to solicit the 
sympathetic response of the audience of them, without themselves 
knowing In what the virtue of the exemplar consisted, then it is also seen to 
be the case that the slavish model in which action is motivated by (blind) 
imitation is perpetuated. Worse, because the measure of mimetic practice 
is determined not by anything essential (or 'formal'), but by the vagaries of 
audience-plea sure, the standard of exemplarity for the depicted or 
dramatised characters becomes itself subject to such vagaries. As 
Christopher Janaway puts it, 
The greatest charge against mimetic poetry is that, willy-nilly, we receive from it a 
training in many real-life feelings and ethical attitudes, which works by by-passing 
rationality, giving pleasure to the 'lower, indulgent part of the soul, and thereby 
disabling the power to reflect on the question of its own influence and value. 94 
'D'ou' il suit que', in Rousseau's version, this time a fairly straight 
translation, 
ce West point la plus noble de nos facult6s, sýavoir la raison, mais une facult6 diff6rente 
et inf6rieure, qui juge sur I'apparence et se livre au charme de l'imitation ... et 
g6n6ralement Yart d'imiter ... exerce ses op6rations 
loin de la v6rit6 des choses, en 
s'unissant 6 une partie de notre ame d6pourvue de prudence et de raison, et incapable 
de rien connoitre par elle-m&me de r6el et de vrai. Ainsi Yart d'imiter, vil par sa nature 
et par la facult6 de Yarne sur laquelle il agit, ne peut que 1'&tre encore par ses 
productions ... 15 
The appeal to an argument of the morally and socially regressive 
implications of a practice without any kind of intelligible measure has a 
94 Janaway (1995), p. 151. 
95 OC V, p. 1205. Repitlglic X, 603a. 
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distinctly Rousseauan flavour. Before considering the rather complex 
relationship that the Platonic scheme enjoys with Rousseau's own analysis, 
we should examine briefly one further aspect of the Republic's 
condemnation of mimetic poetry. 
One of the most frequently levelled objections draws on the following 
observation. Given that Plato excludes all'miMetic" poetry from the 
Republic, and given that his definition of mimesis is, in 
, 
fact, broad enough 
to encapsulate the idea of poetry in general, on what grounds does he 
allow for the inclusion of some types of poetry? The problem is rendered 
more serious because Socrates's reasons for the exception are undisclosed 
and are presented as self-evident: 'Mais songez toujours que les Hymnes en 
Yhonneur des Dieux et les louanges des grands hommes sont la seule 
I espece de poýsie qu'iI faut admettre'. 96 On what grounds, however, are 
these hymns and panegyrics any different from those contained in Homer 
whose poetry, despite being the work of 'le mod&le et le chef de tous les 
97 Auteurs tragique", has just been specifically exluded? 
Janaway's discussion of this problem displays his usual sensitivity to 
this area of Rousseau's thought, but his conclusion seems to leave the 
question slightly suspended: 
[Tihere is one sense in which Plato's favoured hymns and eulogies will not be 
'mimetic': they will not privilege the aim of appearance- making, of conjuring up a 
world of persons and things for the imagination... Plato might easily think (although 
he does not say) that even his hymns and eulogies, being poetry, would lise 
imaginative appearance-making. What better way to honour a great, departed citizen 
in words and song than to make his bearing, his speech, and his actions as vividly as 
possible? But what matters most is that the poetry of the city shall never regard 
imaginative appearance-making and its pleasures as autonomous endS. 
98 
96 OC V, p. 1210. Direct translation of Republic X, 607a 
Q7 OC V, p. 1210. Direct translation of Republic X, 607a. 
'18 Janaway (1995), p. 131. 
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The problem, however, lies not so much in the fact that the ends of poetry 
are self-governing or 'autonomous' for Plato, but in the fact that they are 
ungovernable because unintelligible. The difference, then, between banned 
and admitted poetry lies not with the question of mimesis in itself, but in the 
extent to which the 'images of excellence' it manipulates have themselves 
previously been ascribed exemplary status. In other words, if the subject 
matter and function of poetry is controlled according to an intelligible 
standard - according, that is to say, to the notions of virtue agreed upon by 
the governing class - then the regressive structure which affects both the 
quality of poetry and the morality of the citizens will itself come under 
control. 99 Regardless, then, of the mysteries of imitative poetry, the 
pleasure it arouses and the (lower) faculties thus aroused, an implicitly 
decadent structure is preserved at its perfect, pre-decadent, moment - 
namely, when its production may be subsumed by, without threatening, 
knowledge of the Form of the good. 100 
Plato's project, then, in discriminating between officially desirable and 
undesirable forms of mimetic poetry seems to be to force a situation in 
which arete and kalon, or virtue and beautYlOl are two sides of the same coin. 
Given an ideal world - or rather, in Plato's understanding, given the 
appropriate level of knowledge - such an alliance would occur by itself. 
Such a conviction, too, is central to Rousseau"s own understanding: so 
much of the impetus behind the historical critique of society and its 
99 Note that Plato's discussion of the same topic in the Laws is more lenient with respect to 
the kinds of poetry that may be approved of. Here, some types of dramatic poetry are 
permitted. The essential proviso about the controlled nature of the subject matter, 
however, remains the same. See Laws 817d. 
100 See also Nehamas (1988), p. 215: 'Plato forbids not imitation, which he considers 
essential to education, but imitativeness, the desire and ability to imitate anything 
independently of its moral quality and without the proper attitude of praise or blame 
toward it. ' 
101 To Ulm is literally translated as fineness, or fitness. For the relation between its usage 
in Plato, and elsewhere, and our modem concept of beauty, see 
Collingwood (1938), p. 
38ff. 
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cultural practices arises from the observation that what is found beautiful 
or desirable is neither good in itself nor even, most of the time, good for 
anything, but that it cannot always have been thus. Rather than discuss the 
many similarities and superficial differences between Plato's and 
Rousseau's views of the arts and their relationship to the actual and ideal 
political economy, "' it is perhaps more efficient and instructive to consider 
the more essential structural differences between the philosophical systems 
on which their analyses are grounded. 
B. THE IDEA OF TRUTH 
The two most important structural differences between the philosophical 
systems of Rousseau and Plato, as I see it, are as follows. The first is that 
Rousseau's condemnation of the theatre, while it admits many of the same 
arguments and supporting structures germane to Plato's discussion, is 
based around the objection that theatrical identification results in a 
perversion not so much of knowledge but of pity. 103 This distinction arises 
because of a more fundamental one between Plato's semi-sacred, semi- 
rationalist conception of civic virtue and Rousseau's conception of the 
social and moral good as relating to a kind of being-together well. This 
fundamental difference between the two is reflected in Rousseau's 
discussion of the kinds of artistic practice that should be encouraged in his 
own ideal Republic, that of Geneva, which he describes in the Lettre 
d'Alembert. Here, poetic praise takes second place to a form of 'community 
art' essentially concerned not with beauty or splendour but with the 
102 For a more comprehensive discussion of the differences, see Mabe (1987). 
103The phrase, 'the per-version of p1tv, comes from the title of Philip Robinson's chapter on 
the Lettre ý d'Alend7ert in his Jean-jacqties Roiisseaii's Doctrine of the Arts. See Robinson 
(1984), pp. 125-165. For another, briefer, discussion of the same phenomenon, see Kelly 
(2003), pp. 75-7. 
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simpler pleasures of doing something together for the sake of 
togethemess. 104 
The second difference is related. While Plato"s objection to mimesis as a 
morally and metaphysically compromised mode of epistemic access to the 
world is rooted in what is often seen as a 'severe and outlandish conception 
of what qualifies as knowledge', "' for Rousseau, there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with imitation as such. "' Nor does Rousseau's 
contention that man is naturally imitative, at least at its fundamental level, 
attach itself to any blame or guilt. It is only when - and Rousseau's 
analysis here concurs with that of Plato - imitation breaks lose from the 
bonds of propriety that it comes in for censure. 
These two differences are related because they both turn on what is 
perhaps the most fundamental difference between the philosophical 
systems of Plato and Rousseau, and this concerns the two philosophers' 
contrasting notions of truth. Plato's conception of truth, which lies at the 
heart of his theory of Forms, is of something fully determinate. 
Importantly, this is understood to remain the case even when, as is 
discussed in the more mysterious passages of the Phaedrus, it is suggested 
that the highest Forms, such as goodness and truth itself, are not fully 
intelligible to the mortal mind. In so far as this is admitted, however, the 
task of the philosopher remains one of dutiful approximation. For 
Rousseau, on the other hand, the separation between the divine and the 
mortal is more decisive. In the secular version of the Christian myth of the 
Fall of man provided by the second Discours and present to a certain extent 
in all of Rousseau's mature writing, once humanity is established, the 
104 '[C]es Bals ainsi dirig6s ressembleroient moins ý un Spectacle public qu'6 I'assembl6e 
d'une grande famille, et du sein de la joye et des plaisirs naitrolent la conservation, la 
concorde et ]a prosp6rit6 de ]a R6publique. ' Lettre ý d'Alenil7ert, OC V, p. 120. 
105janaway (1995), p. 129. 
106For as we saw in the first section of this chapter, the concept of imitation provides the 
normative yardstick for music and consequently provides the measure for the good of 
music. 
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notion of truth seems to become explicitly accountable to the category of 
the human. And because this category finds its negative definition 
precisely in indeterminate desire - in desire, that is to say, for what can 
never be brought immediately to knowledge - so too must human truth lie 
beyond the reach of determinacy. 
The important difference between Plato's and Rousseau's conception of 
imitation therefore boils down to the following scheme. Where Plato 
criticises imitation on the basis that its rule, or Form, is unintelligible and 
indeterminate, having its measure merely in human pleasure and the 
'lower orders' of the spirit, it is precisely this indeterminacy that, for 
Rousseau, endows the idea of imitation with a positive value. In other 
words, an integral part of Rousseau"s evaluation of the concept of imitation 
is that its principle ultimately resists the scientific understanding which in 
his century, as he saw it, was increasingly becoming the exclusive measure 
of truth. And just as the source of man's nature, as well as his good, lies in 
determining a healthy relationship with his passions - which, originating 
in our spiritual rather than material wants, are themselves not subject to a 
scientific conception of knowledge - so too must the image of his good 
provided by artistic imitation be designed precisely to resist such 
determinacy. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will examine the importance of this structure for 
Rousseau's understanding of imitation in music. We should note, 
however, that it provides 'in many respects the philosophical basis for 
many of his music-aesthetic values. The heavily valorised oppositions that 
form part of his anti-Ramellian battery - such as those between harmony 
and melody, articulation and accent, (merely) natural and imitative and, of 
course, between physical and moral - all operate by virtue of their reliance 
on a concept of truth as that which resists false or overly-hasty 
determination. As will become clearer in later chapters, the latter terms of 
each of the cited oppositions are all characterised in terms of a kind of 
moral and aesthetic significance which is defined by its inbuilt resistance to 
purely intellectual reduction. It should be noted too, however, that this 
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resistance is not infallible: the history of imitative music, to take one of the 
many examples of Rousseau's narrative of degeneration through increasing 
distance from the origin, is one of a progressive decay of music"s 
specifically moral effects. As Rousseau comments in the Essak 
I A mesure que la langue se perfectionnoit, la m6lodie en s'imposant de nouvelles r6gles 
perdoit insensiblement de son ancienne 6nergie, et le calcul des intervalles fut substitU6 
ý la finesse des infl6xions. Cest ainsi, par kemple, que ]a pratique du genre 
enharmonique s'abolit peu ý peu. Quand les th65tres eurent pris une forme r6guli6re 
on n'y chantoit plus que sur des modes prescrits, et ý mesure qu'on multiploioit les 
r6gles de Firnitation la langue imitative s'affoiblissoit. 107 
If Rousseau thus praises imitation for exactly the same reason that Plato 
criticises it, then it will be immediately understood that this contrast brings 
an extra level of complexity to the many areas where - in particular in the 
Lettre ý d"Alenibert - Rousseau allies himself with Plato's arguments against 
mimetic art. While this should be born in mind, perhaps more relevant to 
our present concerns is the potentially more serious problem that emerges 
when it is considered just how much of Plato's metaphysical and 
epistemological scheme remains intact in Rousseau's writings more 
generally. In particular, Rousseau's use of the distinction between 
apparaitre and etre enjoys the full force of Plato's metaphysics and its 
implicit moral privileging of knowledge over sensation. 1011 For example, 
before the vast 'devoilement' that unfolds during the second Discours, 
Rousseau imagines himself to be 'dans le Lic6e d"Athenes, repetant les 
Leýons de mes Mailtres, ayant les Platons et les Xenocrates pour Juges. '109 
107Essai, OC V, p. 424. 
108 The most famous opposition of 'apparaitre' and 'kre' occurs in Rousseau's 'confession' 
to Christophe cle Beaumont: 'Sit6t que je fus en 6tat d'observer les hommes, je les regardals 
faire, et je les 6coutais parler; puis, voyant que leurs actions ne ressemblaient point 6 leur 
discours, le cherchai la raison cle cette dissemblance, et je trouvai qu'&tre et paraitre 6tant 
pour eux deux choses aussi diff6rentes qu'agir et parler, cette deuxi&me diff6rence 6tait ]a 
cause cle Fautre'. Lettre ý Christoplic de Bealuizont, OC IV, p. 966. 
109 OC 111, p. 133. 
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The putative object of this *d6voilement', the distance between the itre of 
man and the paraitre which governs his consciousness of the world, is 
compared to Plato"s example of the statue of Glaucus, 111 whose godly 
nature lies concealed beneath the ravages of 'le tems, la mer et les orages 
qu'elle ressembloit moins ý un. Dieu qu'a' une Bete f6roce'. 111 
Although Rousseau never actually provides anything like a general 
theory of truth - he writes more frequently as 'un ami de la verite 
1112 than 
as a 'philosophe', a term from which he is generally anxious to dissociate 
himself' II- there is little doubt that the act of 'd6voilement' differs from 
Plato's understanding in its emphasis on keeping the 'voile' in view, as it 
were. The value of the revealed 'essence' of something is understood to lie 
less in its amounting to some kind of facticity than in what it tells those 
who contemplate it: the Otre, In this sense, always retains an element of 
apparaitre, the idea of truth thereby concerning itself with the faithful 
reflection of the one in the other. 
This perhaps accounts for the sometimes astonishing fact that so much 
of Rousseau's intellectual effort is directed towards examining ideas which 
could not permit of any independent verification. The notorious invitation 
in the Discours to begin by '6carter tous les faits', 1 14 whatever its precise 
meaning, 115unambiguously states Rousseau's intention to deploy 
'fictional" 116 methods in pursuit of the truth of 'Thomme en general'. 
117 It is 
110 From Republic X, §611. 
M OC 111, p. 122. 
112Lettre ii Voltaire, OC IV, p. 1059. 
Rousseau understood the origin of philosophy to lie in pride rather than in the love of 
wisdom (for its own sake) suggested by the term. See Kelly (2003), esp. pp. 140-154. 
114 OC 111, p. 132. 
115Paul de Man advised that this statement 'cannot be taken too radically and applies to 
the mode of language used throughout the [text]. ' De Man (1989), p. 132. Maurice 
Cranston's more measured suggestion is that Rousseau is cautiously but surreptitiously 
advising the reader to dispense with all the biblical 'facts' previously employed in 
analysing the pre-history and nature of man. Cranston (1984), p. 176, n. 8. 
1160n the'fictional' status of the hypothetical reasoning of the Discoitrs, see De Man (1989) 
and Althusser (1970). 
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to be understood from this, perhaps, that Rousseau-s concern was less with 
the positive truth of his analysis of the state of nature than with its status as 
a kind of necessary fiction: the state of nature, he writes, is 'un Etat qui 
Wexiste plus, qui Wa peut-&tre point existe, qui probablement Wexistera 
jamais, et dont il est pourtant necessaire d"avoir des Notions justes pour 
bien juger de notre present. ""' This is not to say that no appeal is made to 
traditional forms of reasoning: on the contrary, Rousseau's method of 
reasoning follows what may be called a 'synthetic' model in so far as the 
truth of a proposition lies less in its internal consistency than in its 
explanatory reach. 119 This notwithstanding, however, the prominence of 
Rousseau's concern with the context of writing - i. e. the contexts of who is 
writing and for whom something is written - may not be gainsaid. 120 
If one were to attempt to sketch the theory of truth in Rousseau, one 
might say that for a statement to be true it must meet both a rational 
standard of correctness and, at the same time, match the 'moral' needs both 
of its intended audience and its author. For truth, just as with the good of 
art, having its measure in the human institutions from which the sense of it 
arises, is Mseparable from the good of being together in community; and as 
these human institutions receive their origin from a moral rather than a 
117 OC III/ p. 133. 
118 OC 111, p. 123. 
119 For one of Rousseau's statements on his method in the Discours see OC 111, p. 162: 'mais 
outre que ces conjectures deviennent des raisons, quand elles sont les plus probables 
qu'on puisse tirer de la nature des choses et les seuls moyens qu'on puisse avoir de 
d6couvrir ]a verit6, les consequences que je veux d6duire des miennes ne seront point 
pour cela conjecturales, puisque, sur les principes que je viens d'6tablir, on ne sauroit 
former aucun autre systýme qui ne me fournisses les rnýmes r6sultats'. Such a practice is 
consistent with the central principles of synthetic reasoning. See, for example, Quine 
(1966). For a detailed analysis of Rousseau's method in the Discotirs, see Hobson (1992). 
120See, for example, the first sentence of the Essal: Ta parole distinguee Yhomme entre les 
animaux : le langage distinguee les nations entre elles; on ne connoit d'oil est un homme 
qu'apr&s qu'il a pai-16. ' Given the prominence of this sentence, the absence of any 
reference to the semantic function of language in favour of its contextual disclosures seems 
noteworthy. 
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material structure, so too must their measure stem from such a structure 
also. Having both its origin and measure in such a dynamic model, 
contingent on the progress of human culture and history, truth comes to 
concern itself less with an accurate description of what IS than with a 
credible representation of what ought to be. And just as the sense of ought is 
not disclosed to reason alone, "' so too the language which expresses this 
ought is required to answer to structures which escape reason in isolation 
from moral sentiment. 
C. 'AESTHETIC' AND'MORAL" IN RouSSEAU 
AND THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
Implicit In the idea of this thesis is an examMation of Rousseau's 
understanding of how the moral and the aesthetic spheres interact. More 
specifically, part of my aim is to show the interdependence of each. That is 
to say that, in Rousseau's understanding, moral value is contingent on 
aesthetic and aesthetic on moral. Given that this account will emerge 
during the thesis as a whole, I shall concentrate in this sub-section only on 
some introductory aspects of the question in its general and historical form. 
The first issue that inevitably raises it is an historical one: what did 
Rousseau mean by 'moral', one of his most frequently used terms, and 
what was his understanding of aesthetics, given that he never employed 
the term? "' 
The use of the term 'moral' in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
France was both vaguer and more precise than in modem-day usage. 
Never quite forsaking the derivation it shares with 'moeurs' in the Latin 
121 Rather it originates with passionate desire. 
122AIthough Baumgarten's Aesthetica was published in 1750, the use of the term 
'esth6tique' in the French philosophical and literary establishment did not become 
kvidespread until the early nineteenth century. See'Esth6tique' in Rey (1992), pp. 1311-2. 
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term for social CUStOMS, 123 it had since the middle ages distinguished itself 
from the latter by its acquisition of a connection with virtue, and this is the 
sense which it carries most strongly to-day. By the eighteenth century the 
now obsolete usage in which'moral' suggested opinion - notions, that is, 
which are founded on beliefs other than those provided by reason - was 
linked with its Cartesian connotation of sentiments proper to the Soul. 124 
Indeed, it is in this Cartesian context that the term began to be fixed most 
reliably in the philosophical writings of the eighteenth century. With the 
growth of a more empirical attitude to natural and human science, the 
underlying 'Corps" / "Ame" dualism of Descartes began to be replaced by 
one between 'physique" andmoral', an opposition in which it was 
understood that both terms could allow for some degree of quantifiable 
manifestation in the external world, and hence would prove susceptible of 
some greater analytic continuity than that accorded it by the complete 
separation central to Cartesian accounts. ' 25 
One of the interesting features of Rousseau's use of the term 'moral" is 
that, although he adopts the secular 126 terminology of eighteenth- century 
materialism in employing the opposition betweenmoral' and'physique', 
his frequent and determined insistence on the epistemological and ethical 
priority of the category of the 'moral" displays a continuous commitment to 
Descartes' now old-fashioned rigid dualism. 127 For Rousseau's definition of 
the sphere of the 'moral' is a negative one in the sense that, as we have seen 
123The derivation is from'mores', which is the plural of 'mos' meaning primarily custom 
or practice, but also, and rather interestingly, nature and mood. 
124 In Pic Passions of the Soul, Descartes distinguished between feelings as corporeal 
sensation and feelings as'passions' which have their cause and effect in the soul. See 
Descartes (1984) 1: §25: the passions are'those whose effects we feel as being in the soul 
itself, and for which we do not normally know any proximate cause to which we can refer 
them'. For the etymology of'Moral', see the entry under that name in Rey (1992), pp. 
2284-5. 
125See Moravia (1979). 
126 In the sense that the religious connotations of 'corps' and 'ame', and the distinction 
between them, is discarded. 
127At least in spirit, if not exactlv in method. See Crocker (1963), esp. pp. 137-152. 
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throughout this chapter, its essence is provided for by its intrinsic 
resistance to the reductive science of 'physique. ' There are, then, numerous 
cases in which Rousseau's use of the term implies no necessary extension to 
the normative scheme of 'moralite". 128 
The key to understanding this apparent flexibility (by contemporary 
standards) in Rousseau's usage of the term "moral' is also structural as 
much as historical. This is because use of the normative terms good and 
bad only become meaningful for Rousseau when it is possible to refer to 
the general sphere of the 'moral'. That is to say, the structure of self- and 
other- consciousness which regulates the possibility of morality in general is 
entirely contingent upon there being such a thing as the 'moral' for man, 
and the conditions for this are not provided purely by the physical world. 
Thus, regardless of whether or not Rousseau's 'moral' includes what we 
would now call moral in referring to ethical belief systems, his use of it is 
nonetheless fully consistent with his analysis of the physical and human 
world as a whole. It is important to remember, then, that when Rousseau 
refers to the 'effets moraux' of music and art, or when he wrote that 'il 
entre du moral dans tout ce qui tient ýY imitation', "' one cannot take him 
to be suggesting that such music or such imitation encodes some kind of 
directive for good or bad actions. Similarly, however, it is also equally 
important to recognise that there is no firm conceptual boundary between 
'effets moraux", such as are experienced through artistic imitation, and 
there being such ethical phenomena as good or bad actions. Rousseau's 
usage in this respect is entirely consistent with his general attempt to re- 
instate the philosophical priority of the ethical against a century which, as 
he saw it, 's'efforce ý mat6rialiser toutes les operations de Fame et d'6ter 
toute moralite aux sentimens humains. ' 
130 
128 Equally, however, there are numerous cases in which this extension is absolutely clear 
in his usage. 
121) OC IV, p. 672. Cited above, p. 31. 
130 OC V, p. 419. 
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An understanding of the 'physique' Pmoral' distinction in Rousseau, 
and the absolute priority of the latter in dealing with the affairs of men, 
also sheds light on another normative distinction that Rousseau makes 
increasing use of as his enquiry into nature progresses during the 1750s. 
This is the distinction between 'naturel' and 'humain". When he is 
discussing, for example, the basis of the 'fausse analogie' between colours 
and sounds, and between painting and music, he distinguishes between the 
latter in terms of "naturel' and 'humain' as follows: 'la peinture est plus 
pres de la nature et ... la musique tient plus ý Fart humain. "11 Here, 
clearly, is a correlation between "la nature' and 'physique', and between 
'humain' and 'moral': nature reveals itself as the proper subject of the 
natural sciences, man as that of the human sciences, in modern 
nomenclature. A confusion occurs, however, when it is remembered that 
'la nature' still continues to provide the 'humain' with the measure of his 
(moral) good: the state of nature, in providing a model in which the good 
of 'being together well' is perfectly manifest, may for this reason continue 
to confer a moral and aesthetic authority on the use of the term *, naturel'. 
For example, in the article on harmony in the Dictionnalre, Rousseau writes 
that "toute notre Harmonie West qu"une invention Gothique et barbare, 
dont nous ne nous fussions jamais avises, si nous eussions ete plus 
sensibles aux veritables beautes de IArt, et ý la Musique vraiment 
naturelle! 132 The actual possibility of confusion, however, remains remote 
because Rousseau's generally emphatic valorisation of his oppositional 
terms leaves little room for ambiguity. The possibility is important to note, 
nonetheless. 
131 Essai, OC V, p. 421. We shall also see in the following chapter that the distinction 
observed in the Dictiotinalre between 'musique naturelle' and 'musique imitative' is made 
according to a scheme in which the pleasures of the former are'purement physique' and 
where only the latter is capable of 'effets moraux'. 
132'Harmonie', Dictionnab-c, OC V, p. 851 (my emphasis). 
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Some understanding of the mid-eighteenth- century French conception of 
aesthetics can be gleaned from the observation that, of the two EncyclopMie 
articles dealing with the subject of beauty, "beau' and 'beaute', "' the entry 
on the adjectival form is by far the most extensive. The implicit suggestion 
here, of course, is that considerable knowledge is available about that 
which is beautiful, but very little available about what beauty might be in 
itself. Diderot, the author of both articles, makes this explicit at the outset 
of the longer article: 
[j]e remarquerai d'abord, avec tous les auteurs qui en ont 6crit, que par une sorte de 
fatalit6, les choses dont on parle le plus parmi les hommes, sont assez ordinairement 
celles qu'on connoit le moins... [Oln Fadmire dans les ouvrages de la nature: on 
1'exige dans les productions des Arts: on accorde ou Yon refuse cette qualit6 ý tout 
moment; cependant si Yon demande aux hommes du goOt le plus sCtr & le plus exquis, 
quelle est son origine, sa nature, sa notion pr6cise, sa v6ritable We, son exacte 
d6finition ... on voit aussit6t les sentimens partag6s... Comment se fait-il que presque 
tous les hommes soient d'accord qu'il ya un lyeaii; qu'il y en ait tant entr'eux qui le 
sentent vivement oiJ il est, & que si peu sachent ce que c'est? 1-14 
With characteristic mixture of economy and irony, Diderot identifies what 
came perhaps to be the eighteenth-century problem, albeit that his method 
is more anecdotal than deductive. Indeed, the point he raises at the end - 
namely, that everyone feels that there is such a thing as beauty, but that no- 
one can provide its conceptual definition - became one of the cornerstones 
of Kant's aesthetic theory. Despite the fact, Kant was to argue towards the 
close of the centur-y, that there are no rules for beauty, the judgement which 
ascribes it to something still aspires to a condition of universal validity. 
Rousseau's discussions of the mysteries of 'le go U^t' have much in 
common with his contemporaries, and many of the features that Diderot 
discusses crop up in Rousseau. '-ý5 Almost needless to say, however, it is 
133See EncýyclopMie, 11.1: 'Beau', pp. 169-182; 'Beaut6', p. 182. 
1-14 FacyclopMie, 11.1: 'Beau', p. 169. 
135For example, Rousseau's article on 'go6t' in the Dictionnaire is very reminiscent of 
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when taste acquires a "moral' aspect that its discussion acquires both a 
particularly Rousseauan significance and a positive flavour. The 
particulars of Rousseau's analyses of the structure of taste will be discussed 
at length in the following chapters. Although it is not surprising that what 
today might be called the spiritual effects of aesthetic experience are 
described in the eighteenth century in terms of 'moral', there is in Rousseau 
a conspicuous absence of a distinction between aesthetic and moral feeling. 
Not only does the language not suggest or provide a distinction, but 
Rousseau's treatment of the subject matter of both aesthetic and moral 
theory is such that an attempt to maintain such a distinction in an 
interpretation of his works becomes more or less meaningless. 'Effets 
moraux' not only describe equally emotional responses to aesthetic and 
moral experiences, they are also the same kind of response in each case: 
namely, the mixture of reflection and feeling that provide the moral sphere 
with its indeterminate structure. The only distinction that can realistically 
be drawn is one of situation, and this not so much in terms of the nature of 
the situation but its status: we can distinguish between a moral situation 
that implies a course of action in the real world and an aesthetic situation 
that does not. 136 But given that our access to 'moral' experience is also what 
provides our access, for Rousseau, to what could be called the real - in the 
sense in which humans and the values ascribed to their actions make the 
world a real and meaningful place to exist - it is in this context that the 
moral nature of aesthetic experience becomes important. 
Diderot, especially in opening: 'De tous les dons naturels le Goýit est celui qui se sent le 
mieux et qui s'explique le moins'. OC V, p. 841. 
136This is in fact one of the reasons Rousseau provides in his attack on the arts in the Lettre 
ýi d'Alembert. 
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IV. MUSICAL AND MORAL AWAKENING IN THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITING 
A. THE PROBLEM OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
Confronted by an array of apparently irreducible paradoxes, Rousseau's 
readers are seemingly forced to accept that describing the 'heart and SoUl'137 
of Rousseau's oeuvre necessarily entails a 'deletion"" of contradictory parts 
of that body of work. Robert Wokler takes an analysis of this recurrent 
problem to be indicative of the necessity for a more cautious and 
historically contextual approach: 
[I]n order to understand Rousseau's ideas we shall have to take account of the sense 
that he intended his statements should have in the particular contexts in which they 
were actually made. The distinction that is sometimes drawn between what a man 
says and why he is saying it - if that is supposed to be a distinction between what in 
fact he means by his statement and what perhaps he may have intended in the making 
of it - seems to me 
fallacioUS. 139 
Wokler's prescriptions in this connection seem exemplary, 141and many 
of Rousseau"s most instructive modern commentators have prefaced their 
work with similar cautionary tales, suggesting the necessity of 
supplementing his 'lapidary statements" 141 with details of the contextual 
circumstances of their production in order to construe his thought in proto- 
dialectical terms. 142 
137Wokler (1987b), p. 6. 
138Wokler (1987b), p. 10. 
139Wokler (1987b), pp. 29-30. 
140 Not to say decidedly Rousseauan in sentiment. 
141 Starobinski (1961), p. 98. The term also crops up in Peter Gay's introduction to Ernst 
Cassirer's Das ProNciii Jean-jacqiies Roiisseau, which text also concerns the problem of 
reconciling Rousseau 'to himself', as it were. See Cassirer (1954), p. 14. 
14213oth Wokler and Gay, as well as Cassirer, use the term 'dialectic' in this context. 
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Nonetheless, the problem of understanding as it occurs in Rousseau is 
exacerbated by the additional problem of the heterogeneity of his oeuvre. 
Texts whose apparent concern is, by turns, political, ethical, music-critical, 
pedagogical, fictional, and autobiographical, constantly cross-reference 
each other both with and without their author's explicit permission. The 
recurrent problem of controlling Rousseau's meaning becomes further 
complicated by that of controlling his mode. When Wokler's exemplary 
caution prompts him to demonstrate that Rousseau's early musical 
writings can only be 'properly understood' by situating their claims and 
concerns firmly within the environment of the philosophical and political 
concerns being developed alongside them in other texts, we confront a tacit 
admission that the content of such claims cannot be contextually localised 
at all. What kind of music theory, after all, may not be understood as a 
theory of music? While the contextualist approach seems to address and 
solve one problem, it also seems to create another in that the method 
simply cannot provide its own limits. The only way, as it were, to control 
the free-play of Rousseau's statements would be to localise them in the 
most extreme way possible: to read them all as autobiography, such that 
each statement is understood only in reference to its being made at a 
particular time, in a particular place and with the particular psychological 
orientation observed enjoying an interpretative importance equal to the 
discursive one. The seemingly impossible task of reading Rousseau's texts 
systematically, then, would lead in the end to an equally impossible one of 
systematically reconstructing the man through the texts. One 
inappropriate 'master discourse' simply replaces another, and all writers 
about Rousseau face the danger of their own specific and generic concerns 
collapsing into the 'master' task of simply writing the man's biography. 
141 
143 1 am not suggesting that Wokler's text somehow refutes itself beyond repair, but merely 
that the self-confidence of his cautionarv remarks should not be understood to open up a 
critical landscape which is no longer problematic. 
Writing Between Music and Philosophy -64- Musical and Moral Awakening 
This danger is not easily evaded. jean Starobinski takes this very 
problem as the starting point of his own investigation. 144 In the preface to a 
work that has enriched and clarified the philosophical and literary insights 
of at least two generations of Rousseau scholars, he writes: 
A tort ou ý raison, Rouseau n'a pas consenti ý s6parer sa pens6e et son individualit6, 
ses th6ories et son destin personnel. 11 faut le prendre tel qu'il se donne, dans cette 
fusion et cette confusion de 1'existence et de l'id6e. On se trouve ainsi conduit ý 
analyser la cr6ation litt6raire de jean-Jacques comme si elle repr6sentait une action 
imaginaire, et son comportement comme s'il consituait une fiction v6cue. 145 
Starobinski elaborates this particular problem into a dense and 
philosophically astute account of the theory of subjectivity in Rousseau. 
Yet, we are entitled to ask, what kind of philosophical 'id6e' cannot be 
separated from the circumstances of its formulation? What kind of music 
theory is it that must be read as a 'fiction vecue"? Our admission of 
Rousseau"s presence as author seems - for now at least - to be the 
condition of our understanding his texts: it seems that his ideas must 
always be by Rousseau and his music theory by Rousseau in the same way 
that an autobiography is said to be by its author. In the same way that a 
translator traditionally excuses the inadequacy of a translation, we too 
must seemingly excuse our own inadequacy as his readers. 
And yet, as if by way of a rather perverse lesson, it seems precisely to be 
in Rousseau's autobiographical writing that the "general system' of his 
philosophy of man and nature become most essential as'context. When, 
for example, Rousseau introduces the peculiar task of autobiography, the 
play of man and nature, and of exemplarity and exception is so confusing 
that simply to read the text as autobiography is really not to read the text at 
all: 
141 See also Robinson (1978b). 
145Starobinski (1971), p. 9. 
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Je forme une entreprise qui n'eut jamais d'ýxemple, et dont l'exýcution n'aura point 
d'imitateur. Je veux montrer ä mes semblables un homme dans toute la výritý de la 
nature; et cet homme, ce sera moi... Moi seul. je sens mon coeur et je connois les 
hommes. je ne suis fait comme aucun de ceux que jaj vus; j'ose croire ri'kre fait 
comme aucun de ceux qui existent. Si je ne vaux pas mieux, au moins je suis autre. Si 
la nature a bien ou mal fait de briser le moule dans lequel elle m'a jett6, Cest ce dont on 
ne peut juger qu'apr&s m'avoir]U. '146 
For a text which is so often held to inaugurate the genre 147 of modern 
autobiography, the question of exactly what context the reader is supposed 
to infer seems altogether unanswerable: look for the 'moi seul' behind the 
text and one finds only the most general 'homme de la nature; look for the 
latter, and one may find only the former. Such seems to be the problem 
central to Rousseau's autobiography. 
With these cautions in mind, this section seeks to deploy some examples 
from the autobiographical writing in the service of the musical, aesthetic 
and moral paradigms they seem to exemplify. Since the 'heart and soul' of 
Rousseau"s musical and philosophical thought is seemingly so difficult to 
capture independently of the context of its original presentation, it seems 
that the more relaxed discourse of autobiography allowed him a nicety of 
example that sometimes could serve better than the contradictory "lapidary 
statements' often deemed so problematic. 
B. A COMMUNITY OF ONE 
Rousseau's 'singularity' - his sense of his failure to be like others, 148 of the 
failure of his ideas to transmit themselves cleanly and "transparently' to 
146Confessions, OC 1, p. 5. 
147 If it can be understood as one: see de Man (1984) on the generic problems inherent in 
the literature of self-disclosure. 
"', A 'failure' which he nonetheless also took to be something of a success. See the passage 
cited from ConfessiOns, OC 1, p. 5, above. 
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others, and of his failure to be with others149 - is a common theme in his 
autobiographical writing. His own experience, particularly of his failure to 
be understood, prompts the dual retreat into his texts and away from his 
readers that marks his final writings. In Les Riveries du Promeneur Solitaire 
we read of the constant misreading of his former work, the constant 
misinterpretation of his statements, and the consequent degree to which he 
was 'tenu sans le moindre doute pour un monstre, un empoisonneur, un 
assassin, que je deviendrois Yhorreur de la race humaine'. 111 Having fought 
against this state of tormenting alienation "aussi violemment que 
vainement" - which may still be understood as a real and sincerely felt 
isolation despite having some of its roots in the fantasy of near universal 
conspiracy that was his constant reference during his later years - he makes 
a characteristic statement of reconciled resignation to his fate: 
Sans adresse, sans art, sans dissimulation, sans prudence, franc, ouvert, impatient, 
emport6, je n'ai fait en me d6battant que m'enlacer davantage et leur donner 
incessament de nouvelles prises qu'ils Wont eu garde de n6gliger. Sentant enfin tous 
mes efforts inutiles et me tourmentant ý pure perte j'ai pris le seul parti qui me restoit 
prendre, celui de me soumettre ý ma destin6e sans plus regimber contre la necessit6. 
J'ai trouv6 dans cette resignation le d6domagement de tous mes maux par la 
tranquillit6 qu'elle me procure et qui ne pouvoit s'allier avec le travail continuel d'une 
resistance aussi p6nible quinfructueuse. 151 
No longer tormented by others, he takes comfort in the retreat from the 
possibility of communication, taking the newly found space to constitute a 
kind of self-affirming 'necessite', a necessity in strong contrast to that 
provided by the world of others. This other-necessity, the false and 
149 This failure is a unifying theme in the Confessions: 'Comment se pouvoit-il qu'avec une 
ame naturellement expansive, pour qui vivre c'6toit aimer, Je n'eusse pas trouv6 
jusqu'alors un ami tout ý moi, un v6ritable ami, moi qui me sentois si bien fait pour Fkre? ' 
OC 1, p. 426. See also'Mon portrait', OC 1, p. 1124: 'J'6tois fait pour kre le meilleur ami qui 
fut jamais, mais celui qui devoit me r6pondre est encore ý venir. ' 
150 Les Wzwrics dii pronieneiir solitaire, OC 1, p. 996. 
151 OC 1, p. 996. 
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arbitrary personality-forming forces of society the protection from which of 
his imaginary protege Emile was of such paramount importance, is 
understood to have become subject to Rousseau's now disinterested control 
and is reworked in his more complete, self-authored, isolation as an 
imitation of the necessity to be found in the state of nature. His failure to 
exercise control over the de-natured "perfectibilite 1152 of man in society is 
compensated for by his apparent and newly-found ability to control the 
direction of his own. 
Tout ce qui m'est ext6rieur m'est 6trange desormais. je Wai plus en ce monde ni 
prochain, ni semblables, ni fr6res... je consacre mes derniers jours ý m'6tudier moi- 
rnýme et ý pr6parer d'avance le compte que je ne tarderai pas ý rendre de moi. Livrons 
nous tout entier ý ]a douceur de converser avec mon ame puisqu'elle est la seule que 
les hommes ne puissent m'6ter. Si 6 force de r6fl6chir sur mes dispositions int6rieurs je 
parviens 6 les mettre en meilleur ordre et 6 corriger le mal qui peut y rester mes 
m6ditations ne seront pas enti6rement inutiles, et quoique je ne sois plus bon ý rien sur 
la terre, je n'aurai pas tout 6 fait perdu mes derniers jours. 153 
No longer writing for others, 
154 Rousseau's self-representation in writing is 
now only effected for the heuristic purposes of his re-interpretation of this 
same writing, and the flow of self-writing to self-reading is understood to 
bring him to an emotional and philosophical equilibrium. He is now said 
to be master of his own nature, quasi-divine geometer of 
his soul: 155 
152Rousseau uses the term 'perfectibilit6' in the second Discours to describe man's general 
adaptability to his surroundings, but his argument there also shows how the structure 
sows the seeds of man's degeneration from the state of nature to a state of alienation. This 
will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
153 OC 1, p. 999. 
I 54As he was, for instance in the Conficssions: 'J'6crivois mes premi6res Confessions et mes 
Dialogiics dans un souci continuel sur les moyens de les d6rober aux mains rapaces de mes 
persecuteurs pour les tranmettre s'iI 6toit possible ý d'autre generations. ' OC 1, p. 1001. 
1551-le even makes this immodest implication explicit, albeit not in an unambiguous 
fashion: 'et m'y volla tranquille au fond de Yabyme, pauvre mortel infortun6, mais 
impassible comme Dieu rriýme. 'OC 1, p. 999. 
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ljj'appliquerai le baromettre ý mon ame, et ces operations bien dirig6es et longtems 
repet6es me pourroient foumir des resultats aussi surs que leurs. Mais je Wkens pas 
jusques-16 mon entreprise. Je me contenterai cle tenir le registre des op6rations sans 
chercher ý les recluire en syst&me. Je fais ]a rnýme entreprise que Montagne [sic], mais 
avec un but tout contraire au sien : car il n'6crivoit ses essais que pour les autres, et je 
n'6cris mes r6veries que pourMoi. 156 
The singular melancholy of Rousseau"s science is assuaged by its reduction, 
not to a closed system of controlled relations, but to an open system: the 
'good' of his discoveries is reducible only to the indeterminate 'good in 
itself' of his soul whose self-writing and self-reading is its only self- 
justifying employment. 
The strange metaphysical landscape of Rousseau's Riveries, which I have 
attempted here to introduce briefly - his occupation with unsystematic 
systems, with useless uses, and spectres of others - is important because 
the 'objects' within it can be taken as indicative of the themes of much of 
his earlier writing, and we will return to these images many times during 
the course of the thesis. For the time being, however, I am only explicitly 
concerned with its fundamental gesture of self-containment. The 
attainment of this state, and the possibility of its description which is 
inseparably a part of it, seems to be both the core and goal of Rousseau's 
autobiographical project. 157 Starobinski calls itla transparence du cristal" 
and beautifully captures the mood of Rousseau's Riveries in his chapter of 
that name in La transparence et l'obstacle. 151 But it is not for nothing that 
156 OC 1, p. 1000-1. 
I 57The gesture of self-containment is already present in the Confessions but without being 
so fully developed. As early as Book III he writes: 'Mon coeur uniquement occup6 du 
pr6sent en remplit toute sa capacit6, tout son espace, et hors les plaisirs pass6s qui font 
d6sormais mes uniques jouissances, il Wy reste pas un coin de vide pour ce qui West plus. ' 
OC 1, p. 131. A letter written two years before (4thNovember, 1764) is almost more 
suggestive: 'On ne peut &tre heureux sur la terre qu'ý proportion qu'on s'61oigne des 
choses et qu'on se rapproche de soi. ' CC XXXVI, p. 272. 
", "After Rousseau's own self description in such terms (OC 1, p. 860 and elsewhere). See 
Starobinski (1971), pp. 301-316. 
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these final writings - which for many are the epitome and fulfilment of 
Rousseau"s philosophical and literary career151- are referred to as dreams. 
The term is appropriate partly because of the sense of peace that permeates 
the work (in particular contrast to the Dialogues), and partly because the 
exceptionally rich literary style of the Reveries seems almost to deny 
interpretative access and yet to be at the same time so in need of 
interpretation. Its appropriateness is perhaps most salient for my present 
purposes, however, in respect of the fact that dreams are so 
characteristically not for others: the objects of experience, both human and 
non-human, are for the dream just so many metaphors waiting to unfold, 
so many unmade connections waiting to be underwritten. Inalienably self- 
originating, the phenomena of dreams are radically uncontrolled by our 
sense of reality: they may reflect our real obligations and commitments to 
others, but their imagery suffers no responsibility to this order. And this 
lack of concern with the 'reality' of the real beyond the self, while 
characteristic of his last writing - and while too its distinct flavour 
permeates aspects of his entire output - was not always so conspicuously 
central to Rousseau. 160 
The sense of failure which the Riveries turn into self-authorednecessite' 
did not always have only one author, but rather reflected also the failure of 
others' responses. The Riveries begin with the reflection that'[I]e plus 
sociable et le plus aimant des humains ... [est] voici donc seul sur la terre, 
e' 161 n ayant plus de frere, de prochain, d'ami, de societ' que moi-m&me. 
This reflection colours the entire text, and the apparently successful defeat 
of melancholy is never allowed to become completely convincing. The new 
and peaceful freedom of his self-containment is explicitly still in spite of 
15" Besides Starobinski, see also O'Dea (1995) and others. 
160 See, for example, the b1tre ý d'Alenibert, where Rousseau - who is writing, after all, 
explicitly in the interests of a society - concludes: Te plus m6chant des homes est celui qui 
s'isole le plus, qui concentre le plus son Coeur en lui-mýme' (OC V, p. 107). 
161 OC 1, p. 995 (two phrases quoted in reverse order). 
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others: 'Voila le bien que m" ont fait mes persecuteurs... Ils se sont ot6s sur 
moi tout empire, et je puis desormals me moquer d'eux. ' 162 The retention of 
terms such as 'sociable" and 'societe', 'freres' and 'semblables' index 
precisely what is lost, the forgotten object and cause of Rousseau"s'reforme 
personelle'; his project, that is to say, of reforming himself 'aussi 
violernment que vainement' both as an example and an author for others. 
At the most obvious level, Rousseau's tum to autobiography had an 
arbitrary cause. Being forced first from France in the wake of the 
suppression of Emile in 1762 by the Paris parlement, and subsequently from 
Geneva following the scandal caused by Le Contrat social, it was made clear 
to Rousseau that any return to France from exile was conditional on his 
renouncing all writing with political and religious content. 161 His final 
attempt to remonstrate with the religious and political authorities in Paris - 
the impassioned and badly received Lettre ý Christophe de Bealimont written 
from Motiers in 1763 164 - contains the following recapitulation of the 
programme which many of his earlier writings, from the First Discours to 
the Contrat Social, had followed: 
Sit6t que je fus en 6tat d'observer les hommes, je les regardais faire, et je les 6coutais 
parler; puis, voyant que leurs actions ne ressemblaient point 6 leur discours, je cherchai 
]a raison de cette dissemblance, et je trouvai qu'kre et paraitre 6tant pour eux deux 
choses aussi diff6rentes qu'agir et parler, cette deuxi&me diff6rence 6tait la cause de 
I'autre, et avoit ý elle-m&me une cause qui me restoit A chercher. 165 
This metaphysical separation between being and appearing, and its 
mirroring in the moral separation from speech and act, is a focus of study 
which Rousseau learnt as much from his own experience as from its 
162 OC 1, p. 997. He returns to this narration of overcoming many times during the text, 
willing himself, his reader, to believe it. 
163See Cranston (1997). 
164A place from which he was soon also to be chased. 
1b50C IV, p. 966. 
Wnting Between Music and Philosophy -71- Miiý, ical and Moral Awakening 
obvious source in Plato. His awareness of it is more or less the content of 
the famous visionary episode on the road to Vmcennes. 166 Yet even this 
much-commented upon 'philosophical awakening" is pre-figured in two 
episodes from Rousseau's 'pre-philosophical' life. In these episodes, the 
first from Rousseau's early childhood, the second from his early adulthood, 
the theme of the failure of communication between himself and others, so 
fundamental to both his autobiography and philosophy, is apparent as 
paradigmatic. The rest of this section will be concerned to explore the 
moral-aesthetic awakening narrated in the first passage and the music- 
aesthetic awakening of the second. 
C. MORAL AWAKENING IN THE CONFESSIONS 
Rousseau begins his narration of moral awakening with an account of the 
idyllic emotional and physical landscape of Bossey, the small village to 
which he was sent with his cousin for their early education. The 
description of self-containment, of happy equilibrium, is not far removed 
from its more sophisticated version in the Riveries: 'J'etois doux, mon 
cousin Yetoit; ceux qui nous gouvernoient 1'6toient eux-m&mes. Pendant 
deux ans entiers je ne fus ni temoin ni victime dun sentiment violent. ' 167 
166See the second of the Lettres ý Malesherl)es, OC 1, p. 1135: 'Oh Monsieur si j'avois jamais 
pCi ecrire le quart de ce que j'ai v6 et senti sous cet arbre, avec quelle clart6 j'aurois fait voir 
toutes les contradictions du systeme social, avec quelle force j'aurois expos6 tous les abus 
de nos institutions, avec quelle simplicit6 j'aurois demontr6 que Yhomme est bon 
naturellement et que Cest par ces institutions seules que les hommes deviennent 
m6chans. ' This episode is often taken as the paradigmatic expression of the Rousseauan 
project, where it is understood that Rousseau's written 'acts' comprise an extended 
attempt to reproduce adequately the'words' he read under the tree on the road to 
Vincennes. See, for example, Henri Gouhier, 'Sur Dieu et la R&61ation% OC IV, pp. clxxx- 
cxciii. For the more famous relation of this episode in the Confessions, see OC 1, pp. 35 1 (f 
It, 7 ()C 1, p. 14. 
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Although Rousseau describes himself already as having a sense of shame 
and even justice, it turns out that this sense owes less to judgement than to 
the simple ability to perceive the displeasure of others. 'Conscience' for the 
time being is something transparent, an unproblematic correlation of 
internal and external states and unambiguous, immediately recognisable 
signs: 
[J]e le fus toujours beaucoup ý la honte, et je puis dire ici que Yattente des r6primandes 
de Mlle Lambercier me donnoit moins d'allarmes que la crainte de ]a chagriner... 
Cependant elle ne manquoit pas au besoin de s6v&A6, non plus que son fr6re: mais 
comme cette s6v6rit6, presque toujours juste, m'6toit jamais emport6e, je m'en affligeois 
et ne m'en mutinois point. J'6tois plus fach6 de d6plaire que d'&tre puni, et le signe du 
m6contentement m'6toit plus cruel que la peine afflictive. 168 
The 'family' at Bossey - two sibling adults and two child cousins - lived, in 
other words, in emotional communion: any excesses on the part of the 
younger half were easily contained by the immediate communication of 
appropriate emotional responses through transparent 'signes'. Rousseau's 
early notion of shame amounts to little more than the disagreeable 
sensation of another's displeasure. Similarly the notion of justice merely 
mirrors the trustworthiness of the adults' pleasure or displeasure. In other 
words, there is a more or less complete attunement of sensual pleasure and 
moral pleasure, a kind of aesthetic and ethical harmony in which the good 
of the small community regulates itself. 169 
168 OC 1, p. 14. 
169This situation of 'sweet' chastisement is developed in the following passages in a rather 
interesting way. Understanding his occasional punishments to be the instruments of his 
return to the fold, Rousseau comments that he began actually to enjoy them, and that, 'Ji]l 
falloit m&me toute la v&rit6 de cette affection ... pour m'emp&cher de chercher le retour du 
rriýme traitement en le m6ritant: car j'avois trouv6 dans ... la honte ... un m6lange de 
sensualit6 qui m'avoit laiss6 plus de desir que de crainte de 1'6prouver... Qui croiroit que 
ce ch5timent d'enfant receu ) huit ans par ]a main d'une fille de trente a d6cid6 de mes 
gouts, de mes desirs, de mes passions, de mol pour ]a reste de ma ý, Ie[? ]' Later, he 
confirms the Freudian flavour of this sexual awakening: 'ttre aux genoux d'une maitresse 
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It is only, then, when an inexplicable invasion of this harmony results 
that the community's bedrock of 'sentiments tendres, affectueux [et] 
paisibles' 170 is disturbed. The situation unfolds as follows. A servant places 
Mlle Lambercier's collection of combs in a cupboard in the room where the 
boy Rousseau is studying. When she returns to collect them it is 
discovered that one of them has been broken, seemingly intentionally. No- 
one but Rousseau had been in the room. In response to the immediate and 
sustained accusations, Rousseau earnestly denies having had anything to 
do with it, a position he maintained from childhood to adulthood. 
Nevertheless, his appeal as a child is unsuccessful and he is accused of 
lying. The episode shatters the equilibrium of Bossey the fragility of which 
only now do we discover, and the passage marks for Rousseau a distinctive 
transition into another kind of world. 
Qu'on se figure ... un enfant toujours gouvern6 par la voix de la raison, toujours trait6 
avec douceur, 6quit6, complaisance; qui Wavoit pas mýme l'id6e de l'injustice, 171 et qui, 
pour la pr6mi6re fois en 6prouve une si terrible, de la part pr6cis6ment des gens qu'il 
ch6rit et qu'iI respecte le plus. Quel renversement d'id6es! quel d6sordre de sentimens! 
quel bouleversement dans son coeur, dans sa cervelle, dans tout son petit kre 
intelligent et moral! 172 
Rousseau indicates his awareness for the first time of a collapse of the pre- 
reflective 'justice' 173 previously implicit in the framework of respect, of a 
contradiction between trustworthiness and truth and between the 
sentiment of another's reproach and the knowledge of one's own 
imperieuse, ob6ir ý ses ordres, avoir des pardons ý lui demander, 6toient pour moi de tr&s 
douces joissances'. OC 1, pp. 15 & 17. Maurice Cranston gives an account of the 
development of Rousseau's sexual masochism in Cranston (1991b). See also the account in 
Derrida (1976), pp. 152-7. 
170 OC 1, p. 14. 
171 A remark that obviously leads us to question what kind of 'idea' of justice the child had 
before this episode. 
172 OC 1, p. 19. 
1730n the relation between justice and instinct, see also Contrat Social, 1, viii, OC 111, p. 364. 
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innocence. For Rousseau and his little community, the 'bouleversement' is 
irreversible. 
U fut le terme de la serenit6 de ma vie enfantine... Nous restarnes encore ý Bossey 
quelque mois. Nous y fumes comme on nous r6pr6sente le pr6mier homme encore 
dans le paradis terrestre, mais ayant cess6 d'en joijir. C'6toit en apparence la m6me 
situation, et en effet une toute autre mani6re d'&tre. L'attachement, le respect, 
Yintimit6, la confiance, ne hoient plus les 616ves ý leurs guides; nous ne les regardions 
plus comme des Dieux qui lisoient dans nos coeurs: nous 6tions moins honteux de mal 
faire, et plus craintifs d'kre accus6s: nous commencions 6 nous cacher, ý nous mutiner, 
ý mentir. 174 
Rousseau's narration of the episode and its fall-out is strongly 
reminiscent of the secular, quasi- anthropologica I tale of the Fall of Man in 
the second Discours. We will return to this more systematically elaborated 
narrative below in Chapter 3, but for now it is important to bear in mind 
the failure of communication that for Rousseau is productive of the 
phenomenon of conscience. No longer are the external signs of Mlle 
Lambercier's reproach mirrored by a corresponding remorse, no more than 
is the child Rousseau's innocence communicable except to his confused and 
'bouleverse' self. No longer can one draw one's truth from an outside In 
which it finds itself unproblematically reflected, no more than does 
education remain the free imitation of one's respected models. Truth and 
education, instead, become marked by a process of struggle with one's 
models, a struggle and a failure to communicate one's innocence, one's 
own crucial self-belief, the sense of which seemingly originates only in spite 
of others. 
This awakening of conscience as purely internal negotiation between the 
representation of one's self and others is also presented as a closing of 
aesthetic sensibility. The loss of an equilibrium in which external signs no 
longer guarantee effective transmission is mirrored, that is to say, in a 
174 OC 1, pp. 20-1. 
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change in the way the world is perceived: the landscape of Bossey, which 
previously had reflected the sensual harmony of its community, discolours 
and fades: Ta campagne meme perdit ý nos yeux cet attrait de douceur et 
de simplicite qui va au coeur. ' 175 Starobinski's comments on this passage 
indicate very precisely what is at stake in Rousseau's fall from grace and 
his subsequent awakening to himself as sole master of his own truth: 
En m6me temps que se r6v&le confus6ment la d6chirure ontologique de Fkre et du 
paraitre... 176 le paradis est perdu: car le paradis, Ckait ]a transparence r6ciproque des 
consciences, la communication totale et confiante. Le monde lui-mýme change d'aspect 
et s'obscurcit... Quand le coeur de Yhomme a perdu sa transparence, le spectacle de la 
nature se ternit et se trouble. L'image du monde d6pend du rapport entre les 
consciences... L'6pisode de Bossey se termine par ]a destruction de la transparence du 
coeur et, simultan6ment, par un adieu ý 1'6clat de la nature. La possibilit6 quasi divine 
de 'lire dans les coeurs' Wexiste plus, la campagne se voile et la lumi&re du monde 
s'obscurcit. 177 
Starobinski's valorisation of Rousseau's imagery is beguiling, and it sets up 
a framework for his text in which Rousseau's subsequent178 philosophical 
activity is geared explicitly towards recapturing the lost 'communication 
totale et confiante", the irrecoverable 'transparence reciproque des 
consciences". The failure of this activity to re-incorporate others into this 
paradise mirrors the failure of the child's attempts to represent his 'etre- 
innocent' and overcome the 'paraitre-coupable' ; 179and the effort turns in 
later life, as we saw in relation to the Riveries, to that of reproducing the 
175 OC 1, p. 21. 
176'... [ill vient d'apprendre que Yintime certitude de Yinnocence est impuissante contre les 
preuves apparentes de la faute; il vient d'apprendre que les consciences sont s6par6es et 
qu'il est impossible de communiquer 1'6vidence imm6diate que Yon 6prouve en soi- 
m6me. ' 
177Starobinski (1971), pp. 19 & 21. 
178 Or, rather, previous in so far as the writing is concerned. 
1711 Starobinski (1971), p. 19. 
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'puretý du bonheur enfantin"11 in an'autre bonheur, totalement diffýrent, 
mais ou' son premier etat lui serait non moins totalement resititue. "ll 
The consistency of this structure, however, should not put us off another 
line of enquiry prompted by Rousseau's narration of his moral awakening. 
For all that the collapse of "transparence' into 'obscurite' entails the loss of 
effortless communion, so too does it also introduce a state of work; 
unwelcome at first, just as in Christian mythology, but necessary. This 
necessity, provided for by the (moral) belief that finds itself stranded 
without external confirmation, is deferred from the childhood scene to the 
writing of the extended self-justification of the Confessions. But just as the 
Confessions is not simply to be read as autobiography, in so far as the 
project of self-justification is supplemented by an implicit renewal of his 
attempts to justify his ideas about the world, the text participates to a 
certain extent in the work undertaken in his philosophical and musical 
writing. "' The work, in other words, is the work of interpretation, of 
interpreting the '&tre' hidden behind the 'apparaitre'; work whose necessity 
stems from the moral failure of the world and its inhabitants to be what 
they ought to be. And so while the childhood landscape and its inhabitants 
discolour and become opaque, we also witness the moment of Rousseau's 
individuation in this very will to work and interpret. 
Thus the "signes' of Mlle Lambercier's displeasure lose their transparent 
correlation with justified reproach - or, alternatively, the child Rousseau's 
justified remorse - and become instead signs capable of being interpreted, 
signs of thought processes and values distinct from his own. The lost 
immediacy of signification is replaced by the sign's new openness to the 
sphere of otherness. Rousseau's self-individuation is thus mirrored by the 
individuation to him of others who become objects of awareness in 
180Starobinski (1971), p. 18. 
181 Starobinski (1971), p. 20. 
182 Alain Grosrichard comments on this unIfying intention In Rousseau's work. See 
Grosrichard (1967), p. 64. 
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themselves rather than simple reflections of inner harmony in the outside 
world. The newly-gained opacity of the landscape which clouds the child 
Rousseau in confusion becomes an agent for the precision of the adult 
narrator's intelligence, allowing him access to the inhabitants of his 
childhood awareness on a level of detail that the instinctive suffusion of the 
world in trustworthiness would never previously have afforded. The 
glowing but undifferentiated description of natural harmony yields to a 
precision of description of others and objects that becomes a source of joy 
in itself: 
je me rapelle toutes les circonstances des lieux, des personnes, des heures. je vois ]a 
servente ou le valet agissant dans la chambre... le cabinet de M. Lambercier ... une 
estampe r6pr6sentant tous les papes, un barometre... je sais bien que le lecteur n'a pas 
grand besoin de savoir tout cela; mais j'ai besoin, moi, de lui dire. Que n'os6-je 
raconter de m6me toutes les petites anecdotes de cet heureux age, qui me font encore 
tressaillir d'aise quand je me les rappelle. 183 
This substitution of the "jouissance' of memory for the 'serenite '184 of 
childhood seems clearly to be a purely aesthetic pleasure. This luxury - 
'necessary' for Rousseau because it connects the joy of memory with the 
previous joy of living - is specifically said to be unnecessary for the reader. 
Nevertheless, this moment of aesthetic self-indulgence is only possible 
because the moral reality of the Bossey episode has been dissolved: 'll ya 
maintenant pres de cinquante ans de cette aventure, et je n"ai pas peur 
d'etre aujourdhui puni derechef pour le meme fait. ' 185 The facts of the 
matter - the facts so at odds with appearances - have lost any immediate 
connection with physical suffering, and are important now only for 
example, for their exemplary status in the autobiographical and 
philosophical paradigm being represented in the Bossey episode; a 
183 OC 1, p. 21. 
"'4 OC 1, p. 20. 
185 OC 1, P. 19. 
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paradigm of moral individuation through the failure of communication 
and the consequent opening up of aesthetic awareness to the world of 
individuals. And if the luxury of the aesthetic "tressaillir d'aise' is only 
afforded by our indifference to the moral reality of a situation, it is 
important to remember too that the very access to this aesthetic sphere is 
itself enabled only by the collapse of the guiltless world, by the 
individuation that results from the fracturing of the equilibrium of the 
original community. The work of interpretation always has, for Rousseau, 
a specifically moral origm. 
D. MUSICAL AWAKENING IN THE CONFESSIONS 
The Confessions contain many episodes that might be said to describe 
Rousseau's musical awakening. In her chapter on the place of music in his 
autobiographical writings Beatrice Didier contrasts the formative musical 
experiences of Rousseau's childhood - the songs of Tante Suzon' 86 - with 
those of his adolescence, typified by the farcical episode at Lausanne 
referred to above. 187 The nostalgia of the former"s'immediediate de la 
memoire', 181 and its representation of a world in which'violence' is'exclue 
... du desir', 111 is said to endow music for Rousseau with the promise of a 
return to the ""transparence"' des consciences"10 of the lost childhood. This 
is contrasted with the folly of the Lausanne episode in which Rousseau's 
improbable alter ego, Vaussore de Villeneuve, Inadequately conducts his 
186See OC 1, pp. 7-8. For a detailed discussion of the music of these songs, see Tiersot 
(1931). 
187See above, p. 17. 
188Didier (1985), p. 377. 
1`ý' Didier (1985), p. 378. The connection of violence with desire is first made in the'fall- 
out' of the Bossey episode. 
190 Didier (1985), p. 378. Didier is citing Starobinski here: see the passage quoted in the 
previous section on p. 76 above. 
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artless minuet. Didier makes the comparison that the narration of the 
Vaussore episode 
ne s'agit plus du m&me homme que clans 1'6pisode de Tante Suzon; il ne s'agit pas non 
plus de ]a rnýme musique. 11 s'agit d'une musique qui devrait kre savante, et 
justement tout le drame consiste en ce que Rousseau fait mine de poss6der une science 
qu'il n'a pas... Dans Yepisode enfantin, un cadre strictement familial et quasi matemel, 
Yamour, le secret, le'dedans', un chant simple et qui ne fait appel 6 aucune science, 
mais o6 Y61an du coeur permet une imm6diatet6 de la communication du souvenier. 
Dans 1'6pisode qui marque Yaccesion douloureuse 6 Y5ge adulte, au contraire, la 
pr6sence hostile de la soci6t6, ]a mise en sc&ne d'un spectacle ob se fait durement 
sentire un'dehors', ob Jean-Jacques, dans sa solitude, s'exile de lui-m&me, ob ]a 
musique instrumentale r6clamerait un savoir que justement Yapprenti musicien ne 
poss&de pas; nulle communications possible avec les autres ... 19, 
Didier's vocabulary here is specifically designed to link Rousseau's 
embarrassment at Lausanne with his subsequent adult distaste for 
/musique savante' and his converse search for refuge in a music whose 
'immediatete de la communication' enables him to glimpse his lost 
childhood happiness and its utopian reconstructions. And this 
manipulation of the conspicuous terminology of Rousseau's mature music 
aesthetics is all the more apposite when she comes to discuss his 
rediscovery of music in Venice. For Didier, the more literal 'awakening" to 
music in the theatre of Saint-Chrysostome presents the adult Rousseau's 
first grasp of music in which the estrangement of his aunt's folk-songs from 
the unapproachable music of the real world can be negotiated. 
The passage in question comes from Book VII of the Confessions, and is 
related as a reminiscence of the'celebres amusemens de cette ville"'I which 
compensated a little for his ill use by the ambassador in whose service he 
was at the time. It thus provides some light relief from the wider setting of 
the extreme change of tone that separates the first half the work (Books I- 
191 Didier (1985), p. 380. 
l')2 OC 1, p. 313. 
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VI) from the second (Books VII-XII). The memories that Rousseau relates 
in the second half are both closer to him and more painful, containing 
nothing but 'malheurs, trahisons, perfidies, [et] souvenirs attrisants et 
dechirants. "191 Gone now, therefore, is the Jouissance' of memory that 
arose from the writer's distance from the moral reality of the Bossey 
episode. The subject of the later confessions is the simultaneous injustice 
and righteousness of writer's alienation from society, and its tales thus 
connect directly with the general moral orientation of the Confessions as 
self-interpretation: the work of justifying the self as both innocent and 
good. 194 Passages in which the dark tone of much of the second half is 
absent are therefore both remarkable as well as welcome, and the brief 
passage on the musical amusements of Venice is particularly conspicuous 
for the more or less complete absence of any kind of justification. 
Un jour au th6atre de St. Chrysostome je m'endormis et bien plus profond6ment que je 
n'aurois fait dans mon ht. Les airs br-uyants et brillants ne me r6veill&rent point. Mais 
qui pourroit exprimer la sensation d6licieuse que me firent la douce harmonie et les 
chants ang6liques de celui qui me r6veilla. Quel r6veil! Quel ravissement! quelle 
extase, quand j'ouvris au m&me instant les oreilles et les yeux! Ma premi&re id6e fut de 
me croire en Paradis. Ce morceau ravissant que je me rappelle encore et que je 
n'oublierai de ma vie commenýoit ainsi. 
Conservann la bella 
Che si niaccende il cor. 
je voulus avoir ce morceau, je 1'eus, et je I'ai gard6 longempts; mais il n'6toit pas sur 
mon papier comme dans ma m6moire. C'6toit bien la rnýrne note, mais ce n'6toit pas ]a 
193 OC 1, p. 279. 
11)4Rousseau addresses his reader in the Preface to the work, requesting them 'de ne pas 
oter ý Yhonneur de ma m6moire le seul monument sýir de mon caract6re qui Wait pas 6t6 
d6figut-6 par mes ennemis. ' OC 1, p. 3. For more on the gesture of self-justification in the 
Confcs,,; I'Oiis, see Bernard Gagn6bin and Marcel Raymond's introduction, OC 1, pp. xxx- 
xxxviii. 
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m&me chose. jamais cet air divin ne peut kre ex6cut6 que clans ma tke, comme il le fut 
en effet le jour qu'il me r6veilla. 195 
This passage is important for a number of reasons. The gesture of 
passing, via a "digression within a digression', "' to less serious topics such 
as music -a gesture we find in a number of the musical writings, 
particularly the Lettre - and the accompanying release from the rhetoric of 
self-justification is undercut by Rousseau"s apparently jealous 
possessiveness of his 'example': Je voulus avoir ce morceau, je Feus, et je 
Fai garde longtems. The example, which Philip Robinson describes as a 
-'single unique incident, a moment of inner life inaccessible in principle to 
anyone but the subjectV 97 is one of the survival of his inner self against the 
onslaught of false representations that mark the condition of his 
confessional subjectivity. The memory of the Venetian theatre is clearly a 
form of aesthetic 'jouissance", an interpretation of an aesthetic experience 
which somehow penetrates into the dim gloom of moral connections in 
which the reader and writer are immersed. Nevertheless, this 'jouissance' 
is somewhat different to that of the memories of Bossey we described 
earlier. There, Rousseau's delight was in capturing the details of the scene 
and in sharing them. Similarly, his concern in doing so seems clearly to 
have been the reproduction of a paradigm of moral and aesthetic 
consciousness. Here, such access is resolutely denied, for the object 
referred to is a unique perceptual act which we have neither the ability nor 
it seems the right to share. 
A number of things contribute to this denial of access. Rousseau doesn't 
name the opera. Nor does it seem either to have been well-known at the 
time or to be traceable now, and the question of whether the 'air' is 
invented or not is, after considerable research, left open by Jacques Voisine 
191 OC 1, p. 314. The editors of the P16iade edition translate the couplet as'La belle me 
garde / Qui m'enflamme ainsi le coeur. ' OC 1, p. 1399. 
196Robinson (1979), p. 22. 
1"7Robinson (1979), p. 23. 
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in his commentary on the passage. 198 Moreover, the apparently precise 
information about the theatre turns out to be equally misleading, if equally 
suggestive, in that, according to Giovanni Morelli, it cannot have been in 
this theatre that Rousseau heard thisair". whether real or imaginary. 199 
Rather than being a reference to the actual, hidden, event itself, Rousseau's 
specificity with respect to the theatre seems instead to refer allegorically to 
his intention in narrating the event; for St. Jean Chrysostome is the saint 
who, as Grosrichard puts it, 'operait de si miraculeuses conversions chez 
ceux dont les oreilles et le coeur etaient prets a accueillir le divin message 
transmis par sa "bouche dor". "10 One can speak of a 'conversion' of course 
because the passage is 'staged' as the first time Rousseau discovers the 
Italian music the virtues of which so much of his musical writing is 
intended to communicate and establish theoretically. One can also speak of 
Rousseau's 'openness" to this conversion in reference to Didier's 
framework of a search for a music which neither chastised him nor whose 
beauty is simply the reflection of the apparently limitless benevolence of 
Tante Suzon and her like. 101 It thus seems to be Rousseau's own adidt 
beauty - his inner sincerity and truth the earnest defence of which frames 
the digression on the Venetian "air' - that seems to find itself mirrored in 
the music. But as to the external sign of this self-communion, it is either 
forgotten, erased, or simply dreamed. 
198 See Voisine (1964), p. 371, n. I- See also Robinson (1979), p. 26, and Grosrichard (1987), 
pp. 10-11. 
I" Cited by Grosrichard (1987), p. 17, n. 6: 'GrAce ý Giovanni Morelli - de Venise -, on salt 
pr6sent que ce West pas au th65tre de Saint-Chrysostome que Rousseau entendit chanter 
cet air. ' 
200 Grosrichard (1987), p. 11. 
201 Didier does not in fact make this point, but given that Book VII marks a decisive break 
with the universal trustworthiness of his childhood awareness and its moral unreality, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that in the absence in his life of figures like Tante Suzon, there 
is no corporeal presence other than Rousseau's own to which such beauty can attach itself. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Why this seemingly purposeful erasure? Surely in a work so littered with 
examples and allegorical explanations of Rousseau's philosophical and 
musical ideas to the degree that most critics find them indispensable as a 
source of reference, this one seemingly crucial example of his discovery of 
the delights of Italian music should be accompanied by some manner of 
justification, some account of the 'music itself" except in a series of clues 
which, seemingly, lead nowhere? For the sphere of possible reference to 
his own published writings on music included (November 1769) not just 
the celebrated and still much cited Lettre slir la musiqueftanpise - in which 
the virtues of Italian vocal music are justified, as we shall see, in a very 
specific way - but also the then very recently published Dictionnalre de 
musique, 202 a work very well received and certainly far from being silent on 
this issue. Yet at no point in his discussion here does Rousseau say 
anything but that he remembers the words (Garde-moi la beaute pour qui 
mon coeur bru^ le tant' ), 203 that he remembers the music, and, most 
emphatically, that he remembers the moment. No explanation - neither of 
the adequacy of the music to the words, nor of the adequacy of the words 
and music to his sentiment - is provided. Rather, these possible 
connections are effaced: 'C'etoit bien la meme note, mais ce n'6toit pas la 
meme chose. Jamais cet air divin ne peut &re execute que dans ma t&te, 
comme il le fut en effet le jour qu'il me reveilla. " Rousseau's denial of 
access is resolute. 204 
101 The Lettre was published in 1753, the Dictionnaire in 1767. The specifically musical 
writings which Rousseau wrote in between these two remained unpublished at this time. 
203Translation of Jacques Voisine in op. cit., p. 371, n. 1. 
-'()4The denial is reminiscent of the less mysterious one Rousseau describes when 
discussing the half-remembered song of Tante Suzon: 'J'ai cent fois projett6 d'6crire 6 Paris 
pour faire chercher le reste des paroles, si tant est que quelqu'un les connoisse encore. 
Mais je suis presque sCir que le plaisir que je prens ý me rappeller cet air s'6vanouiroit en 
partie, si)'avois la preuve qu d'autres que ma pauvre tante Suson Yont chant6. ' OC 1, p. 
12. 
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The episode, then, in contrast with the intelligible paradigm of Bossey, is 
something of a mystery. Neither the facts nor the 'effet' can be reproduced 
except by Rousseau himself: no possible notation could suffice for the 
communication of this 'effet" to others; and nor is any such notation 
necessary for the reproduction of this to himself, etched so decisively and 
defensively on his memory. Does this contrast allow for the suspicion that 
Rousseau, by 1769, had decided that his moral philosophy, on the one 
hand, offered adequate explanations, but that his music theory, on the 
other, did not? Does it suggest, too, that the aesthetic jouissance' opened 
up by the origination of moral consciousness described in the Bossey 
episode is never to be commensurate with the terms of that moral 
consciousness itself? Does a sustained engagement with moral reality 
proscribe aesthetic jouissance' except M dream-like digressions? Or does it 
rather suggest that at the bottom of his conception of musical experience 
lies a phenomenon irreducible except in terms of the allegorical 
representation of the event itself; a conception, that is to say, in which the 
explanatory mode of interpretative discourse is itself a part of the idea of 
music itself? 
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CHAPTER 2 
MUSIC AND IMITATION 
I 
IMITATION IN THE LETTRE SUR LA MUSIQUE FRAN(ýOISE 
A. DOEs FRENCH Music ExiST? 
Rousseau's Lettre sur la musiquefranpise is consistently analysed in terms of 
its being a transitional text; of its presenting, that is, an understanding of 
the question of musical taste and significance the problems of which are 
overcome in the later musical writings. According to Philip Robinson, for 
example, the Lettre 
is to Rousseau's musical theory rather what the first Discours is to his social theory: it is 
less important for the depth of its analysis than for the audacity of its challenge to the 
adversary, and for the all-important sketch of method and principles which later texts 
subsequently develop. 205 
This analysis seems to me apposite in the respect that while some of music- 
theoretical and philosophical flaws of the text are either discarded or 
substantially revised in later writings, the central tenets of Rousseau's 
mature music theory are presented in an orderly and reasonably systematic 
way. The doctrine of 'Unite de m6lodie', as we have already seen, is 
outlined in the Lettre, as are the supporting theories concerning the primacy 
of vocal music over instrumental and melody over harmony. Moreover, 
205Robinson (1984), p. 106. See also O'Dea (1995): 'The Lettre ... is a transitional work, in 
the sense that it lays down certain principles that will continue to inform Rousseau's 
musical writings, but does not place them in the historical setting that will later give them 
a greatly enhanced significance. ' 
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although these areas of thought are substantially re-worked in the later 
writings, this re-working concerns not so much the music-theoretical 
substance of the ideas themselves so much as a strengthening and 
reformulating of the philosophical framework designed to support them. 
On the other hand, it is also desirable to emphasise that there is another 
important sense in which the Lettre occupies not so much a transitional as 
an essentially singular place among Rousseau"s musical texts. Its 
singularity in this sense relates to the extremity of the positions taken on 
the two main subjects addressed: the relation between music and language, 
and the differences between French and Italian operatic music. "' The 
rather complicated relation which the Lettre bears to the other musical 
writings is, then, one of its most instructive features in so far as the modern 
reader is concerned; for if there is both a palpable sense that its 
philosophical and music-theoretical shortcomings identify the problems his 
later thought seeks to overcome, there is also a way in which its ambitions 
and content are integrated to a degree which none of the subsequent texts 
manages to reproduce. 
In the first chapter, we discussed the way in which the philosophical 
aims of the Lcttre seemed to constitute an attempt to 'speak the good' of 
music, to write well of the subject, that is, in addition to writing of that 
which is good about music. This task, it will be remembered, was 
understood by Rousseau in the Lettre to fall in a certain sense to the 
philosopher rather than the musician, 207 and the argument put by Rousseau 
certainly proceeds according to a philosophical framework within which 
the music-theoretical content is organised and valorised. The framing 
argument is a simple one: devastating if taken seriously, a rhetorical coup dc 
grace if taken with the severe pinch of salt it requires. Rather than employ 
206 Jacqueline Waeber emphasizes the way in which the Lettre's polemical nature of acts to 
distort Rousseau's position on the question of French and Italian opera. See Waeber 
(2004). 
207See Chapter I above, pp. 26-7. 
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arbitrary principles to attempt to decide the question of whether Italian 
opera is preferable to French, Rousseau argues, surely it is better to ask 
what kind of music is proper to each nation, and, 'avant que de parler de 
1'excellence de notre Musique, il seroit peut-etre bon de s"assurer de son 
existence, et d'examiner d'abord ... si nous en avons une. " 208 
The extreme nature of the position taken by Rousseau on this question, 
while conceived partly humorously as a rather masterful rhetorical 
flourish, is predicated on an argument the elegant simplicity of which must 
have exasperated the unsympathetic portion of his readership. The 
argument runs as follows. The expressive content of music resides in 
melody, and both the expressive content and character of the melody 
derives from the language it imitates. Crucially, this imitation of language 
is direct, or at least partly so: the melody draws its metrical and accentual 
qualities from those of the language and thus possesses the same 
expressive qualities as are manifest by the particular metre and accent. 
Given this, and taking a language like the French - which, as Rousseau 
states, is non-accentual in nature - and the conclusion is easily reached that 
French melody is bound to be inexpressive. From where it follows that, if 
the purpose of music is to be expressive, there is no such thing, properly 
speaking, as French music. 
Although the argument in itself is a blunt one, the way in which 
Rousseau pushes a number of basic but unsystematically explored 
elements of contemporary musical understanding to their logical limits 
shows a great deal of rhetorical sophistication. Foremost among these is 
his handling of the notion that the purpose of music is to be expressive. 
The argument hinges on the idea that music which fails to be expressive 
thereby also fails to be music, but he seems to have been careful not to 
present this idea too straightforwardly -a strategy that would have 
allowed his reader grounds for a disagreement that would completely 
'()s Lcttrc sur la musi . quefran(oise, OC V, p. 291. 
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undermine the argument - and instead simply skirt round the issue, 
playing on the increasingly widespread assumption that the purpose and 
measure of music is indeed to be expressive. Instead, he seems content to 
lay something of a 'false scent, presenting a secondary argument about the 
source of musical expression in the imitation of linguistic accent. Thus an 
argument with relatively extensive contemporary theoretical support - that 
musical expression derives from the imitation of linguistic accent - carries 
another more controversial position to the effect that music exists to be 
expressive. 
It is on this basis that Rousseau is able to present what are the Lettre's 
three genuine contributions to the music-theoretical debate. First, and most 
famously, the Lettre sketches the idea of 'Unite de melodie' for the first time 
in detall. 209 Second, Rousseau argues that, irrespective of basis of principles 
according to which musical sound is organised, the principles of musical 
expressivity are cultural-historical in nature. Third, he uses the previous 
two notions as a lens through which to characterise the history of musical 
style. 
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY OF MELODY 
The principle of unity of melody draws its strength from the previously 
established precepts about the source of musical expression and the 
expressive goal of music: 
Pour qu'une Musique clevienne int6ressante, pour qu'elle porte ý I'ame les sentimens 
qu'on y veut exciter, il faut que toutes les parties concourent ý fortifier 1'expression du 
109 Elements of the idea are presented in the slightly earlier Lettre ý Grinini. Here, however, 
the theory operates in the background of the text, providing much of the armoury of 
Rousseau's attempt to discredit Rameau's operatic compositional style to provide an 
armoury of negative criticisms, and no positive theory is really elaborated. See OC V, pp. 
272-4. 
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sujet; que I'harmonie ne serve qu'ý le rendre plus 6nergique; que Yaccompagnement 
Yembelisse, sans le couvrir ni le d6figurer; que la Basse, par une marche uniforme et 
simple, guide en quelque sorte celul qui chante et celul qui 6coute, sans que ni Yun ni 
I'autre s'en apperqoive; il faut, en un mot, que le tout ensemble ne porte ý la fois 
qu'une m6lodie ý Yoreille et qu'une Jd6e ý 1'6sprit. 210 
A relatively simple idea, therefore, and supported by a seemingly stable 
general philosophical argument about the nature of music, is made to 
extend some considerable distance into a discussion of musical style. 
The appeal to this unity of melody is deepened further by Rousseau's 
suggestion that it is "fondee sur le meme principe, et dirigee vers le meme 
objet' as the Aristotelian principle of the unity of action in drama. Besides 
adding to the pedigree of the principle, this manoeuvre also had the benefit 
of robbing some of the high ground of establishment from the opposing 
camp in the Querelle des bouffons, the polemical context of the Lettre . 21 1 The 
'coin du Roi' had taken Jean-Philippe Rameau as its main figurehead, and 
the one field of battle they would have thereby assumed to have taken 
comfortably was that of established French practices. And yet, as Rousseau 
knew very well, in the previous pamphlet war, Rameau's camp had been 
attacked on the grounds that his operas failed to display precisely this 
unity of action. 212 Rousseau"s claim to find this unity, sacrosanct to French 
210 OC V, p. 305. 
211 Although Rousseau writes that the Lettre was written in the auturrin and winter of 1752 
at the height of the pamphleteering, he refrained from publishing the text until November 
of the following year. This, whether a true report or an intentional conceit, was something 
of a masterstroke, for it both caught the opposition unprepared and also, and more 
importantly, allowed Rousseau to claim the tone of independent judiciousness. 
'Maintenant que les Bouffons sont cong6di6s', as he writes in the preface, 'et qu'il West 
plus question de Cabales, je crois pouvoir hazarder mon sentiment ... sans craindre en cela 
d'offenser personne. ' OC V, 289. That no single text in the history of French musical 
literature has given more offense than this one only adds to the sense that of Rousseau's 
mastery of the polemical situation. For Rousseau's account of the Lettre's reception, see 
CoiifesslOns, OC, 1, pp. 384-5. 
212See, for example, Masson (1911), pp. 201-ff. 
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theatrical tradition, transmuted into the musical stylistic practice of Italian 
opera, would therefore have been a considerable blow. 
We will return to the substance of Rousseau's "principe' of "unite de 
m6lodie' at the end of this chapter when we discuss its presentation in the 
Dictionnaire de musique. It is important to stress at this point, however, that 
there is strong evidence that Rousseau considered the principle to be the 
cornerstone of his musical and, in a sense, general aesthetic theory. As 
Michael O'Dea suggests, the analogies between Rousseau's presentation of 
it in the Lettre and aspects of Rameau's exposition of the idea of the 
fundamental bass are -too close to be entirely coincidental. 1213 And 
although, as we saw in Chapter 1, there is a change of emphasis over the 
years in the way in which the principle's derivation is understood by 
Rousseau, the suggestion that the good of music occurs in the requirement 
that'le tout ensemble ne porte a la fois qu"une melodie ý Foreille et qufune 
idee a Yespritf is the one which displays the greatest possibility of genuine 
music- theoretical application and the greatest evidence of genuine practical 
compositional influence in the French vocal traditions of the latter half of 
the century. 
C. THE CULTURAL ORIGIN OF MUSICAL ExPRESSION 
The idea that musical expression is cultural-historical in origin is partly an 
extension of the idea that music imitates the accents of language: different 
national languages reflect differences in national character which are both 
historically and culturally contingent; in imitating language melody thus 
also reflects this difference. 
2130'Dea (1995), p. 31. The analogy occurs particularly in respect of the suggestion that 
the principle is observed in practice but has hitherto been 'regI6 par aucun Th6oricien' (OC 
V, p. 311). 
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J'ai dit que toute Musique Nationnale tire son principal caract&e de la langue qui lui 
est propre, et je dois ajouter que c'est principalement la prosodie de la langue qui 
constitue ce caract&e ... [L]es diverses mesures de la Musique vocale Wont pü naitre 
que des diverses manieres dont on pouvoit scander le discours et placer les brýves et 
les longues les unes ä Fýgard des autres. 214 
The notion of melody's irreducibly cultural origin goes hand in hand with 
the notion that melody is the carrier of expression in music. In the Lettre 
this relation between cultural difference and aesthetic significance, to use a 
more modern term, remains more or less unexplored, but it does provide 
the basis for Rousseau's main music-theoretical attack on Rameau; that is, 
the assertion of the priority of melody over harmony in both ontological 
and practical musical terms. The assertion is supported by the idea of the 
cultural origin of expression in virtue of the fact that Rousseau no longer 
needs to tackle Rameau's theory of harmony'head on', as it were. 215 
Instead, he may cede its practical relevance, ingenuity and even scientific 
value, all the while maintaining its irrelevance to the issue of expression. 
L'harmonie ayant son principe dans la nature, est la rriýme pour toutes les Nations, ou 
si elle a quelques diff6rences, elles sont introduites par celles de la m6lodie ; ainsi, c'est 
de la m6lodie seulement qu'il faut tirer le caract6re particulier d'une Musique 
Nationale. 216 
Expression, unlike the rules of harmony, is not answerable to a static 
conception of nature, or the nature of things, but to a dynamic conception 
of culture. Armed thus with a semi-explicit realignment of the 
understanding of the nature of music, now understood to lie in it fulfilling 
2140C V, p. 294. 
215Many commentators have observed that there is no real music-theoretical engagement 
between Rousseau and Rameau. Wokler (1987b) argues that the difference is essentially 
one of how far rational principles extend into (cultural) musical practice (pp. 250ff); 
Kintzler (1979) argues that the opposition is primarily aesthetic and not genuinely 
theoretical, while Verba (1993) stresses the music-theoretical proximity of the two authors 
(pp. 8-18). 
216 OC V, p. 292. 
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its expressive potential, Rousseau, in terms of the substance of his 
argument, need hardly discuss Rameau's claims at all. 
While the assertion of melody"s - and, by extension, music"s - cultural 
origins is obviously a cornerstone of the Lettre's overall argument about the 
superiority of Italian vocal music, Rousseau seems to lose sight of the idea 
at a strategic point in the text. This occurs when he seeks to provide a 
series of pseudo-empirical proofs for his argument, the third of which 
consists of a story about an Armenian visitor to Venice who has no 
previous experience of music. Rousseau attests to having witnessed an 
event during which performances of a monologue from Rameau's Hippolyte 
and an aria by Galuppi were given, 
m6diocrement pour le Franýois, et mal pour l'Italien, par un homme accoutum6 
seulement 6 ]a Musique Franýoise, et alors trýs-anthousiaste de celle de M. Rameau. je 
remarqual dans I'Armenien durant tout le chant Franýois, plus de surprise que de 
plaisir; mais tout le monde observa d6s les premieres mesures de I'air Italien, que son 
visage et ses yeux s'adoucissoient; il 6toit enchant6,11 prkoit son ame aux impressions 
de ]a Musique, et quoiqul'il entenclit peu la langue, les simples sons lui causoient un 
ravissement sensible . 217 
In this rather disarming way, Rousseau, as Michael O'Dea puts it, 
'smuggles"" a static conception nature back into the equation. So while 
much of the force of Rousseau's argument draws precisely from the denial 
that the laws of nature govern the production of music, or at least the 
production of what in music is significant or expressive, the 'proof' of 
precisely this denial appeals to exactly the same kinds of laws of nature in 
disguise. So while music has specifically cultural origins, its reception can 
nonetheless be considered subject to trans-cultural or pseudo-natural laws. 
As O'Dea points out, however, that appeal to a static or physical 
conception of nature 'is not related to acoustic laws but to the universality 
217 OC V, p. 302. 
'I, ', See O'Dea (1995), p. 29. 
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of the emotions that find expression in the music of certain languages. "" 
The opposition, thus, may be understood to relate to one between the 
nature of man and the culture of men; an opposition, that is to say, central to 
Rousseau's moral-philosophical endeavour in general. 
The obvious reason for this manouevre is that, the Lettre being a 
polemical work, Rousseau requires all the resources he can muster by fair 
means or foul. In this case then, where it seems appropriate to call on the 
idea of nature to guarantee the superiority of Italian music, Rousseau is 
happy to do so, regardless of whether his previous arguments have placed 
this support beyond his legitimate reach . 221 However, while the example 
was surely conceived more for its rhetorical than any proper evidential 
force, the appeal to the idea of nature as authority for cultural practice is 
enormously significant because it identifies very precisely a general 
problem that Rousseau spent more or less the entirety of his career trying 
to come to terms with. 
This is the problem of the two kinds of nature - the nature of man and 
nature per sc - which we touched on in Chapter I in the context of our 
discussion of Rousseau's attempt to construe the cry of nature both as 
something originating in nature (thus deriving its philosophical authority 
from this), and at the same time as the origin of culture. There is evidence, 
for example in both the Essai sur Vorigine des langues: and the second 
Discours, that Rousseau considered the transition between nature and 
human culture to be among his central and most important, if most 
puzzling, themes. On the other hand, the absence of a sufficiently elaborate 
historical and historiographical framework in the Lettre to address the issue 
makes Rousseau's ambivalence seem more like an error in argumentation 
than an attempt to deal sensitively with one of the eighteenth century's 
knottiest problems. Nonetheless, it is difficult to question Rousseau's 
sincerity, at the level of basic convictions, in deploying the An-nenian 
2190'Dea (1995), p. 29. 
220 This is certainly O'Dea's reading. See O'Dea (1995), pp. 29-30. 
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example for the simple reason that without such an appeal there would be 
no basis for Rousseau's general argument. That is to say, regardless of 
whether the French have a national music, there would still be no basis for 
arguing to a French audience about the relative merit of Italian vocal music 
because, in principle, such music, rooted in specifically Italian cultural 
institutions, would be unintelligible to French ears. 
This ambiguity surrounding the precise question of the cultural 
specificity of musical reception is one which remains in Rousseau's music 
theory throughout. His indecision in this respect reflects a genuine 
wavering between a desire, on the one hand, to emphasize the cultural 
origins of music in particular and aesthetic significance in general and, on 
the other hand, to bring out the equally critical notion that it is precisely in 
its ability to cross such divisions as cultural and national difference that the 
moral importance of music lies. That is to say, if Rousseau is never in any 
doubt that music draws its emotional and expressive content from those 
that produce it, he also seems to take a firm line on the idea that such 
content has no value if it does not somehow transcend the scene of its 
production. 
In this sense, then, Rousseau's appeal in the story about the Armenian 
can be read less as an appeal to a kind of substitute natural principle than 
to an order of openness within the structures through which cultural 
products such as music signify, or come to be expressive. In other words, 
although the 'evidence" operates on one level as a kind of proof by 
referring to a standard of universal validity drawn from the nature of 
things, on another level the story is presented as evidence of Italian music's 
resistance to a kind of cultural ossification; resistance, that is to say, of the 
musical materials from forming a closed, pseudo-natural order. 
D. A (MORAL) HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MUSICAL STYLE 
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It is in this connection that the third of Rousseau's main points we have 
singled out becomes particularly significant. This feature of the Lettre was 
its deployment of a morally valorized historiography of musical style. In 
style and structure it is related to the main idea of the first Discoiirs to the 
effect that increasing sophistication in artistic practices is both a symptom 
as well as an agent of cultural decay. In the musical context, attached to an 
already powerful critique of French musical aesthetics, the message is a 
powerful one. 
L'impossibilit6 d'inventer des chants agr6ables obligerolt les Compositeurs [franýoisesj 
ý tourner tous leurs soins du c6t6 de Marmonie, et faute de beaut6s r6ellees, ils y 
introduiroient des beaut6s de convention, qui n'auroient presque d'autre m6rite que ]a 
difficult6 vaincue; au lieue d'une bonne Musique, ils imagineroient une Musique 
sqavante ; pour suppl6er au chant, ils multiplieroient les accompagnements ; il leur en 
couteroit moins de placer beaucoup de mauvaises parties les unes au-dessus des 
autres, que d'en faire une qui ffit bonne. Pour 6ter l'insipidit6, ils augmenteroient la 
confusion ; ils croiroirent faire de la Musique et ils ne feroient que du bruit. 221 
The historiographical content of this analysis is easy to grasp. The 
deficiencies of French music in respect of its proper expressive function has 
led to compensatory strategies which themselves inform and control the 
history of the style which has been one - and could only have been thus - 
of increasing decadence. The historiographical axes are provided by a 
terminology that resonates strongly both with contemporary aesthetic 
theory and with Rousseau's general moral philosophy: conventional 
beauty replaces real beauty, confusion succeeds insipidity, noise eradicates 
music. The history of French composition becomes one of the progressive 
suppression of intention from the musical material. 
This characterization of French musical style and its history both draws 
on and supports the idea of 'unite de m6lodie' and, more obviously, the 
notion of music as cultural practice. In advocating a compositional style in 
221 OC V, p. 293. 
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which all parts of the music are at one with the melodic expression, 
Rousseau clearly thinks he has found a recipe which, even if it is unclear as 
to whether it can be applied as a remedy for French practices, provides 
music with insurance against decay by remaining faithful to its natural 
function. 222 (The historical angle is also applied to Italian music whose 
recent history has been, in contrast to the French, a process of 
refinement. 
)223 
In strengthening the main claims of the Lettre thus, however, Rousseau's 
historiographic analysis also points towards what I consider to be the text's 
main weakness. This weakness - or, rather, that in the text which appears 
to be most 'transitional' as opposed to more straightforwardly polemical - 
lies in the way in which the analysis of history fails to extend to the 
principle of imitation adopted in the Lettre. That is to say, it seems that 
while Rousseau was happy to provide a historical analysis of the further 
degeneration of French musical style, and to a certain extent of the 
perfection of Italian, there is no sense in which the historical sense of 
musical style is applied to the concept of imitation. This, in the Lettre, 
remains as a purely static concept according to which, as we discussed 
earlier, music simply imitates the metrical and accentual qualities of 
language. Moreover, these qualities are assumed to be stable, resident as it 
were in each language at its birth. 
In this way, and whether for reasons of polemical efficacy or 
philosophical oversight, Rousseau's account is relieved of the responsibility 
of accounting for the history of human expression as that upon which the 
222See OC V, p. 307: 'Voila tout ce que rendre la r6gle de FuniI6 peut accorder au go6t du 
Musicien, pour parer le chant ou le rendre plus expressif, soit en embellissant le sujet 
principal, soit en y ajoutant un autre qui lui reste assujetti. ' 
221 A process not yet complete in Rousseau's view. See OC V, p. 309: 'Depuis rnýme que les 
Italiens ont rendu Yharmonie plus pure, plus simple, et donn6 tout leurs soins 6 la 
perfection de la m6lodie, je ne nie pas qu'il ne soit encore demeure parmi eux quelques 
16g6res traces des fugues et desseins gothiques, et quelques fois de doubles et triples 
m6lodies. ' 
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history of music is ontologically and historically reliant. The history of 
style, in other words, is prevented from connecting fruitfully with the 
history of what is styled. That Rousseau felt this to be a weakness in the 
text is not evidenced directly by any of his later references to the Lettre, but 
is nonetheless indirectly suggested by the fact that it was precisely towards 
the question of what and how music imitates that Rousseau's music- 
theoretical work of the following years was oriented. As we shall see, the 
model of imitation Rousseau develops moves squarely away from a 
scheme in which music imitates language towards one in which music and 
language are both considered imitations of the same original 
communicative event. In cases, such as vocal music, then, the idea becomes 
not so much one of music imitating the accents of language, but one of both 
music and language imitating that of which both musical and linguistic 
accent are considered both an expression and an imitation. 224 
The model - again as we shall see - is evidently a more subtle one in 
respect of being able to account for the history of musical style as being 
itself part of the history of expression. It is also far more equipped to allow 
for a genuine link with the moral sphere than the structure of the Lettre 
allows. For despite Rousseau's moralising, both genuine and postured, in 
the Lettre, the model of the musical good elaborated in the text remains a 
purely aesthetic one. And while, as I argued in Chapter 1, it makes little 
sense to enforce a stringent distinction between the categories of aesthetic 
and moral in the eighteenth century, and particularly in Rousseau, 225 there 
is little sense in the Lettre of anything beyond a latent desire on Rousseau's 
part to relate the good of music to the good of living, and this is evident 
more in the style than in the content of the text. This, while obviously an 
important point in relation to my overall thesis, would not necessarily 
constitute a problem by itself. After all, very few music-theoretical texts, 
'24 In this sense, as we shall see, the principle of 'Unit6 de m6lodie' stands in no need of 
alteration in Rousseau's later musical xN, ritings. 
225See above, pp. 57-62. 
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both then and now, make systematic connections between the ethical and 
the aesthetic. But it is significant in the respect that Rousseau's concern in 
the Lettre is clearly to provide solid reasoning to support a position on 
matters of musical taste, and that Rousseau's concern generally in matters 
of reasoning, by this point in his career, 226 was with moral and ethical 
structures. 
The substantial change in the model of musical imitation, as we shall see, 
is firmly linked to this desire to incorporate a properly moral account in his 
music-aesthetic rationale. Despite this shift, however, the polemical 
positions taken in the Lettre, although they are rarely presented in quite so 
robust a manner as in that text, are, by and large, retained. In particular, 
although Rousseau later derives music's expressive qualities from an idea 
of human communication in general, his sense of the expressive purpose of 
music - at a practical compositional level at least - remains one of its being 
tied to the voice and the words being sung. Similarly, although the 
rejection of the "possibility' of French music is strongly contingent on the 
idea of music's imitative dependence on language, Rousseau retains both 
the details and the historiographical scheme of degeneration central to the 
analysis of this "impossibility'. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Lettre siir la mitsiquefranpise was the most widely-read of Rousseau's 
musical publications, and if its relevance to a putative Rousseauan 
philosophy of music may be characterized as transitional, the transition 
was nonetheless a crucial one. For the music-aesthetic and music- 
theoretical positions developed in the text - shored up by a rhetoric as 
smooth and confident as it is barbed - are ones that remain present, albeit 
226 That is to say, after the'revelation' of the first Discoitrs, and the more gradual 'reforme 
personelle' that followed from it. 
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without quite the same force or uncompromising presentation, throughout 
his musical writings. More importantly, the very public nature of his 
identification with the text, and the strength of the reaction it provoked, 
particularly from the pen of Rameau, significantly rose the stakes in so far 
as Rousseau's sense of requiring a supporting argument were concerned. 
Thus even though the model of imitation deployed in the Lettre in support 
of his position may be written off as transitional, it nonetheless leaves its 
mark on Rousseau's "mature' musical thought for the reason that it is only 
this theory of imitation that comes in for substantial revision during the 
years following the writing and publication of the Lettre, and not the music- 
aesthetic positions which both the early model of imitation and its 
refinements were intended to support. 
The question that this poses, then, is the following. Given that 
Rousseau's music-aesthetic position remained, more or less, consistent with 
the one elaborated in the Lettre siir la muslquefranCoise, but given also that 
the theoretical foundations of this position were substantially changed, to 
what extent does Rousseau"s mature musical theory offer a coherent and 
consistent philosophy of music? 
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MUSICAL IMITATION AND MORAL EFFECT IN THE 
DICTIONNAIRE DE MUSIQUE 
A. A TECHNICAL DICTIONARY OR A PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC? 
The claim is often made to the effect that of all Rousseau's texts that deal 
with music, it is the Dictionnaire de Musique which presents most fully 
and coherently the authors mature music theory. 227 Despite the 
complex chronology of the work - Rousseau began work on it in 1752 
but did not complete the text until around 1764, publishing it only at the 
end of 1767 228 - and hence obvious problems with the notion of 
/maturity" in this context, the claim is attractive for many reasons. The 
Dictionnaire is by far Rousseau's longest work on music; it is also the last 
published of those of his works that would claim the status of 
theoretical scholarship. By Rousseau's own admission, he planned the 
Dictionnaire as a replacement to the music articles that he wrote for the 
Encyclopedie which he soon found unsatisfactory and from which he 
sought to distance himse If. 229 
One of the most important reasons for maintaining this assessment is 
that the Dictionnaire is thereby able to provide a music-theoretical 
completion to the group of music-related texts written in 1754-6, and 
revised in the early 1760s, which culminate in the Essai sur Vorigine des 
langues. In this text, in the Examen de deux principes avancýes par M. 
227See, for example, Scott (1998a), p. xxxvi, Verba (1989), p. 308, Hunt (1967), p. 5. 
Similar sentiments are also expressed in O'Dea (1995), p. 62 and Wokler (1987b). 
228 1764 is the date of the preface. The publication date for the first edition is given as 
1768, but distribution was under way by November 1767. Thomas Hunt even argues 
the case for dating work on the Dictionnalre back to January 1749, the month of 
Rousseau's commission for the EncyclopMie. See Hunt (1967), pp. 52ff. This was also 
Rousseau's own view, in so far he refers to his manuscript as 'seize ans d'un travail de 
crocheteur', in CC, XXII, p. 243. 
22' 'Bless6 de Fimperfection de mes articles ý mesure que les volumes de I'Encyclop6die 
paroissoient, je r6solus de refondre le tout sur mon brouillon'. Preface to the 
Dictioiniaire, OC V, p. 606. 
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Rameau, and the relatively recently discovered fragment Uorigine de la 
m6lodie" 231 Rousseau's understanding of the musical material is shown 
to function within and be part of the construction of an account of the 
origins of communication and, by extension, social inequality. In these 
texts, then, Rousseau can be understood to develop a scheme in which 
the value of music, potential or actual, can be assessed in terms of moral 
and social reality in a way, as we saw in the previous section, that the 
Lettre fails to accomplish. There is, however, a distinct sense in these 
texts of a separation of the philosophical and more practical elements of 
Rousseau's discourse. This separation is best illustrated by Rousseau's 
decision to excise the fragment on the origin of melody from its initial 
position as an intrinsic part of the argumentation of the Examen, neither 
of which, ultimately, he considered worth publishing. 131 
The claim with which we started, however, is as problematic as it is 
important, not least for reasons of textual status: the Dictionnaire is a 
reference work, not a treatise. Rousseau does explain in the preface to 
the Dictionnaire, warming to the confessional literary style that marks 
much of his later writing, that his intention had been to provide what he 
calls a" treatise- dictionary' but that for various reasons he had failed in 
this aim. His "excuse" is a complex one. Beginning with an explicit 
denial that the problem is inherent in the subject - that is, music - he 
moves from attributing his "failure' to causes such as lack of access to 
materials following his withdrawal from Paris in 1756, distraction by 
other (and he suggests more rewarding) work, to hinting at larger 
causes which would implicate the nature of his understanding of the 
subject in the absence of a coherent unifying theory. There is a 
resounding ambiguity here, therefore, surrounding the question of 
whether or not Rousseau considered the 'failure' to be a result of his 
2-10 The fragment is included in the Oeiivres CoiiiplHes under this title. See OC V, pp. 
33-1-343. 
231 He did of course prepare the Exaiiien for publication in 1763, but the short 
azwrtI"s,,; ci? ient added for the intended publication remarks to the effect that he only 
considered publishing it because it provides an '6claircissement de quelques Articles 
de mon Dichomiairc'- OC V, p. 347. 
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own inadequacy as a theorist or a property of the material itself: the 
question, that is, of whether Rousseau"s understanding of the musical 
material was in fact compatible with any underlying theory of 
communication and expression which that author would consider to be 
coherent. 
B. A SCIENCE OF THE ART OF MUSIC 
A good place to begin to look for Rousseau's mature conception of 
music is in the article 'Musique" in the Dictionnaire de Musique. Elements 
of the text for this are adapted from the Encyclopedie article of the same 
name, but the rather exuberant if sophisticated polemic of the latter is 
replaced by a more considered and detached confidence in the 
Dictionnaire article. 232 A glimpse of the distance between the two can be 
gained by comparing the first sentences of each. Whereas we read in 
the Encyclopedie that music is the "science des sons, en tant qu"ils sont 
133 capables d'affecter agreablement Foreille" Rousseau writes in the 
Dictionnaire that music is the "Art de combiner les Sons dune maniere 
IN agrea ea 'oreille. Cet Art devient une science, ' Rousseau continues, "et 
meme tres-profonde, quand on veut trouver les principes de ces 
combinaisons et les raisons des affections qu'elles nous causent. '234 
While the earlier article, therefore, seems to equate the idea of music 
232The earlier article is one of the most outspoken of Rousseau's EncyclopMie 
contributions vzs-ý-vis Rameau (although unnamed) and the question of Italian and 
French music. Consider the rather explosive sentence: 'Consid6rons les Italiens nos 
contemporains, dont la musique est ]a meilleure, ou plut6t la seule bonne de Funivers, 
au jugement unanime de tous les peuples, except6 des Franýcais qui lui pr6f&rent la 
leur. ' EiicyclopMic, X, p. 901. The article was not in fact published until Volume X of 
the EncyclopMic finally appeared in 1765. For an account of the sophisticated and 
almost esoteric mode of argumentation employed by Rousseau in this text, which 
demonstrates its proximity on many counts with Rousseau's later musical thought, see 
O'Dea (1995), pp. 18-23. 
233 FticilclopMic X, p. 898 (my italics). 
234 'Musique', DictlOniialre dc Miisiqiic, OC V, p. 915 (my italics). 
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with the scientific knowledge of its materials, the later version observes 
a distinction between this knowledge and the art of 'combiner les Sons. 
The Dictionnaire article thus begins by introducing the important 
Platonic distinction between art and knowledge that we examined in 
Chapter 1.215 However, Rousseau's observation that the art of music 
may be susceptible to scientific knowledge is rather troublesome when 
viewed in this connection. While Rousseau does not take an overtly 
Platonic line here, neither does he take the overtly anti-Platonic one we 
might have expected him to take in this connection. For there is a 
certain sense in which one would expect the notion of 'devient une 
science' to be inflected with the by now standard disapproval of 
/musique sýavante' and the 'chaos, 'confusion de parties [et] fracas 
d"accompagnements qui etouffent IaVoix'236so often described 
elsewhere as symptoms of the sacrifice of expressiveness to 'science' in 
musical practice. The familiar pattern of this tirade, however, while 
present in prototype in the EnqlopMie article and developed elsewhere 
in the Dictionnaire and other musical writings, does not emerge in the 
present article. By contrast, it would appear for once that the scientific 
project is here being presented in something of a favourable light; the 
projected science would even be capable of being "profonde', a term 
which Rousseau never uses, to my knowledge at least, in a negative 
way. 
What kind of "science' is Rousseau referring to here? At first glance 
there is nothing to distinguish this putative science of music from any 
other kind of science; the guiding model is 'trouver les principeS'. 237 
However, the words are carefully chosen to retain some kind of priority 
for artistic practice in the relationship with the "science' of music. For it 
is clear in Rousseau" s formulation that the 'principes' to be discovered 
relate to the combination of sounds in art, not to the combination of 
235See above, pp. 47ff. 
236 'Musique', EnQ1c1opMI'C, X, p. 900. 
237 And even the provisory suggestion of the incompleteness of the science - the text 
reads 'quand on veitt trouver not 'quand on trouve ... ' - does not suggest anything 
stronger than that the principles as yet lack final determination. 
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sounds in the abstract, and thus defer to the original artistic principle of 
combination "d'une maniere agreeable a Foreille'. Rousseau is therefore 
not promoting a kind of science in which one could deduce the 
principles of musical taste from a knowledge of how these sounds are 
arranged according to nature; rather, his concern and sympathies lie 
with a science which seeks to enquire (veut trouver) what kind of 
principles govern musical taste and the emotional effects music has on 
its listeners. In other words, the science is "humaine' rather than 
/naturelle'. 
For many of Rousseau"s contemporaries, of course, the observation of 
such a careful distinction would have been completely unnecessary. 
According to a more empirical model of enquiry, there is no difference 
between the two kinds of science because, when armed with complete 
knowledge, the logical contingency of musical taste and affect upon the 
principles of sound should become apparent. 231 The whole matter, that 
is to say, would be subsumed under an empiricist equivalent to the 
ancient and scholastic science of musica speculativa, which, 'comprenant 
toutes les combinaisons possibles de la Musique et des Sons, semblent 
comprendre aussi toutes les causes des impressions que peut faire leur 
succession sur Foreille et sur Fame. 1239 
Rousseau-'s account in the article of the history of this genre of 
musical science is subject to an irony the intensity of which increases as 
his narrative nears the attempts of his contemporaries. Referring to the 
ancient extension of the concept of music, Rousseau writes that 
Non-seulement sous le nom de Musiquc ils comprenoient ... 
la Danse, le Geste, la 
Po6sie, mais m&me la collection de toutes les sciences. Herm&s d6finit la Musique, la 
connoissance de Fordre de toutes choses. C'6toit aussi la doctrine de Itcole de 
Pythagore et de celle de Platon, qui enseignoient que tout dans l'Univers 6toit 
Miisiqiie. Selon 1-16sychius, les Ath6niens donnoient ý tous les Arts le nom de 
Miisiqiie; et tout cela West plus 6tonnant depuis qu'un Musicien modeme a trouv6 
238 This is indeed Rameau's argument in Obscrvations. See esp. CTW, 111, pp. 266-277. 
23" 'Musique', Dictionnairc, OC V, p. 916. Note that Rousseau is careful to say'semblent 
comprendre'. 
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dans la Musique le principe de tous les rapports et le fondement de toutes les 
scienCeS. 240 
The irony that emerges at the end of this description is reserved, of 
course, for Rameau; particularly for the Rameau of the 1750s whose 
philosophical ambitions were becoming increasingly subject to the 
ridicule of fashionable intellectuals . 241 The ancients are mostly protected 
from it, although there appears at first sight to be little to differentiate 
the ambitions of each. 
In the discussion that follows, however, the basis of this 
differentiation, and therefore of the differentiation between the two 
kinds of science referred to above, becomes a little clearer. For one of 
the primary foci of ancient theory, and the source of the "plus grande 
estime' in which music was held by ancient peoples, 'principalement 
chez les 
GreCS", 242 is 
considered to have been the "puissance de la 
Musique sur les mceurs": 
On Wavoit point trouv6 de moyen plus efficace pour graver dans Yesprit des 
hornmes les principes de la Morale et Varnour de la vertu; ou plut6t tout cela 
n'6toit point Yeffet d'un moyen pr6m6dit6, mais de la grandeur des sentimens, et 
de 1'616vation des id6es qui cherchoient par des accens proportionn6s ý se faire un 
langage digne d'elles. 243 
This final clarification is important. For Rousseau, while ceding respect 
to the ancient "science' of music, as well as to the art, does not credit it 
with a purely scientific relation between cause and effect. The moral 
effect of ancient music was not simply a property of the music itself and 
the physical and metaphysical systems which partly co-ordinated it, but 
rather is also held to participate in an open structure in which music 
reflects the values invested in it by its audience and theorists. It is 
partly, in other words, the "amour de la vertu', the 'grandeur des 
240 'Musique', Dictionnalre, OC V, p. 918. 
241 See Christensen (1993), pp. 209-212, Lester (1992), pp. 143-150, and Neubauer (1986), 
pp. 85-120. 
242 'Musique', Dictionnaire, OC V, p. 920. 
'43 'Musique', Dictionnairc, OC V, p. 921. 
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sentimens' and the "elevation des idees' already present among the 
ancients that accounted for the celebrated moral effects of their music. 
The greatness of ancient music lies partly in its reflection of the 
greatness of the people who composed it and whose cultural beliefs and 
moral desires are reflected in it. 
A powerful but concealed social criticism is therefore implicit in the 
argument of the article. Perhaps the failure of contemporary accounts 
may be understood to owe more to music's modem audiences, and to 
the nature of their ethically compromised interest in it, than to the music 
itself? Such, at any rate, is the argument proposed by the first Discours, 
according to which the arts both reflect and sustain the vanity of their 
consumers. While this argument is indeed adapted for specifically 
music-critical purposes in the writings that we will turn to in the 
following section, in the Dictionnaire article under discussion, this 
apparent limitation of contemporary interest in music is reflected not so 
much in the music but in its theory. 
At the heart of the article, then, is a rather restrained criticism of the 
direction of modem research into the 'combinai sons [de la Musique] et 
les raisons des affections qu"elles nous causent. ' Such research seems to 
have been, so far as Rousseau was concerned, more preoccupied with 
the 'physique des Sons" than with the art of music. "' Following a hasty 
and rather derogatory discussion of some examples - including the then 
celebrated "histoire de la Tarentule", 241 and the mysterious column in the 
nave of Reims cathedral which was said to vibrate 'in sympathy' with 
one of the bells, "egalement quand on a ote le betail'246 - Rousseau sums 
up the whole enterprise as follows: 
Tous ces exemples, dont la pl6part appartiennent plus au son qu'ý la Miisiqiie, et 
dont la Physique peut donner quelque explication, ne nous rendent point plus 
'44 'Si notre Musiquc a peu de pouvoir sur les affection de Fame, en revanche elle est 
capable d'agir physiquement sur les corps'. 'Musique', Dichomialre, OC V, p. 922. 
'45 'Musique', Dictiomiairc, OC V, p. 922. 
246 'Musique', Dichomialre, OC V, p. 923. 
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intelligibles ni plus croyables les effets merveilleux et presque divins que les 
Anciens attribuent ä la Musique. 247 
The error of the modems, in other words, is to mistake a human science 
for a natural one, the unsurprising result being that no account of the 
legendary moral effects of ancient music is forthcoming because the 
whole sphere of the 'moral' has been specifically excluded from the 
naturalist epistemology of the enquiry. 248 
C. NATURAL AND IMITATIVE MUSIC 
This modem confusion about the "science' of music turns on a 
distinction that Rousseau has, at first sight apparently rather casually, 
inserted into his discussion of the various ancient and scholastic 
theoretical divisions of music. In the manner in which many of the 
Dictionnaire articles employ a subtle mixture of descriptive and 
prescriptive modes, this new distinction adopts a more normative 
framework: 'On pourroit et Fon devroit peut-&re encore diviser la 
Musique en naturelle et imitative. Q49 In contrast to the previous 
discussion, it seems to be clear, then, from this 'devroit - peut-&tre' that 
the formulations we are about to read are Rousseau's own. The 
introduction of the normative mode plainly confronts the reader with 
the following questions: why should we make this distinction, and what 
does it mean if we do? Rousseau goes on to explain what he means by 
the distinction, and what types of music he takes the two contrasting 
notions to extend to: 
La premi&re [Miisiqiie izatitrelle], born6e au seul physique des Sons et Wagissant que 
sur le sens, ne porte point ses impressions jusqu'au coeur, et ne peut donner que 
'47 1 Musique', Dictionnaire, OC V, p. 923. 
'48 Rousseau attributes the attempt by some modems to compensate here to'la 
persuasion o6 nous sommes de 1'excellence de notre Mwsiqiie, et ... 
le m6pris que nous 
avons pour celle des Anciens. ' OC V, p. 923. 
249 OC V, p. 918. 
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des sensations plus ou moins agr6ables. Telle est la Musique des Chansons, des 
Hymnes, des Cantiques, de tous les Chants qui ne sont que des combinaisons de 
Sons M61odieux, et en g6n6ral toute Musique qui West quHarmonieuse. 
La seconde [Misique infitative], par des inflexions vives accentu6es, et, pour ainsi 
dire, parlantes, exprimes toutes les passions, peint tous les tableaux, rend tous les 
objets, sournet ]a Nature enti&re ý ses savantes imitations, et porte ainsi jusqu'au 
coeur de Yhomme des sentiments propres ý 1'6mouvoir. Cette Musique vraiment 
lyrique et th65trale 6toit celle des anciens Poýmes, et c'est de nos jours celle qu'on 
s'efforce d'appliquer aux Drames qu'on ex6cute en Chant sur nos Th6tres. Ce 
West que dans cette Musique, et non dans Marmonique ou naturelle, qu'on doit 
chercher la raison des effets prodigieux qu'elle a procluits autrefois. Tant qu'on 
cherchera des effets moraux dans le seul physique des Sons, on ne les y trouvera 
point et Yon raisonnera sans s'entendre. 250 
We can gather a good deal of material from this quotation. The final 
sentence provides the key, and the idea expressed - to the effect that 
'moral' effects do not have their cause (exclusively, at any rate) in the 
physical properties of sound and its arrangement, whether this is 
"agreable a Yoreille' or not - underpins most of what has led up to it. 
The distinction between 'imitative' and "naturelle' in music seems 
therefore to turn on this question of 'effets moraux': only the former has 
the capacity for moral effect, and, indeed, it seems to be this capacity 
that provides its basic necessary condition. 
Other important features to emerge during the passage are as 
follows. Firstly, the apparent cause of the "moral' effects of imitative 
music come from the 'inflexions vives accentuees". Importantly, these 
are described as 'parlantes', suggesting that the reasons these accents 
participate in the imitative rather than the merely natural sphere is that 
they have access to a kind of cognitive and emotive significance rather 
like that of speech. The use of these accents, then, allows imitative 
music to express "toutes les passsions, and, indeed, communicate pretty 
much anything. Secondly, a relationship between the 'naturelle' and 
'imitative' distinction and another between harmony and melody is 
established, but this is not as clear-cut as many of Rousseau"s other texts 
250 OC V, p. 918. 
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might lead us to suppose. For here, curiously, music which consists 
only in -des combinaisons de Sons Melodieux-' is ascribed the same 
value as music'qui n'est qu"Harmonieuse. ' Similarly, not all vocal 
music is automatically imitative, but only that music'lyrique et 
theatrale qu'on sefforce d"appliquer aux Drames quon execute en 
Chant'. The important point, then, is that imitative status is 
automatically ascribed neither by virtue of musics being vocal, nor by 
virtue of its being melodic. Music's being vocal and melodic are 
understood therefore to be necessary but not sufficient conditions for its 
being imitative. 
We should distinguish between 'natural' and 'imitative' music 
because this distinction captures the difference between a series of 
sounds that is simply a matter of resonance and physical sensation and 
a series which has some kind of 'moral' significance. Proper to "natural" 
music is said to be the agency of sensual pleasure. This agency is the 
success of the "physique des Sons, and without it - without music's 
being an arrangement of "Sons dune maniere agreable a Foreille' - it 
can no longer be said to be true to its nature. As Rousseau confirmed, in 
another of the key Dictionnaire articles, "le premier et principal objet de 
toute Musique est de plaire a Foreille ... : voila la premiere loi, qu'il 
n'est jamais permis d'enfreindre. -251 If it is in the nature of music to act 
on our senses in a way that arouses our pleasurable awareness of it, 
then 'music' that does not act in this way, in breaking the "premiere loi" 
can no longer be said to be music. More importantly, however, this 
'nature' of music is also understood to be its limitation: being merely 
agreeable, while a necessary condition for music, is nonetheless still 
only a minimum one. For music to be as it is, is one thing; but for music 
to be as it should be is another. And that which grants music access to 
the realm of what it should be is imitation: the principle of imitation 
supplements the principle of sound in order for music to be as it should 
be. 
211 'Accent', Dictionnairc, OC V, p. 61-5. 
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The principle of imitation, rather than the principle of the "Physiques 
des Sons, therefore seems to supply the 'science' of music with its 
proper object. What is this principle for Rousseau? How do the laws of 
musical imitation work? And also importantly for our purposes, how 
do the "effets moraux, construed in this passage as reaching Jusqu'au 
coeur de Yhomme', relate to the other, complementary, sense of "moral' 
looked for in the article "Musique', in the sense of being connected with 
'Ies principes de la Morale et Yamour de la vertu'? The article itself does 
not really provide much in the way of an answer to these questions, for 
the most part consisting in observations to the effect that 'effets moraux" 
have been found to be caused by music, and in a series of accounts of 
the failure of historical music theory to explain them. However, there 
are two important clues. 
The first lies in the rather curious conclusion of the final sentence of 
the passage describing the nature and effects of imitative music. 
Concluding that the "effets moraux' of music are not answerable to a 
science concerned merely with what may be reduced to the material of 
nature ('Ie seul physique des Sons), Rousseau observes that where the 
search is thus limited, 'Yon raisonnera sans s'entendre'. Although the 
basic meaning of this phrase is to the effect that, in limiting the material 
of musical "science" to the study of its purely physical properties, one 
would reason without fully understanding the nature of the subject 
matter, 'entendre', which is translated as hearing, intending, or 
understanding, in its pronomial form would usually signify something 
like understanding deeply. 151 Rousseau"s conclusion thus would simply 
echo the musico-social critique outlined above. It seems possible, 
however, that Rousseau was intending something a little more reflexive, 
such as that one would reason about music without understanding 
hearing oneself as part of it, as it were. 
252A similar construction crops up in the article on 'M61odie', after which Rousseau 
adds a clarificatory clause: 'on parlera sans s'entendre; on ne saura ce qu'on dira. ' OC 
V, p. 885. Rey cites an eighteenth -centu ry definition of the form 's'entendre ý': 
/ corinaitre ý fond, kre habile dans (une activit6). ' See'entendre', Rey (1992), p. 1250. 
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One cannot be sure, of course, but such a structure would suggest a 
relation between Rousseau's conclusion here and his more general 
thought about the degeneration of music and indeed of morality. There 
is a distinct resonance with the conclusion of the Essai sur Vorigine des 
langues, which has it that "toute langue avec laquelle on ne peut pas se 
faire entendre au peuple assemble est une langue servile; il est 
151 impossible qu"un peuple demeure libre et qu'il parle cette langue-la. 
The argument leading up to this exceptionally strongly stated 
connection between liberty and the communicative power of language 
operates by maintaining a distinction between two kinds of ideal 
languages. 254 On the one hand, there is the ideal of precision of 
understanding, an ideal which Rousseau, in common with many of his 
contemporaries, observes modem languages steadily to be moving 
towards. This process of perfection, however, having both its measure 
and end in the material of the natural sciences, thereby risks forfeiting 
access to the one category excluded from this domain, namely that of 
the human. As he puts it at the beginning of the Discours sur VinýgalW, 
"La plus utile et la moins avancee de toutes les connoissances humaines 
Q55 me paroit etre celle de Yhomme. His expansion of this initial 
diagnosis is in the following terms: 
Ce qu'il ya de plus cr-uel encore, Cest que tous les progr6s de I'Esp6ce humaine 
I'Moignant sans cesse de son 6tat primitif, plus nous accumulons de nouvelles 
connoissances, et plus nous nous 6tons les moyens d'acquerir la plus importante de 
toutes, et que c'est en un sens ý force d'6tudier Yhornme que nous nous sommes 
mis hors d'6tat de le connoitre. 256 
Treating man according to the same model by which natural 
relationships are determined, we place him beyond reach of 
understanding. When applied to the musical case, the suggestion is 
therefore that unless we attempt to hear ourselves as part of it, to place 
253Essai, OC V, p. 429. 
2 5,40n this subject, see Starobinski (1976). 
21-', Discotirs siir VmýgalW, OC 111, p. 122. 
25(, Dismirs mr VinýgalW, OC 111, pp. 122-3. 
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ourselves at the heart of its operations, 'nous nous sommes mis hors 
d"etat de flal conno^ltre. ' The historiography of moral degeneration and 
a certain kind of musical and linguistic progress is similar in structure to 
the model presented in the Lettre sur la musiquefranpise. Here, 
however, the analysis is extended so that not only are the ramifications 
of the degenerative process more clearly delineated, but so too is the 
structure of its more positive, or regenerative, corollary. 
On the other hand, there is present in Rousseau another ideal of 
language, according to which its perfection consists of something more 
like communion of understanding. Here, the purpose of language is not 
so much to identify and enable comparative understanding of objects in 
the world, but rather implies a process of identifying ourselves as part 
of a world configured by human relationships. It is upon this ideal of 
language as that which draws oneself into it that the relation between 
language and liberty analysed in the Essai is contingent. The idea, then, 
is that the 'moral' aspect of musical understanding, which has its basis 
in the drawing of oneself into it, relies on something like the reflexive 
connotation of Wentendre" as hearing / understanding / intending 
oneself as part of this process. It is not just that there cannot be, in other 
words, any understanding of the 'effets moraux" of music without a 
proper knowledge of principles of imitation, but that music cannot be 
the cause of such effects without the listener bringing his own moral 
sphere to bear on the listening process. Such a reading would certainly 
link the passage more firmly with Rousseau"s remarks, cited earlier, to 
the effect that one cannot understand the legendary moral effects of 
ancient music without considering the 'grandeur des sentimens, et de 
Yel6vation des idees qui cherchoient par des accens proportionnes a se 
faire un langage digne d'elles. "257 The moral effects of music are not to 
be understood as a "one-way street' arrangement, but must be linked to 
the kinds of moral desires implicit at a deeper level in culture itself. 
This idea of the danger implicit in "raisonnera sans s'entendre' may 
thus be related to Rousseau's more general thoughts about the progress 
257 'Musique', Dictionnaire, OC V, p. 921. 
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of reason itself. These, which we will examine more fully in Chapter 3 
below, may be understood in terms of Derrida's useful and important 
characterisation of the "economy of pity'. The "economy' here, which 
Derrida observes as a key function in the analysis of man at his origin, is 
one in which the relationship between the dynamic structure of human 
imagination and intelligence and the environmental and emotional 
equilibrium of the state of nature is regulated by pity. The idea is that 
the progress of human reason, which has the adverse effect of orienting 
human desire towards things of which man has no real need, is limited 
by the "s'identifier avec" of pity in its provision of a union of 
151 understanding and passion. In relation to the degeneration of music 
and its 'science", therefore, the structure is to be observed in the idea 
that culture has lost its proper relation with the moral need of which 
music is an expression. Thus, in a situation where 'Yon raisonnera sans 
s'entendre", the result of reasoning about music without understanding 
its proper environmental and "moral' function is that reason replaces 
hearing as the basis of culture's relationship with music. Music 
becomes a folly of reason, a purely intellectual ambition, and thus loses 
its relation to the moral passion of which it is supposed to be an 
expression. The message behind the structure which "s'entendre' 
appears to pick out can therefore be understood as something like the 
following: take out the human element and we are lost to the blind 
machinery of progressive decadence. In this way, Rousseau's 
conclusion of 'raisonnera sans s'entendre' seems to supply something of 
a moral and an aesthetic basis for the normative status ascribed to 
"Musique imitative. ' 
The second clue as to the nature of Rousseau"s 'science' of the art of 
music to be found in the article relates to the way in which the aesthetic 
significance of music should be understood. For while it is clear that the 
moral effects of imitative music do not have their cause in purely 
physical relationships, it remains unclear precisely what kind of cause it 
does have. During his discussion of the contemporary failure to account 
'q, s See Derrida (1976), pp. 185-192. This will be discussed further in Chapter 3 below. 
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for this structure, Rousseau introduces a discussion of the Swiss folk- 
pastoral tradition of the Rans-des-Vaches. This mountain air, "cheri des 
Suisses", are said to have moral effects, but the context provided is 
rather negative: the use of such airs is proscribed in the military because 
'il faisoit fondre en larmes, deserter ou mourir ceux qui 1'entendoient. "" 
The soldiers, hearing the call which excites in them an 'ardent desir de 
revoir leur pays, are said to forget their duty to their country through 
the forceful exposure to their nostalgic love for it. However, this more 
or less Republican objection to the Rans-des-Vaches does not appear to be 
Rousseau's main point, which is rather that the moral effect, whether 
considered desirable or not, appears to have no real basis in the music 
itself: 
On chercheroit en vain dans cet Air les accens 6nergiques capables de produire de 
si 6tonnans effets. Ces effets, qui Wont aucun lieu sur les 6trangers, ne viennent 
que de Fhabitude, des souvenirs, de mille circonstances qui, retrac6es par cet Air 
ceux qui Yentendent, et leur rappellant leur pays, leurs anciens plaisirs, leur 
jeunesse, et toutes leurs faýons de vivre, excitent en eux une douleur am&re d'avoir 
perdu tout cela. La Miisiqitc alors Wagit point pr6cis6ment comme Musiqlle, mals 
comme signe m6moratif. Cet Air, quoique toujours le m&me, ne produit plus 
aujourd'hui les m6mes effets qu'il produisoit ci-devant sur les Suisses; parce 
qu'ayant perdu le goýit de leur premi&re simplicit6, ils ne la regrettent plus quand 
on la leur rappelle. Tant il est vrai que ce West pas dans leur action physique qu'il 
faut chercher les plus grands effets des Sons sur le coeur humain. 160 
This passage seems to present us with something of a conundrum. 
At one level, Rousseau's thinking is clear. An explanation of "effets 
moraux" solely in terms of the evidence of those effects themselves is 
unambiguously held to be inadequate. The mere evidence that the rural 
melody stirs the hearts and minds of the Swiss soldiery - the mere fact, 
in other words, that its effect is a 'moral' one - is simply not enough for 
Rousseau to ascribe to it the status of 'musique imitative' proper. 
Rather, Rousseau seems clear that such effects must bear some kind of 
relation to the sounds themselves of a kind in which the sense data 
259 OC V, p. 924. 
260 OC V, p. 924. 
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cannot simply be reduced to cultural convention: such arbitrary terms of 
relation between the music and its emotional response is not so much 
proper to music as it is to a kind of 'signe memoratif'. 
There is something strange about this situation. Surely the 
distinction between 'naturelle' and 'Imitative" that Rousseau made earlier 
still obtains here. The notion of the 'signe memoratif' was not present in 
the original formulation, but the intimation was nonetheless that some 
kind of signification did take place in imitative music. Earlier, 'Musique 
naturelle" was said to be incapable of producing a moral effect, and this 
incapacity was said to be the reason for its not being "Musique imitative'. 
Now, however, Rousseau makes it clear that the Rans-des-Vaches does, 
or at least did, display precisely this capacity, but that, in spite of this, 
the nomenclature of "Musique imitativeis no more applicable here than 
it was before, but this time for the reason that it is in some sense 
deficient in respect of its properly musical qualities. Moreover, the only 
explanation given earlier of what is proper to "Musique imitative' was 
that it contained "des inflexions vives accentuees, et, pour ainsi dire, 
parlantes' and the only -explanation" of what these comprised was that 
they, somehow, produced the desired effect. Since the Rans-des-Vaches 
was so clearly and, of old at least, so effectively productive in this 
manner, surely one need look no further into the nature of these "accens" 
than to confirm that the 'etonnants effets' are or were in evidence? 
There are two further odd features of the passage. The first is the 
discussion's concluding remark, and the second is the feature of cultural 
specificity which Rousseau suggests as the cause of the Swiss airs 
having now lost their 'effets moraux". First, then, the observation with 
which the passage concludes jars rather with the rest of the paragraph. 
For it seems odd, in following a discussion of historical music cited as 
having the looked for moral connection, to take up again the earlier 
objection about the inadequacy of the 'Physique des sons: "ce nest pas 
dans leur action physique qu'il faut chercher les plus grands effets des 
Sons sur le coeur humain. ' But this conclusion seems to miss the point 
just made; namely, that the effects of the Raiis-des-Vaches owed nothing 
to Aeur action physique' but rather to their function as a kind of 'signe 
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memoratif'. At the bottom of the mystery, then, seems to be some kind 
of analogy between the 'signe memoratif' and the 'action Physique' of 
sounds. Does this analogy have any reasonable basis? 
The context in which the discussion of the Rans-des-Vaches occurs did 
indeed emerge out the criticisms of the 'action physique' of musical 
sound which we looked at earlier. Rousseau began the discussion with 
observations to the effect that the "Physiques des sons" did not provide 
us with access to the realm of 'effets moraux. As we saw earlier, his 
conclusion about the physical and physiological resonance of musical 
sound in the most part "appartiennent plus au son qua la Musique" and 
that while an examination of the physics involved might explain the 
facts of resonance in both animate and inanimate bodies, nothing in 
such an explanation would render'plus intelligibles ni plus croyables 
les effets merveilleux et presque divins que les Anciens attribuent a leur 
Musique. "11 Concerning these 'effets merveilleux, Rousseau had 
previously cited some ancient authors - notably Plato"' - but not 
provided any modem explanation. No more does he do this now. In 
conclusion, he simply refers the reader to two short examples of ancient 
Greek music, but the inadequacy of these to communicate the imitative 
principle is immediately suggested: 'Mais qui osera juger de Vancienne 
Musique sur de tels echantillons? "263 
The example of the Rans-des-Vaches, then, is introduced as a substitute 
for the ancient Greek example, but following his similarly negative 
discussion of the example, Rousseau foregoes any further 'explanation" 
of the nature of imitation in music. The explanation is deferred, as it 
were to a less restricted discursive context, and he moves instead to 
discuss the history of notation. 264 For this reason the Rans-des-Vaches still 
2MOC V, p. 923. 
2(, 2See OC V, pp. 920-1. Rousseau cites Plato's claim that the systems of musical 
organisation cannot be changed without a corresponding change in political 
organisation. See Rcpi&11c IV: 424c. 
2630C V, pp. 923-4. 
264 See OC V, pp. 924-5, and further, 'Notes', OC V, pp. 931-942. The discussion of 
notation - and its progressive history from accent marks to a svstematic graphic 
scheme indicative of pitch, duration and synchronicity - is, of course, participatory in 
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sticks out as the last in a sequence of failed -explanations. We can, 
however, at least see more clearly now that its discursive environment 
configures the discussion in two seemingly distinct contexts: first, as an 
example of music's 'effets merveilleux'; second, and more mysteriously 
at the end of the quotation, as an example of 'action physique". 
It seems that Rousseau's main reason for this instructive but 
nonetheless doubly negative example has something to do with the 
cultural specificity of the -signe memoratif' of the Rans-des-Vaches. The 
Swiss melodies are said to contain no evidence of "accens" whose 
imitative status would be such in themselves as to produce 'effets 
merveilleux'. Thus the objection seems to be that the Swiss airs are too 
culturally restricted: they obtain their effect solely by virtue of the 
percipient's being some particular kind of person with a specific set of 
memories and associations. Their "effets moraux', in other words, are 
not mediated through a culturally exchangeable sign, but are 
immediately felt by the percipient of the Air who already had this 
specific sentiment "to hand, as it were, and merely needed a simple 
prompt to re-present it to his mind. The physical qualities of the 
mediating element, in other words, become unimportant because of the 
immediacy implicit in the idea of the "signe memoratif'. The 
uncomfortable analogy that Rousseau makes between this kind of sign 
and the "action physique' of sound thus seems to lie on the basis of the 
Rans-des-Vaches being too immediately effective, too indicative of some 
kind of diachronic form of the "certain rapport'. He seems to be saying 
that the synchronic "certain rapport' of the "action physique' between 
inanimate and animate objects is somehow the same as the diachronic 
terms of relation between the Swiss soldier and the landscape of his 
youth. 
the imitative/natural distinction. Put briefly, we need notation now because we have 
lost the'natural' connections between words and tonal accents. Wholly reliant on 
notation, we are now dependent on its own systematic nature for our (impoverished) 
conception of music. While this argument is clearly connected to the argument about 
imitation in music, it cannot be said to be explanatory. 
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It thus seems to be this very immediacy that somehow prevents the 
Rans-des-Vaches from being "Musique imitative'. The purely private 
arrangement between sound and 'moral effect", the incommunicable 
nature of the experience, effectively becomes analogous to the resonance 
between two inanimate objects. The mediating element of the Swiss air 
itself is just as arbitrary as was the clapper in the relation between the 
bell and pillar at Reims: the sound itself, that is to say, becomes 
unimportant, and the relation between cause and effect becomes 
transparent. In this sense, an investigation of the way in which the 
emotion experienced by the Swiss soldier of old is "caused' by a folk air 
is more appropriate to a study of memory than 'Musique', and is 
perhaps therefore a subject of which a psychologist could provide more 
explanation than a "musicien-philosophe' like Rousseau. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The article on "Musique, then, introduces as fundamental the 
distinction between 'Musique naturelle" and 'Musique imitative, and 
announces to a certain degree that the proper 'science' of the art of 
combining musical sounds should be concerned with the latter. Despite 
this, however, the article leaves us with no more explanation of what it 
is that is proper to'Musique imitative'than two examples of what is not: 
neither natural resonance and the agreeable sensation of this; nor a 
simple, arbitrary, "signe memoratif". It is neither a synchronic 'certain 
rapport", nor a diachronic one. Imitative music, one might conclude, is 
never purely natural music, but neither is it ever 'imitative" to the extent 
that it could not be called music at all. It must be both "Musique 
naturelle' and 'imitative' at the same time. 
Importantly, however, there is a sense in which these two negative 
qualifiers are similar: they both concern a structure in which the cause 
and effect relations are somehow un-mediated or immediate. The 
'certain rapport' of the relation in 'Musique naturelle' is such that a 
physical cause has a physical effect without the sound itself - the 
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appearance, as it were, of the physical cause - being of any importance 
to this relationship. Similarly, the 'certain rapport" of the Rans-des- 
Vaches is such that the moral cause and effect bear no determining 
relation to the appearance of the mediating element: any "signe 
memoratif' would do, so long as the effect was produced. 
Can we infer, then, that one thing that can be said about imitative 
music is that it is not immediate? Perhaps; but this is still a distinctly 
odd conclusion, and one doesn't need to read much of Rousseau's 
music theory and the commentary on it to find that immediacy is 
normally construed as something positive, a quality in music which, 
when perceived, might be held to guarantee its aesthetic virtue. 265 
Might the reason for this possible confusion lie with Rousseau's mature 
analysis of the nature of the moral passions? As we saw in the first 
chapter, his understanding of this centred around the notion of pity. 
And as we saw too, the conception of pity with which he is concerned is 
similarly marked by an ambiguity concerning the mixture of immediacy 
and mediacy of the relations brought to consciousness by the sentiment 
of pity. While on the one hand, the sense of immediacy is the measure 
of the force with which pity is experienced as a demand to identify our 
sphere of interest with that of someone else, on the other hand, it is 
precisely such an extreme of immediate identification that Rousseau 
analyses as being manifest in the state of nature, and consequently 
before the advent of morality per se. 
In order to get a handle on this difficulty and to assess its relevance to 
Rousseau's aesthetics of musical imitation, we must examine in some 
depth the writings in which the account of the 'economy of pity" is 
developed and then see to what extent this analysis may be traced in the 
musical theory espoused in the rest of the Dictionnaire. For while the 
article on 'Musique' discussed above opens out what I consider to be 
one of the fundamental issues concerning Rousseau's "science' of 
2(, 5 For a discussion along these lines, see Didier (1985), esp. pp. 387-82, and Kintzler 
(1979). 
Nlti,, Ic and Imitation -120- Musical Imitation and 
Moral Effect 
musical imitation, it should be remembered that the articles of the 
dictionary were conceived as interdependent theoretical units. The 
ambition was, it will be remembered, to treat "si relativement les articles, 
d"en lier si bien les suites par des renvois, que le tout, avec la 
commodite d-un Dictionnaire, eu^ t Yavantage d'un Traite suivi". 111 Thus, 
if the delimitation of the sphere of 'Musique imitative' is to a certain 
extent conducted negatively and uncertainly in the article on 'Musique', 
that is not to say that the many articles - among the most prominent of 
which are those on 'Opera', "Melodie', 'Harmonie-, " Expression' and 
'Unite de melodie' - which relate to the normative distinction of 
imitative and natural music might not furnish us with a more consistent 
understanding of Rousseaus musical science. 267 
These investigations will form the substance of Chapter 3 below. By 
way of preparation, however, the rest of the present chapter will 
address two areas some understanding of which should prove helpful 
in disentangling the issues at stake. To begin with, we will examine 
some of the philosophical issues concerning the relevant eighteenth- 
century conception of musical imitation and communication by 
exploring briefly its relationship with a prominent twentieth-century 
position on the nature of the sign and its relationship with 
understanding. Following this, we will turn to a text by a contemporary 
of Rousseau"s, Diderots fictional dialogue Le Neveu de Rameau. In many 
respects, this curious and difficult work presents an important and 
potentially devastating challenge to what I consider to be the core of 
Rousseau's musical philosophy, namely that the aesthetic and moral 
evaluative measure of modem music lies in its established proximity to 
the origin of human cultural institutions. For Rousseau's philosophy of 
music to hold water, I shall argue, it must provide some kind of 
2661'reface, Dictiontiaire, OC V, p. 608. 
267This is certainly the appraisal of jean-Jacques Eigeldinger who, while noting that 
'Rousseau ... regrette 
Fimperfection' of the system of internal references in respect of 
providing a coherent treatise, suggests that as far as the central subject of opera and its 
constituents are concerned, 'ce syst&me fonctionne avec une efficacit6 6loquente dans 
Icle champ. ' Eigeldinger (1995), p. 1712. 
II ation and Moral Effect Music and Imitation - 121 - %lLis'cal Ini't , 
response to Diderot's analysis of the essentially arbitrary basis of 
musical imitation and communication, and of the essential negativity 
and emptiness of the ultimate object of this imitation. 
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III 
NECESSARY AND ARBITRARY SIGNS: 
WITTGENSTEIN, CONDILLAC AND UALEMBERT 
A. THE SIGN THAT is NECESSARILY ITSELF 
One way of understanding Rousseau's distinction between the 'signe 
memoratif' and what we might call an imitative sign is to see the latter 
in terms of a kind of necessity. Whereas the immediate 'rapport' of the 
former seemed to suggest that the signifying material was in a certain 
sense irrelevant - the pleasure associated with the Swiss countryside 
was the object of the soldiers' nostalgia regardless of how the music 
actually sounded - the material construction of imitative music was 
held to be important to whatever was imitated or signified by it. The 
sound of the imitative musical sign, that is to say, was necessary for the 
particular 'effets moraux' produced in the listener. 
Although this analysis is somewhat indecisive at present - the 
argumentation of the article on "Musique' was, it will be remembered, 
largely negative - it does appear to suggest a fruitful line of enquiry 
when we consider the entity considered by Rousseau and many of his 
contemporaries to be the ultimate object of musical imitation; namely, 
the 'cri de la nature". This, as we saw in Chapter 1,261 derived its 
authenticity from its status as a natural sign; a sign, in other words, that 
is necessarily itself in the sense that its form occurs naturally as a 
symptom of a state of being and not as the product of an arbitrary 
choice. 
In the attempt to replace divine with scientific narratives, this concern 
with the derivation of arbitrary from non-arbitrary signification was one 
of the eighteenth century's defining problems. In this section, rather 
than aiming to provide an historical overview of the relevant accounts 
26SSee above, pp. 39-40. 
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in which the derivation is attempted, I shall pursue a more comparative 
line of enquiry. 
B. NECESSARY SIGNS AND THE AESTHETIC IN WITTGENSTEIN 
This discussion examines the relevance to our concerns of a passage 
from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein's subject 
for this and the surrounding paragraphs is the question of how 
something can be understood from a sign or, more properly, an 
arrangement of signs in a sentence. 119 The mechanics of this process as it 
is explored by Wittgenstein need not trouble us here since his starting- 
point remains unaffected by his investigation: 271 namely, that, regardless 
of the mysteries of the process, it remains true to say that thoughts do 
occur in relation to signs. An inalienable part of a sign's being a sign, in 
other words, is that something is understood by it. 
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by 
another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by 
any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another. ) 
In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different 
sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these 
positions. (Understanding a poem. )271 
269Note that Wittgenstein does not actually employ the term 'sign'. The sense in which 
I am using it here extends to any signifying entity, or unit of sense, and thus includes 
both words and the sentences Wittgenstein is discussing. 
270 An examination of Wittgenstein's understanding of how thoughtsmake contact' 
with language is given by Arrington (1991). The problem here is, on the face of it, one 
of how a thought - which is understood to be something that positively and 
adequately grasps a phenomenon or an event - can be related to a sign or arrangement 
of signs, where signs are understood to owe their value primarily to their own 
physical properties and the grammatical and syntactical arrangements in which they 
are located. Thoughts are positively about or of something. Signs, by contrast, are 
understood to be 'the physical instruments of thought', and, as such, are 'self- 
contained: they describe ... 
in terms of their own properties alone' (p. 178). 
271Wittgenstein (1953), 1: §531, pp. 143-4. 
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The passage identifies two paradigms for understanding 
combinations of signs in sentences, two paradigmatic notions of the 
relationship between the arrangement of a sign or signs and what is 
272 understood. The first paradigm has it that there is something about 
the arrangement of the sign that is sufficient but not necessary to what is 
understood. The second notion entails that the connection between the 
arrangement of the sign and what is understood by it is both necessary 
and sufficient. It is important to note, too, that the passage does not 
observe a big distinction between musical and linguistic signification. 273 
For Wittgenstein, as for us and indeed most people, it is obviously true 
to say that we understand something by or in music. Indeed, it seems to 
be this that prompts Wittgenstein, prima facie at least, to try to 
incorporate into the concept of understanding this strange modality 
whereby music, and other signifying fields that seem to lack an obvious 
capacity for reference - to lack, that is, the capacity to point to anything 
except themselves - can be "understood'. 274 
In the first instance, then, Wittgenstein notes a sufficient relationship 
between a sign and the thought prompted by it: a sign, for example a 
sentence, can be such that its arrangement and content are sufficient to 
convey a certain meaning. Thus in this case, while the sign can be said 
to be productive of the thought attributed to it, the sign is in itself 
arbitrary in the sense that the meaning can be produced equally well by 
an alternative sign, such as another sentence for example. This way of 
understanding is the one we operate with most commonly. An 
instructive instance of this paradigm is to be found in the notion of a 
272An arrangement of signs is taken to be equivalent to a sign in so far as it is 
perceived as a unit. See n. 269 above. 
273 See Wittgenstein (1953), 1: §527, p. 143: 'Understanding a sentence is much more 
akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think. What I mean is that 
understanding a sentence lies nearer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called 
understanding a musical theme. ' And 1: §528, p, 143, 'It would be possible to imagine 
people who had something not quite unlike a language: a play of sounds, without 
vocabulary or grammar. ("Speaking with tongues. ")' 
,4 For an account of the relevance of music to Wittgenstein's theory of 
language and 
understanding, see Guter (2004). 
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dictionary definition. In a valid definition of a term, that term must not 
figure in the explanation provided by the definition. The arbitrary 
nature of the sign is thus completely fundamental: we cannot be said 
properly to understand what is meant by a sign unless we can substitute 
that sign for a different one. This freedom, if it can be called that, of 
what is understood from the sign productive of this understanding, is 
something so basic to the practice of understanding signs that 
Wittgenstein's first comment would barely be sufficient to arouse 
interest by itself. 275 One might say, even, that the art of paraphrase is 
itself entailed by the concept of understanding. 
The second notion of understanding instanced by Wittgenstein seems 
to fly in the face of the first. And where an intuition - such as that 
expressed by the apparent truism that we do understand something by 
music - appears to contradict the firm and well-established principle 
enshrined in the first notion of understanding, our usual rational 
procedure would be to discard it as incorrect. Wittgenstein, however, 
seems unwilling to do this. The notion that our intuition is indeed 
correct, and that there is a form of understanding - typified for 
Wittgenstein here by both music and poetry276- in which the particular 
sign is itself necessary to what is understood, seems to him to be equally 
if more mysteriously fundamental to the concept of understanding. 
271 There are many passages in Wittgenstein where the centrality of paraphrase as an 
epistemological paradigm is reinforced. For example: 'Every time I say that this or 
that representation could be replaced with another, we take a further step toward the 
goal of grasping the essence of what is represented. ' Wittgenstein, Philosopliische 
Beinerkungen (Frankfurt am Main, 1964), p. 51. Cited and trans. by Karsten Harries, 
'The Many Uses of Metaphor', in Sheldon Sacks (ed. ), On Metaplior (Chicago and 
London: Chicago University Press, 1979), pp. 165-172, p. 168. 
276 It is interesting that Wittgenstein uses the example of music for the first expression 
and poetry for the second. This would appear to reflect that Wittgenstein holds that 
the case of 'necessary signs' is more easily seen in music, but that we learn more about 
how such signs relate to understanding by talking of them in the context of poetry 
where the use of language is such that we can still speak of paraphrase even though 
we admit to losing the 'meaning' of the poem by reading its paraphrase. Despite this, 
the obvious possibility (and practice) of something like paraphrase in music is not 
denied, though ýý, e should bear in mind the same proviso of 'loss' that applies to 
poetry. 
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There is something indispensable about the kind of understanding 
exemplified by our relation to music and poetry. 277 
We have said that the first sense of understanding - that in which the 
sign is replaceable or arbitrary - is the one that characterises what is 
most obviously fundamental to the sign as an instrument of thought. 
One could say that it is fundamental in this way because thinking 
would be un-economical if it were never possible to abstract what is 
understood from the signs presented to us. If it were always the case 
that a particular sign's presence is a necessary part of the understanding 
produced by this particular sign, then we could draw some rather 
absurd conclusions. We would, for example, have no capacity for 
abstract thought because the thoughts themselves would be constantly 
and irredeemably encumbered with the precise instance of whatever 
sign it was that engendered them. And were this precise instance of 
whatever sign to be absent, for whatever reason, the thought too would 
disappear. Thus we would lose all the connections by which one 
thought is related to another (or all thoughts about thoughts). We 
would lose, in fact, the entire possibility of intelligible access to the 
phenomenal world. To put this in another and simpler way, we would 
never have developed signs in the first place since the structure, 
embodied in signification, of one thing referring to another thing that 
may or may not be present would be impossible. 
We may conclude rather roughly, then, with something like the 
following. Replaceable signs are useful to understanding, and that 
which is useful about them may be characterised by their 
replaceableness. We may also infer also that this replaceableness is the 
index of a sign's efficiency or usefulness: since the work of the sign is to 
bring a particular thought to mind, it seems likely that the thought will 
277The question of why Wittgenstein thinks this would better be left to another 
discussion, but the fact that he does so is clear and unambiguous in the paragraph that 
follows the one previously quoted: 'Then has 'understanding' two different meanings 
here? -I would rather say that these kinds of use of 
'understanding' make up its 
meaning, make up my coiict, pt of understanding. For I Want to apply the word 
'understanding' to all this. ' 1: ýý'532, p. 144. 
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become present to the mind just as fast as the sign itself (its physical 
qualities, that is) becomes absent to the mind. Thus we can characterise 
the usefulness of the sign in terms of the degree to which it appears to 
be 'transparent": the sooner a sign produces the thought which it was 
designed to produce (or any other thought, perhaps), the less 'visible' or 
more transparent it is in itself. And since signs are, by definition, 'of 
something else, then the more transparent they are, the better we "see' 
that "something else, and, consequently, the better to its purpose, or 
more useful, the sign. 
What, then, of this strange breed of signs that Wittgenstein. is so 
anxious to defend; of these signs which - to continue this metaphor of 
visibility and transparency - refuse to go out of sight? Are they not, for 
the purposes of intelligibility at least, useless in this refusal? Are they 
not betrayers of the very concept of understanding, and of that of the 
sign? Wittgenstein's answer is typically elusive, but the fact that the 
two provided examples of this strange kind of sign are the musical 
theme and the poem, elements of cultural production whose purpose is 
commonly understood as being to participate in the aesthetic sphere are 
an important pointer. 
The relevance of this opposition between the "visibility' and 
'transparency' of signs according to the structure we identified in 
Rousseau"s Dictionnaire article discussed above seems clear. just as 
Wittgenstein seems to want to privilege the necessary and 'visible' signs 
seemingly productive of some kind of aesthetic experience, so too does 
Rousseau appear bent on preserving the same kind of priority for a 
conception of musical imitation centred around the same kind of 
'visibility'. The transparency of communicative structures in which the 
/rapport' is sufficiently determinate - whether this be in the case of the 
purely material rapport of bells and stone columns, or in the structure of 
cause and effect of the Raiis-des-Vaches in which the musical sign seemed 
to play an arbitrary role - is found somehow to be at fault because the 
certainty of understanding it denotes is, perhaps, such as to exclude the 
possibility of any genuine aesthetic or 'moral" engagement. 
MUSIC and Imitation - 128- Necessarv and Arbitrarv Signs 
C. MUSICAL IMITATION IN UALEMBERT AND CONDILLAC'S "CRi NATUREL I 
This oppositional structure in Wittgenstein, it seems to me, is one that 
can take us to the heart of eighteenth-century debates about 
signification and imitation, and in particular those about imitation in 
music. Much of this debate was concerned with whether music should 
in fact be considered imitative or not. 271 For those that granted that it 
should be thus considered, a further question arose about what it is in 
this case that is being imitated. 
D'Alembert, towards the end of the Discours prýliminaire to the 
EncylopMie, makes a number of observations which both loosen and 
strengthen eighteenth-century conceptions of what is going on in music 
that can be called imitative. His discussion takes us far beyond the 
obvious and rather red-herring issue involved in the fact that music can 
imitate directly the sounds that other things make, but it is important to 
bear this progress in mind because of problems caused by the difficulty 
of naming whatever thing it is that is being imitated. D'Alembert has it 
that, 
Quoique les perceptions que nous recevons par divers organes diff&rent entr'elles 
autant que leurs objets, on peut n6anmoins les comparer sous un autre point de vue 
qui leur est commun, c'est-6-dire, par la situation de plaisir ou de trouble oil elles 
mettent notre 5me. Un objet effrayant, un br-uit terrible produisent chacun en nous 
une 6motion par laquelle nous pouvons jusqu'A un certain point les rapprocher, & 
que nous d6signons souvent dans l'un & dans I'autre cas par le m&me nom, ou par 
des noms synonymes. Je ne vois donc point pourquoi un Musicien qui auroit ý 
peindre un objet effrayant, ne pourroit pas y r6ussir en cherchant dans la Nature 
Fespece de bruit qui peut produire en nous 1'6motion la plus semblable ý celle que 
cet objet y excite... Les sons harmoniques ne peuvent pas peindre le sentiment, 
mais ils peuvent en r6veiller Fid6e & mettre 1'5me dans Ykat oil Yon suppose qu'est 
celle du personnage qu'on fait agir. 279 
27,1 For a verv incisive account of this debate, see Hobson (1980), pp. 273-281. 
27 
,Q D'Alembert, Dismirs prMimnairc, EiicilclopMic 1, p. mi. 
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Passing over the extraordinarily apposite description of the 
phenomenology of perception, one should note a number of things 
before accepting that the model of musical imitation encapsulated by 
d'Alembert here can be taken as the one that presided over the debate 
during the second half of the century. The first is that the hearer is 
herself involved in the imitation, and that she needs not only a 
particular sensory apparatus for this, but that she is also responsible for 
mirroring the connections made by the composer between, say, an 
object and its effect (or affect), and between that effect and its imitation 
in music. The second point allows for more ambiguity. D'Alembert 
invokes the category of Nature for the purposes of providing a resource 
for the composer. This begs two questions: one of how such natural 
sounds can be translated into music; and another of what can be 
understood as being music's nature in this respect, of what repertoire of 
sounds is natural to music. In begging these questions without 
answering them, d'Alembert forfeits a possible account of what 
happens if such a translation is effected. It is, as we shall see in the 
following chapter, precisely with such questions that Rousseau came to 
concern himself. 
For the time being, however, it is important to pursue d'Alembert's 
account a little further. He puts it to us that what is imitated is neither 
the thing itself which may (or may not) produce a certain sentiment 
within us; and nor is it that sentiment. Instead, what is imitated is 
whatever it is about the thing itself which is productive of a certain 
sentiment. The question is one, in d"Alembert's words, of something 
like analogy: a certain movement in music is analogous to a certain 
noise, where the object referred to (or productive of the noise "in 
nature") and the emotional state it produces are somehow analogous in 
the natural and musical cases. Music, then, is understood to be 
imitative by virtue of the fact that it imitates something which can be 
described as an (audible) sign of an object's presence to our experience. 
We can speak of imitation in music, in other words, in the peculiar sense 
that it produces signs of other signs of the presence of objects. 
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Before we get lost in this seemingly problematic relay, let us try to 
orientate this question of 'signs of other signs' in terms of the initial 
formulation offered by Wittgenstein. Seemingly, we are back with the 
first and more quotidian conception of understanding in which the sign 
is replaceable. The musical sign, by virtue of the resources particular to 
music (the manipulation of sounded durations, say), refers to something 
else, where this something else is characterised by its production of a 
particular (say, emotional) effect in us. And this something else is said 
to remain the same despite the fact that there are various ways, in 
music, of imitating it. Thus the modality of musical signification 
appears to be based on the same arbitrary model that characterises the 
usefulness of signs in everyday language: the success of the musical 
sign lies in its transparency, in the economy and effectiveness with 
which it makes present to mind that particular something else that 
produces within us such and such a state. And where the transparency 
of words lies in the effective presentation of an idea to the mind, the 
transparency of music seems to lie instead in the effective presentation 
of an emotion to the "heart. 
However, this "something else' we are talking about is also, as we 
have said, a kind of sign. It is the kind of sign which, acting on our 
perceptual faculties in a particular way and causing us thus to be in 
particular state of mind, suggests to us that such and such an object is 
present to our awareness. It may appear, then, that the kind of sign we 
are talking about is the kind we characterised as necessary, the kind of 
sign that refuses to dissolve into the presence (to mind) of the object 
which it announces; instead the sign is itself a necessary part of the 
presence of this object. 
An example will be useful here; but the kind of examples suggested 
by Wittgenstein - poetry and music, that is to say - may 
be too 
confusing at this stage. Let us instead draw on an example, following 
d'Alembert, from nature, on something of which we could say, again 
following d'Alembert, that it is naturally terrifying. A lion, for example, 
is a fearsome object; and one of the noises it makes, a roar, is a terrible 
noise. In so far as we believe this terrible roar necessarily to indicate the 
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presence of a lion of which we have every reason to be afraid, we can 
speak of some kind of necessary sign. This necessity is reliant on our 
belief that the lion is fearsome and the roar terrible because a lion roars 
when it is in a mood to act in whatever way it deems appropriate to 
satisfy its desire; and on the belief too that the desire of a lion in our 
immediate vicinity will be directed towards us. We may appear to the 
lion to be the food that it desires because it is hungry, or we may appear 
to it to be the competition that it desires to eliminate for other, no less 
natural, reasons. But in either case, our belief is that in the vicinity of a 
roaring lion, we are, short of some form or other of effective evasive 
action, 'dead meat". And thus we feel fear. Given these beliefs, that is, 
we necessarily feel fear in the presence of a lion's terrible roar. 
We can speak of necessity, then, only in so far as our beliefs - namely, 
that the lion is fearsome and that its roar is terrible, etc. - are true. Thus 
our beliefs in this instance, which are more than amply provided for by 
instinct, entail two things in response to a particular sound, the terrible 
roar: first that there is a lion in our midst; second that we feel fear. And 
since we are talking in this case primarily of instinct, and only 
secondarily of reasonable beliefs, we can assume that there is some level 
of truth operative in the sense that instincts can be said to entail kinds of 
beliefs that remain true for us until some other evidence leads us to 
reason that they are untrue. Thus, until something leads us to suspect 
that our belief that a lion"s roar is terrible, there is a necessary 
connection between the terrible roar and the terror that we experience. 
The connection is necessary, in other words, until such time as we 
discover for instance, that we are indomitable and can in actual fact eat 
lions for breakfast; or, alternatively, that despite the obvious fact of the 
lion"s terrible roar, there are actually no lions present and the roar is in 
reality the product of a much less fearsome object, a televised lion, say. 
But what, then, of music? Can we follow Wittgenstein in asserting 
that such a structure of necessity obtains in the case of the musical sign? 
The first point to make here is an obvious one: there are no lions 
present. No matter how effectively the musical sign behaves, no matter 
how transparent is the manner in which it yields its place to an 
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analogous sound which is, in actualfact, a terrible one, we cannot speak 
of the lion's presence and thus cannot, at first sight, speak of our fear as 
being necessarily entailed by that particular arrangement of notes. 
However, to say this is rather to miss the point of both Wittgenstein's 
and d'Alembert's formulations. For the point was never that the object 
itself must be present, merely that the sign must be so. The connection 
that is important for both men, and which is characterised by necessity 
for Wittgenstein, is between the sign and a state of mind, an emotional 
state for d'Alembert, a thought for Wittgenstein. The lion's roar is 
terrible because we believe it to be so. And thus as long as the musical 
sign does the job of being terrible, like a lion's roar, a necessary 
connection obtains such that in the presence of this particular sound our 
emotional state is bound to be one of fear. 
However, while this account may satisfy d"Alembert, it will not 
satisfy Wittgenstein. This for the simple reason that we are still talking 
about replaceable or arbitrary signs in the music. A certain musical 
movement may be sufficiently like a lion's roar to do all this work, but 
that is all it is: like. It is not the thing itself which is a necessary part of 
our particular terror, or whichever other particular emotional or 
cognitive response, but an imitation of this thing. And however 
effective it may be in this likeness, that is no guarantee that another 
certain musical movement may not be equally sufficient, if not more so, 
to the production or eliciting of this response. What Wittgenstein seems 
to be driving at, on the other hand, is a situation in which it is the 
musical sign itself that is irreplaceable, or opaque, so that whatever 
emotional state it elicits (for example, one analogous to the particular 
emotional state identifiable as 'terror in the presence of roaring lions'), 
or whatever thought is 'understood" by it, is particular to it, is 
irreducible to any other emotional or cognitive response in which that 
precise sign does not figure. The structure of analogy suggestive of 
success in musical imitation for d'Alembert is insufficient, in other 
words, for Wittgenstein, who seems to want music to be in some 
respects inimitable. 
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Perhaps, then, we are simply looking at the wrong model. We 
should recall, if we are to investigate this possible error, that one of the 
things that d'Alembert's account of musical imitation lacked was an 
account of the kind of resources available to music, an account, that is to 
say, of what it is about music which enables this imitative capacity and 
its consequent ability to elicit emotional or other possibly cognitive 
responses. 
At the time d'Alembert wrote the Discours prýlimlnaire there were two 
main accounts of music's "nature' in this respect. The first account, 
developed by Rameau, understood music to be a relation between 
resonating bodies, one productive of the sound, the other receptive to it. 
Music, on this account, may be understood to be imitative in the sense 
that it imitates the natural organisation of the physical world, where this 
organisation is understood to be a good and harmonious arrangement. 
The second account, which finds its first systematic expression in the 
eighteenth century in the writing of Condillac, sees music, and language 
as well, as an imitation and subsequent refinement of original 
communication, of the 'cri de la nature'. In the first, the imitation is 
enabled by the natural origin of music, where nature is understood in 
terms of the laws of physics. In the second, equally, the imitation is 
enabled by the natural origin of music, but where nature is understood 
historically and anthropologically. 280 
The basis of Condillac and his contemporaries" interest in the "cri de 
la nature' and the idea of the natural sign in general lies in its provision 
of a model in which the arbitrary cultural practice of using signs, such 
as in language and music, to communicate is related to and firmly 
grounded in a natural structure. 'The force", as Marian Hobson puts it" 
of the first human modes of expression lies in the fact that they are both symptom 
and sign. As symptoms, these gestures or noises are a part of the experience itself; 
as signs, they refer to that emotion. 281 
28OThe fact that part of Condillac's project Nvas to reduce the historical origin to a 
synchronic and systematic structure of relations need not trouble us here. 
' 11 "I Hobson (1980), p. 241. 
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Neither the event of the natural sign, then, nor the form of its utterance, 
is a matter of choice; and yet, in being a communicable symptom of 
something (a state of desire), it is also a sign of this something for those 
that hear it. 
The lion's roar that we laboured over a moment ago would be one 
example of a natural sign in this sense, but it is not a favourable 
example for a simple reason: lions have not, so far as we know at any 
rate, developed either a music or a language. The example chosen by 
Condillac is a human one, where the humans involved are taken to be 
primitive ones: "Des signes naturels, dont le caractere est de faire 
connoitre par eux-memes et independamment du choix que nous avons 
fait, Fimpression que nous eprouvons, en occasionnant quelque chose 
de semblable chez les autres'. 111 
Now there is an obvious problem here in the fact that as soon as the 
sign is used as a sign, or as soon as it ceases simply to be a symptom, we 
can no longer speak of natural or necessary signs. If there is imitation 
involved, however minimal the degree of consciousness with which 
such an imitation is effected, we can no longer be speaking of 
symptoms, of expressive phenomena that arise naturally. In 
recognising this to be a problem, we should alert ourselves to the idea 
that it is not really so very different from the problem faced by 
Wittgenstein; the problem to which the only answer seemed to be that 
Wittgenstein 'wanted' our concept of understanding to incorporate both 
kinds of sign, both the necessary and the arbitrary. Similarly, Condillac, 
throughout his text, seems to want what he calls "conventional signs" to 
be continuous historically and epistemologically with these cries of 
nature, or natural signs. 
One thing that Condillac's account of the natural sign does provide, 
however, is an opportunity to relocate the sphere in which imitation 
understood as analogy appears to operate. For were the problem just 
mentioned to disappear - were the modern musical sign to share the 
'82 Condillac (1947), p. -19. 
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necessity of the natural sign in an unproblematic way - we would not 
be talking about analogy between one (kind of) sign and another, but 
between ourselves and those others Condillac mentions as being 
equipped to receive similar impressions to our own. Were, in other 
words, the infinite relay of the "conventional sign' to be somehow 
reduced to the natural sign, the analogical structure of communication 
would be grounded, firmly, in the knowledge that some similar other 
was present; and it would be, not the relay of seemingly origin-less 
convention that would be irreducible, but rather, a particular kind of 
knowledge of others being present. The required necessity would, in 
this sense be provided by the anchorage of the sign, not in a real object, 
but in a particular kind of other that would only be present in so far as 
this was signified by it. 
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IV 
MIMICRY AND MIMESIS: 
DIDEROT'S MORAL CHALLENGE TO ROUSSEAU 
A. MUSIC As HIEROGLYPH IN DIDEROT 
Before we proceed in the next chapter to examine the way in which 
Rousseau attempts to reconcile the idea of musical imitation with the 
idea of the presence of others, and assess the way in which this relation 
is valorised in morally positive terms, I should first like to discuss an 
area of Diderot"s contribution to the problem. This, as I hope the 
present section will demonstrate, consists of an account of peculiar 
richness and complexity which our reading of Rousseau can only 
benefit by taking into account. 
In Diderot's Lettre sur les sourds et les muets, written the year 
d'Alembert's Discours was published, we find the following two 
observations on the problem of imitation in music. 
Cest la chose m&me que le peintre montre; les expressions du musicien et du poýte 
n'en sont que des hi6roglyphes. 
Comment se fait-il donc que des trois arts imitateurs de la nature, celui [la 
musique] dont 1'expression est la plus arbitraire et la moins pr6cise parle le plus 
fortement ý 1'5me? 283 
The term 'hieroglyph' is used often by Diderot to suggest that infinite 
relay seemingly so problematic to CondillaC , 284 and indeed, to every 
writer, Wittgenstein included, who wishes to provide an account of a 
sign's being necessarily itself. "' The painter has the advantage of being 
283Lettrc siir 1cs soiirds ct iiniets, Diderot (1965), pp. 84 & 102. 
284Condillac, it must be admitted, thought this was a problem he had solved. Most 
commentators, however, denv this, from Rousseau and Herder onwards. See, for 
example, Hobson (1980), p. 284. An exception is Englefield (1977). 
211 Diderot's conception of the hieroglyph is really rather like an artificial and arbitrary 
version of the necessary or 'natural' sign, in that it is, in the words of Hobson, 'the 
means whereby things are said and represented at one and the same time'. See 
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able to make a likeness of a real object. In this case, our response to the 
painting can be compared to the way in which we would respond to the 
object itself, were it indeed to be present in the manner shown by the 
painter. But this trick, this facet of allowing us, as it were, to see the lion 
behind the terrible roar, seems to Diderot to miss the point; to miss the 
point, that is, so long as the point of imitative art is conceived in terms 
of affecting the soul. And, with this in mind, he suggests that it is 
actually music, the most hieroglyphic of the arts, the most locked up in 
its own imitations of itself, that 'speaks most strongly to the soul'. Do 
we infer from this that music"s ability in this respect is somehow a 
function of its excessively hieroglyphic status? Or, rather, does it 
suggest that while music may seem to be the most hieroglypl-dc of the 
arts, it is in fact not so, and that we know this to be the case because it 
expresses to us what it has to express more surely and more effectively 
than any other apparently less hieroglyphic artform? 
B. RAMEAU"S NEPHEW ON MUSICAL IMITATION 
One of Diderot"s most curious and blunt answers to such questions 
occurs in the context of a discussion with a fictional character, 
understood to be the nephew of the composer Rameau, and also himself 
a rather brilliant if not quite so respectable musician. The work in 
question, Le Neveu de Rameau, consists for the most part of a dialogue 
between the Nephew, referred to as "Lui" in the text, and a character 
referred to as "Moi', whom we understand to be something of a moral 
philosopher, a man of the Enlightenment not unlike Diderot but not, we 
are given to understand, the man himself. 286 
The subject of music and its effects on us arises after a break in the 
conversation. Moi is feeling ill after being exposed to the Nephew's 
Hobson (1982), p. 280. 
286During the course of the conversation, 'Lui' refers to Diderot by name. The 
character known as'Moi', whom we nevertheless rightly associate with Diderot, 
makes it clear that he is not that person. See Diderot (1946), p. 46-5. 
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rather diabolical seeming breed of morality, 287 while Lui wanders about 
/ whistling and singing". To change the subject, Moi asks Lui what he 
was doing. 
Lui. - Rien... f&ais dýjä suffisamment b&te. J'ai &ý entendre cette musique de 
Duni et de nos autres jeunes faiseurs, qui m'achevý. 
Moi. - Vous approuvez donc ce genre ? 
Lui. - Sans doute. 
Moi. - Et vous trouvez de la beautý dans ces nouveaux chants ? 
Lui. - Si j'en trouve ? Pardieu, je vous en rýponds. Comme cela est dMarný 
Quelle výritý! Quelle expression! 288 
This expression of preference for the 'modem' or Italian style of operatic 
music would appear to be extremely significant, for it evokes the 
context of the Querelle des bouffons, a context, that is, suffused with 
arguments which turn partly on whether music should be understood 
to owe its expressive powers either, to use the two paradigmatic 
eighteenth- century notions mentioned earlier, to the harmony of 
resonating bodies, or to the primitive resonance embodied in the idea of 
the 'natural sign" and its successful imitation. The Nephew"s apparently 
unambiguous siding with thecoin de la Reine" against the "coin du Roi' 
(with his uncle at its figUrehead)289 is not, however, as fundamental as it 
first seems. The conversation continues, 
Moi. - Tout art d'imitation a son mod&le dans la nature. Quel est le mod&le du 
musicien quand il fait un chant ? 
Lui. - Pourquoi ne pas prendre la chose de plus haut ? Qu'est-ce qu'un chant ? 
Moi. - je vous avouerai que cette question est au-dessus de mes forces. Voilý 
comme nous sommes tous. Nous n'avons dans la m6moire que des mots que nous 
croyons entendre par Fusage fr6quent et Yapplication mýme juste que nous en 
faisons; dans Fesprit, que des notions vagues. Quand je prononce le mot chant, je 
n'ai pas des notions plus nettes que wus et la plupart de vos semblables quand ils 
disent: r6putation, bl3me, honneur, vice, vertu, pudeur, d6cence, honte, ridicule. 
287 We will return to the content of this previous conversation presently. 
211 Diderot (1946), p. 480. 
itlý expressed a little later on: 'Moi. - Cest que, si cette musique 2`; Q This is more explic] 7 
est sublime, il faut que celle du divin Lulli ... et m&me, soit dit entre nous, celle du 
cher oncle, soit un peu plate. ' Diderot (1946), 482. 
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Lui. - Le chant est une imitation, par les sons, d'une 6chelle, invent6e par Yart ou 
inspir6e par la nature, comme il vous plaira, ou par la voix ou par Yinstrument, des 
bruits physiques ou des accents de la passion; et vous voyez qu'en changeant M 
dedans les choses 6 changer, ]a d6finition conviendrait exactement 6 la peinture, 6 
1'61oquence, 6 la sculpture et 6 la po6sie. 290 
There are a number of important points to be raised about this 
exchange. At first sight, it is the comments made by the Lui that seem 
most immediately relevant, so let us examine these first. The most 
obvious thing to note is that the Nephew's account of musical imitation 
is more or less identical to that provided by d'Alembert and Rousseau: 
music imitates not the passions themselves, nor the worldly objects that 
act on us to elicit such passions, but the 'bruits physiques ou des accents 
de la passion'; the external signs, that is to say, that seem to bear some 
kind of connection with our emotional or cognitive states of mind. He 
also goes one step further than d'Alembert, 191 who, we may remember, 
omitted any account of how music comes to have this imitative capacity; 
but this further step is somewhat ambiguous in its orientation. 
The Nephew, who we have just understood to be committed in some 
or other way to the musical doctrines of the 'coin de la Reine', and thus 
to a particular position on precisely this issue, remarks however that 
this seemingly central issue is in fact of no importance whatsoever. That 
he does so in parenthesis seems to be for the purpose of inflecting the 
sentence with some kind of ironic de-emphasis, as if to indicate that 
although such matters weigh greatly with us, they do not do so for him. 
With the suggestion that the matter of whether the scale, the primary 
material of music, is "inventee par Fart ou inspiree par la nature' is 
simply a question of taste - or of "comme il vous plaira- the Nephew 
can be understood to imply something like the following: that were we 
even to expand this formulation into one seemingly more apposite, such 
as "the physical resources of music are invented by art aiid inspired by 
290 Diderot (1946), pp. 480-1. 
2Q] And this further step should not be taken as one simply of daritig to go further. The 
point is more fundamental than that. 
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nature, where this closeness to nature in some respect provides the 
measure of the quality of the arrangement of these resources, that is to 
say, of the music', we would still be dealing with a meaningless and 
pointless expression. 
This second formulation oddly characterises the viewpoints of both 
Rousseau and Rameau; both polar perspectives, that is to say, of the 
Querelle des Bouffons. It allows for this opposition by virtue of the 
ambiguity of the term 'nature", where in the context of the Querelle and 
its continuations, the conception of nature at each pole is radically 
different: Rameau's conception is, broadly speaking, that of a natural 
scientist; Rousseau's, again broadly speaking, that of the anthropologist. 
Thus what we can suppose the Nephew to be saying is simply, contrary 
to both men, that the concept of nature is thoroughly dispensable. We 
do not need, in other words, a concept of nature. We do not even need, 
by extension, a concept of necessity, that concept for which nature is so 
often made to stand. All we need, by contrast, is the knowledge, gained 
by experience, that certain things act on us in certain ways, and that if 
they act on us in a way that is pleasing, for whatever reason, then they 
are good. And thus when the Nephew, in what follows this exchange, 
seems to espouse many of the central Rousseauan tenets concerning 
what is good and what is bad about the music currently being 
performed in Paris, we can do no more than conclude that his 
suggestion is that such types of music seem to him, at the moment, to be 
good; and further, that whatever reasons he may adduce in support of 
this position (most of which are explicitly Rousseauan), others could be 
found, if, desired, to contradict them. 
To make this explicit, the conversation concludes with the following 
exchange: 
Moi. - 11 ya de la raison, ä peu prýs, dans tout ce que vous venez de dire. 
Lui. - De la raison ? Tant mieux. je veux que le diable m'emporte si j'y täche. 
Cela va comme je te pousse. Je suis comme les musiciens de l'impasse quand mon 
oncle parut. Si j'adresse ä la bonne heure, c'est qu'un garýon charbonnier parlera 
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toujours mieux de son mäier que toute une acadýmie et que tous les 1--)uhamel du 
monde. 292 
The whole process of reasoning about matters of taste, we may infer, is 
itself arbitrary. "' The Nephew's bold message, then, seems to be that 
taste, in so far as taste is understood to be a particular kind of 
connection between a sense perception and an emotional response, is 
arbitrary; that any reasons adduced in support of the idea that our tastes 
might be appropriate or inappropriate are similarly arbitrary; and 
finally, that whatever rational principle is understood to underlie such 
reasons is equally arbitrary. 
Such points are radicalised further by the sentence that follows the 
initially innocuous-seeming reference to d'Alembert's (and Rousseau's) 
account of imitation. In this sentence, the Nephew effectively 
deconstructs - and this seems an appropriate enough word - another of 
the apparent oppositions sacred to ei ghteenth- century France, that 
between painting, poetry, and MUSiC. 294 For the Nephew puts it simply 
enough: by changing the variables the same definition would apply 
exactly to painting, eloquence, sculpture or poetry. In addition, then, to 
all the other arbitrary connections suggested by the Nephew in the 
affair of taste and the art in which it finds itself exemplified, we 
understand him to say that the medium - the material stuff of art itself - 
is also arbitrary. 
The concluding definition, that the Nephew invites us to provide by 
incorporating the different arbitrary variables into d'Alembert"s 
292Diderot (1946), p. 484. 
203 It is interesting to note that some of the examples of 'bad' French music that the 
Nephew introduces into this discussion are peculiarly inapposite. Since Diderot 
makes it clear that we are in no position to mistrust the character's knowledge and 
memory of musical matters, the suggestion is that these 'examples' are intended to 
disrupt any remaining stability of the discourse. For a discussion of this, see Rex 
(1987), esp. pp. 146ff. 
2114And most notably in this context, to both Diderot and Rousseau. See Diderot in the 
passage cited above from LItre siir Ics soiirds ct 1cs iinictý, and Rousseau's Fss(71, esp. 
Chapter XVI, OC V, pp. 419-424. Rousseau's dependence on the distinction between, 
in particular, music and painting will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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definition of musical imitation would be something like the following. 
A work of art, which we can take to be any object or moment that 
engenders in us a particular kind of response (for whatever reason), is 
an imitation, by virtue of whatever resources it may be said to have at 
its disposal (regardless of how these resources can be said to have come 
into existence), of a certain kind of phenomenon, which may be artificial 
or natural (were such a distinction to be apposite, which it is not), to 
which we respond in some way that can be characterised as passionate. 
The Nephew, it seems, regardless of his commitments to and 
engagements with the tastes and practices of his own time, is not far 
short of, and almost certainly quite far beyond, being an exponent of 
what we would today call conceptual art. 
C. L"HOMME ORCHESTRE 
Following the often passionate and almost entirely astute discussion 
about music, the particular artistic phenomenon that the Nephew treats 
us to is the famous mime, described by one commentator as the scene of 
the "I"homme orchestre'. 295 Immediately after the remark about the coal 
boy, the Nephew engages on this 'art experiment. Moi withdraws from 
the conversation and becomes a silent (for the most part) observer. His 
narration I quote at length. 
Et puis le voilý qui se met ý se promener en murmurant dans son gosier quelques- 
uns des airs de I'He desfoits, du Peintre anioureiix de son modNe, du Markhalferrant, 
de la Plaidciisc; et de temps en temps, il s'6criait en levant les mains et les yeux au 
ciel :, Si cela est beau, mordieu ! si cela est beau ! Comment peut-on porter 
ý sa 
tke une paire d'oreilles et faire une pareille question ? >> 11 commenýait 
ý entrer en 
passion et ) chanter ý tout bas; il 6levait le ton ý mesure qu'il se passion-nait 
davantage. Vinrent ensuite les gestes, les grimaces du visage et les contorsions du 
corps ... 
11 entassait et brouillait ensemble trente airs italiens, franýais, tragiques, 
corniques, de toutes sortes de caract&res. Tant6t avec une voix 
de basse-taille, il 
descendait jusqu'aux enfers ; tant6t s'6gosillant et contrefaisant le fausset, il 
2l)5See the chapter on T'homme orchestre', in Werner (1987), pp. 23-38. 
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d6chirait le haut des airs, imitant de la d6marche, du maintien, du geste, les 
diff6rents personnages chantants; successivement furieux, radouci, imp6rieux, 
ricaneur. Ici, Cest une jeune fille qui pleure, et il rend toute la minauderie; 1ý il est 
pr&tre, il est roi, il est tyran, il menace, il commande, il s'emporte, il est esclave, il 
ob6it. 11 s'apaise, il se d6sole, il se plaint, il rit ; jamais hors de ton, de m6sure, du 
sens des paroles et du caract&re de Fair. Tous les pousse-bois avaient quitt6 leurs 
6chiquiers et s6taient rassembl6s autour de lui. Les fenkres du caf6 6taient 
occup6es, en dehors, par les passants qui s'6taient arr&t6s au bruit... En chantant 
un lambeau des LanientatiOns de Jornelli, il r6p6tait avec un pr6cision, une v6rit6 et 
une chaleur incroyables les plus beaux endroits de chaque morceau ; ce beau 
r6citatif oblig6 oij le proph&te peint la d6solation de j6rusalem, il Farrosa dun 
torrent de larmes qui en arrach&rent de tous les yeux. Tout y 6tait, et la d6licatesse 
du chant, et la force de 1'expression, et la douleur. 11 insistait sur les endroits oii le 
musicien s'6tait particuli&rement montr6 un grand maitre. S'il quittait la partie du 
chant, c'6tait pour prendre celle des instruments qu'il laissait subitement pour 
revenir ý la voix, entrelapnt Fune 6 Fautre de mani&re 'conserver les liaisons et 
Funit6 du tout; s'emparant de nos 5mes et les tenant suspendues dans la situation 
la plus singuli&re que jaie jamais 6prouv6e... Admirais-je ? Oui, j'admirais ! ttais- 
je touch6 de piti6 ? J'6tais touch6 de piti6; mais une teinte de ridicule 6tait fondue 
dans ces sentiments et les d6naturait. 
296 
It may seem inappropriate to call the scene that is described here a 
mime, for the proceedings are far from silent. Yet the term is a long way 
from being inappropriate. For in the sense in which mime simply 
suggests mimicry, at its narrowest, and mimesis, at its broadest, our 
concept of mime, like the concept the narrator has of a tune, is not a 
well-defined one. Mime can, however, be described as an artform 
whose primary resource is gestures; gestures of a particular kind which 
point to something which is not there but nonetheless manage, by virtue 
of the way they are made and the way they are perceived, to suggest 
that that something is there. The primary modality of mime"s gestures, 
indeed the central characteristic of mimetic sign itself, is the 'as if. 
The remark with which the narrator concludes the passage - the 
reflection that despite the scenes having all the results of an excellent 
and successful music-theatrical performance, that nevertheless a tinge of 
ridicule attached itself to the scene - should serve to remind us of some 
2"(, Diderot (1946), pp. 484-5. 
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comments in the preceding discussion between "Lui' and Moi that 
remained to be remarked upon. These, it will be recalled, concerned 
concepts such as 'vice, vertu, pudeur, decence, honte', notions of which, 
the inference was, the Nephew had no better grasp than the narrator 
had of the concept "chant. The introduction of these specifically moral 
notions into the comparison is due to the fact that the break in the 
conversation that had allowed it to turn to discussion of music -a 
morally neutral subject, it might be assumed - was occasioned by Moi 
feeling somewhat sick at the attempt to contain his moral outrage at a 
story the Nephew had just related to him. The story concerned a 
renegade who brilliantly evades capture by denouncing a Jew, stealing 
his fortune and leaving him to be burnt at the stake by the Inquisition. 
The expanded interjection provided by Moi thus provides a link back 
over the hiatus in a "lest we forget' kind of a way, serving to remind us 
of the moral failings of the Nephew who is, in his own words, 'un &re 
tres abject, tres meprisable ... je me felicite plus souvent de mes vices 
que je ne men blame. ' 297 More importantly, we are reminded of the 
peculiar structure used by the narrator, in his introduction to the 
dialogue, to frame the character of Lui. The narrator writes of the 
Nephew that he is 
un des plus bizarres personnages de ce pays oii Dieu Wen a pas laiss6 manquer. 
Cest un compos6 de hauteur et de bassesse, de bon sens et de d6raison. 11 faut que 
les notions de I'honn&te et du d6shonnke soient bien 6trangement brouill6es dans 
sa tke, car il montre ce que la nature lui a donn6 de bonne qualit6s sans 
ostentation, et ce qu'il en a reýu de mauvaises sans pudeur. 218 
The ostension so magnificently exemplified by the Nephew's mimcry, is 
not in other words ridiculous because it is ostentatious; the Nephew is 
207Diderot (1946), p. 479. 
298Diderot (1946), p. 425. This structure is, in turn, introduced by another, which is in 
the form of an observation about the men playing chess in the Caf6 de la R6gence 
where the narrator is sitting. The Caf6'est Yendroit de Paris o6 Fori joue le mieux ý ce 
jeu ; Cest chez Rey ... qu'on voit 
les coups les plus surprenants et qu'on entend les 
plus mauvais propos; car si I'on peut kre homme d'esprit et grand joueur d'6checs ... 
on petit kre aussi Lin grand joueur d'6checs et Lin sot'. Diderot (1946), p. 425. 
Music and Imitation - 145- %limici-N, and 
Mimesis 
not showing off exactly, but rather showing, in a stream of exceptionally 
well-conceived gestures, that "something else' of mimesis. 
The case of the Nephew's morality is not a simple one in which he is 
simply 'abject" and 'despicable'; it is, rather, an intriguing and more 
complex one. For while it is clear that he retains intact both the 
differential structure of moral terminology and also the differential 
structures of supposedly moral feeling, the connections between the two 
seem to be 'etrangement brouillees dans sa tete. ' Thus we should infer 
that, in the presence of a moral situation such that it would normally 
arouse a feeling of approbation, the Nephew will feel disgust; and that 
faced with a situation that is supposed to be morally bad, the missing 
response of approbation will ensue. And this supposition is confirmed 
by the story about the renegade and the Jew, such that Lui is shown to 
revel in the mastery of the renegade's plotting and deception, while Moi 
is outraged both at the fate of the Jew and at the teller of the story. The 
narrator's moral confusion in this respect is what makes him feel sick. 
Conversely, however, and significantly, the same chiasmic exchange 
would not obtain in a purely aesthetic situation: the Nephew has 
demonstrated both his extreme sensitivity to music as well as providing 
sound and sensible judgements on the subject. While retaining, 
therefore, a masterful and enviable control of the differential structures 
of both aesthetic and moral value judgements, at the same time as 
demonstrating extreme emotional sensitivity, the Nephew displays 
thoroughly appropriate emotional responses in the aesthetic case and 
thoroughly inappropriate emotional responses in the moral case. 299 
2Q9 There is also a sense in which Diderot seems to want to suggest that the artistic 
excellence of Liti is both in spite of and also partly caused by his moral failings. This 
implication of causation between moral laxity and artistic competence is born out 
elsewhere in the text: 'Moi - je ne sais lequel des deux me 
fait le plus d'horreur, ou de 
]a sc6l6ratesse de votre ren6gat, ou du ton dont vous en parlez. Lui - Et voilý ce que 
je vous disais : Fatrocit6 de Faction vous porte au delý du m6pris, et Cest la raison de 
ma sinc6rit6. J'ai voulu que vous cormussiez jusqu'o6 j'excellais dans mon art, vous 
arracher Yaveu que j'6tais au moins original dans mon avilissement, me placer dans 
votre tke sur la ligne des grand vauriens'. Diderot (1946), p. 476. See also p. 493. 
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This, then, is what Moi has in mind when he introduces the moral 
concepts above; finding no response from the Nephew on this subject 
(and soon mostly forgetting it himself), Moi can conclude that Lui 
would dispute neither the idea that he has only vague notions of these 
moral concepts, nor perhaps the hidden suggestion that he wouldn't 
care anyway. One can effectively relate this provisional character 
analysis to the devastating reduction of two of the eighteenth century's 
most valuable music-aesthetic principles that we witnessed in the 
Nephew's remarks about musical imitation. This reduction, if we recall 
it, entailed a wholesale rejection of the concepts of nature and necessity 
in an aesthetic context. The laws governing aesthetic taste, were we 
successfully to discover any, are contingent both culturally and 
historically; they are both arbitrary and temporary. So what replaces 
this structure of necessity that appeared at first, to Wittgenstein as well 
as to Rousseau and Rameau, to govern the aesthetic sign? The answer 
provided by the Nephew seems to be, simply, nothing. Nothing, that is, 
except for its appearance. The apparent necessity of the aesthetic sign is 
accepted so long as it feels natural to do so; but beyond this mimicry of 
nature, there is nothing. We must take our tastes seriously in order to 
enjoy them. We must take the differential structures in which our tastes 
find expression seriously - despite our belief that such differential 
structures are themselves arbitrary rather than necessary - in order for 
our potential aesthetic pleasures to find expression in the arrangements 
of sense-perceptions, in the aesthetic signs, that experience presents to 
us. 
In this way, the entire phenomenal world, for the Nephew, is 
effectively and radically aestheticised. And thus the responses to 
situations which, for characters like Moi and most of us in the real 
world, would be valorised by their moral content, come for the Nephew 
simply to be aesthetic. In the opacity that characterises the Nephew's 
world of aesthetic signs - an opacity provided for by the signs' 
appearance of necessity - there is no hidden "real world" to 
be 
discovered. For the character of the Nephew is such that none of his 
beliefs are capable of being true for longer than the duration of any 
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particular moment of aesthetic perception, and such therefore that all 
his assumptions about the world, the values attached to its objects, and 
all his emotional responses, are arbitrary. Nothing matters to him 
except for the fact that there remains in play some kind of differential 
structure, of whatever arbitrary origin, for his aesthetic responses to 
find their objects in the world. The terror engendered by the lion"s roar, 
to draw on our example from the previous section, might well, for the 
Nephew fail to be accompanied by the presence of an actual lion, that 
thing, in other words, which we believe to be fearful and for which 
belief we could provide excellent reasons were any required. The 
Nephew, on the other hand, is such that any apparently necessary 
connections between the lion"s roar and his fearful response might at 
any minute disappear in a puff of smoke, and thus what would be for us 
a kind of moral terror would be, for the Nephew, an aesthetic 
experience, free to be enjoyed much as we could enjoy the fright we 
experience on being surprised by the roar of a televised lion. Morality, 
as Moi suspects, thereby comes to be for the Nephew a meaningless 
concept. The emotional responses that we would identify as moral ones 
are, for him, indistinguishable from those we would identify as 
aesthetic. Even when Moi addresses him on precisely this point, his 
answer makes use of a musical analogy. 
Moi. - Comment se fait-il qu'avec un tact aussi fin, une si grande sensibilit6 pour 
les beaut6s de Fart musical, vous soyez aussi aveugle sur les belles choses en 
morale, aussi insensible aux charmes de la vertu ? 
Lui. - Cest apparernment qu'il ya pour les unes un sens que je Wai pas, une 
fibre 
qui ne m'a point 6t6 donn6e, une fibre lkhe qu'on a beau pincer et qui ne vibre 
pas. 300 
Interestingly then, the collapse of the idea of necessity does not entail 
a similar collapse in the momentary belief that this necessity is still out 
there, embodied in the aesthetic sign. Having no need of anything less 
300 Diderot (1946), p. 489. 
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shallow than this illusion of necessity, the aesthetic model the Nephew 
can appeal to bears every resemblance to that understanding in which 
the necessity of the aesthetic sign is rooted in the idea of necessity 
implicit in the concept of nature. This is indeed what he does do, at the 
one moment in the mime sequence that he breaks the rules and 
addresses his audience directly: 'Si cela est beau, mordieu! ", he appeals 
to us, 'Comment peut-on porter a sa tete une paire d'oreilles et faire une 
pareille question? "Ol His suggestion here is much the same as his 
uncle's, and much the same as the version in Rousseau's Lettre 
discussed earlier; 302namely, that all that is required for the perception of 
the beauty of a culturally specific artwork is the relevant physical 
apparatus. This appears to be the Nephew"s sincere belief, a belief 
which seemingly for him is both true and productive of necessity. 
Sincere and with all the appearance of necessity, this belief, and the 
'necessity' contingent upon it, nonetheless lasts no longer than the 
duration of the act of perception in which it finds itself momentarily 
confirmed. Similarly, the thoughts about the world and its object that 
are given to the Nephew, both the plausible and the extraordinary ones, 
are understood to be the product of some pre-reflective consciousness: 
'Je n'ai pense de ma vie, ' he reports at one point, 'ni avant que de dire, 
ni en disant, ni apres avoir dit. '303 He appears to embody some kind of 
miraculous 'natural resonance"304 inevitably "in tune' with himself and 
his world. 
Later on in the text, the narrator observes the following in an aside: 
11 y avait dans tout cela beaucoup de ces choses quon pense, d'apr&s lesquelles on 
se conduit; mais qu'on ne dit pas. VoiM, en v6rit6, la diff6rence la plus marqu6e 
entre mon homme et la plupart de nos entours. 11 avouait les vices qu'il avait, que 
301 Note that the Nephew has no more trouble invoking the concept of nature than he 
does in invoking that of God. 
101 See Rousseau's account of the'experiment' with the Armenian cited in Section I 
above, p. 93. 
303Diderot (1946), p. 465. 
301 The idea of natural resonance extending from bodies to consciousness was one to 
which Diderot was not at all unfriendly. See for example the 
famous discussion in Le 
Wve d'Alenillcrt, Diderot (1946). 
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les autres ont; mais il n'6tait pas hypocrite. 11 n'6tait ni plus ni moins abominable 
qu'eux; il 6tait seulement plus franc, et plus cons6quent, et quelquefois profond 
dans sa d6pravation. 305 
Consistent, profound, yet strangely empty, mysteriously expressive of 
both our spoken and unspeakable thoughts, the character of the 
Nephew seems to be the product of our own beliefs and desires bound 
inalienably to the rhetorical constructions in which he is embodied. The 
inexorable, musical thud of his maniacal parataxis, coerces us into some 
kind of complicity with the connections he so effortlessly draws and 
retraCtS. 306 
We do well, in fact, to remember that the Nephew is not a real-life 
character, but rather almost seems to be intended by Diderot to be some 
kind of emblem of aesthetic experience itself; a mimetic sign, as it were, 
playing on the crests of successive waves of irony whose peaks are 
beauty and whose troughs ridicule. This irony, so pervasive as to infuse 
every moment of the text, is not the classical irony of Voltaire's auto-da- 
fi, an irony whose 'as if' is so clearly rooted in the moral sphere. The 
irony of Le Neveu admits of no such unifying "oughts' precisely because 
this modality is itself so clearly ironised. In place of Voltaire's 
underlying morality, Diderot grants us an infinite sequence of 'as ifs', an 
infinite relay of mimetic gestures, upon which the only limit placed is 
the limit (supposing there to be one) of our imagination. The waves, in 
other words, start and end with us, the time of our existence marked out 
only by the frequency of the troughs and peaks. The origin of the 
aesthetic is identical to its end: it is us, just as clearly as the object of the 
Nephew"s mimicry is also clearly ourselves, his readers. 
This element of the return to ourselves is important, and lies at the 
heart, I think, of the dialogue's concerns. Like Condillac's natural sign, 
the sign whose necessity lies ultimately in the presence of some being 
similar, or analogous to ourselves, Diderot's analogical structure seems 
-105Diderot (1946), p. 492. 
3060n the subject of parataxis, and its implicit breaking and re-forging of semantic 
connections, see Hobson (1995). 
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also rooted in this level of similarity. But it has a crucial difference. For 
the implication is quite simply that there is nothing there except our 
own echo; nothing behind the lion's roar except our own possibly 
fragile beliefs about lions; nothing behind the text except the text itself, 
the text with its promise of necessity and the text with its yielding of 
emptiness. And, as if to make things even more confusing (certainly 
one of the author's intentions here), Diderot leaves us completely 
undecided about what we should make of it. The Nephew"s mime, with 
the many glimpses it affords to gaze through the various operatic 
worlds conjured at the infinite relay of the mimetic gesture, and beyond 
to the emptiness at its origin, is marred for the narrator because he 
cannot get rid of the ridiculous sight of the Nephew. At every moment, 
he is there obstructing our vision, like an execrable companion whose 
attentions we cannot deflect. What prevents us, then, from fully 
grasping the emptiness of the figure of the Nephew is precisely that 
figure himself: it is the Nephew's ridiculous consistency that prevents 
us from seeing the emptiness of which he, ultimately, is both the mask 
and the mirror. Moi, in other words, no more than we, is genuinely 
undecided as to whether he ought to look at the mask, or into the mirror. 
There is something of an either/or in this choice between the mirror 
and the mask, and I believe that Diderot was genuinely undecided 
about which way to go; about whether, that is to say, the mime's 
'success" would have been rendered complete by presenting us with a 
mirror of infinite relay or with an impenetrable mask. 
D. THE QUESTION OF MORALITY IN LE NFvEu 
We will take stock of these notions in the next chapter when we come to 
discuss the similar but subtly different demands that Rousseau places 
on the aesthetic sign and of where, or how, we ought to be "looking'. To 
conclude our discussion of Diderot, and to introduce our discussion of 
Rousseau - whose anxiety to repair the damage done to the "ought' by 
the 'as if' is much less ambivalent than Diderot's -I would like to return 
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to the question of morality that is so prominent in Le Neveu. We have 
seen that Moi had good enough reasons for introducing moral concepts 
in the exchange about musical imitation: he was finding the character 
nauseating and the story about the renegade and the Jew insufferable. 
The narrator seemed to want to 'get at" the Nephew, wanted to get to 
him in some attempt to compensate for the fact that he wouldn't go 
away. The narrator is quite specific about this level of ambivalent 
motivation, when he writes: 
je ne savais, moi, si je devais rester ou fuir, fire ou m'indigner. Je restai dans le 
dessein de tourner la conversation sur quelque sujet qui chass5t de mon 5me 
Yhorreur dont elle 6tait remplie. Je cornmenýais ý supporter avec peine la pr6sence 
d'un homme qui discutait une action horrible, un ex6crable forfait, comme un 
connaisseur en peinture ou en po6sie examirye les beaut6s d'un ouvrage de gofit, ou 
comme un moraliste ou un historien rel&ve et fait 6clater les circonstances d'une 
action h6rdique. 307 
At first sight, this passage seems to re-enforce the suspicion that one of 
the ideas operative at the core of Diderot's text is one in which the 
process by which the Nephew is able to so radically aestheticise the real is 
directly linked to his moral depravity. While, I think, such an idea is - 
and remains - central to the work, what does not follow from this is 
another understandable suspicion: namely, that the Nephew's 
excellence as a mimetic artist - both as a mimic and as a musician - is 
conditional on this same depravity; the idea that the Nephew is some 
kind of Faust figure who, having sold his soul to the devil, becomes in 
consequence all-powerful in the world of appearances. For what Moi in 
this passage suggests to be specifically objectionable is not the 
Nephew"s performances but the commentary these performances seem 
to offer on themselves. His objection, in a sense, is that the 
'commentary' should have itself become part of mere 'performance". 
And interestingly, the narrator, beginning to feel the nausea whose 
explanation we have just analysed, asks the Nephew directly to separate 
307Diderot (1946), p. 479-80. 
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the two: 'Eh ! laissez la vos reflexions et continuez-moi votre histoire. ' 
To which the Nephew replies that 'Cela ne se peut. 11 ya des jours o6 il 
faut que je reflechisse; c'est une maladie qu'il faut abandonner a son 
cours. "308 The Nephew's 'reflections' thus seem somehow inescapably to 
be part and parcel of his 'pre-reflective" discourse. Commentary - the 
discourse identifiable by its mode of explanation - is also now, at the 
hands of the Nephew and his world without 'ought", no more real and 
consequently no different to the performative gestures they are seeking 
to render intelligible. The Nephew's 'explanations' don't explain away 
the gestures but, in their failure to do so, simply add another layer to 
them. 
Is this suggestion, then, the real reason for the narrator's nausea? My 
answer is both yes and no: no, because this nausea arises in response 
not, I would argue, to the Nephew's depravity, but instead to his own 
guilt, his own moral error; yes in the sense that this guilty response, 
given this new direction, provides an ostensible reason for the narrator"s 
sickness. 
The narrator is made of stem stuff, and at no point in the dialogue 
does he completely drop his guard and simply let the Nephew"s 
unanchored consciousness flood in: he remains, as it were, a 
'responsible reader' of the Nephew. Indeed, for most of the time, the 
narrator seems elated by his exposure to the Nephew"s uncontrollable 
discourse; he seems to be expanded by it, to be capable of learning from 
it, and even feels slightly resentful that he cannot detach his sense of the 
Nephew's ridiculousness or radical impossibility from his performance. 
I think, then, that Diderot's point here is actually the reverse: namely, 
that the narrator becomes sufficiently unsettled by the Nephew and his 
story about the renegade and the Jew that he feels on the contrary that 
he should put his guard up. And so this is perhaps why he makes the 
jibe about the Nephew's apparently inadequate grasp of moral 
concepts. In doing this, he seems to want to accuse the Nephew of 
taking his "pre-reflective' pseudo-natural beliefs and judgements too 
308 Diderot (1946), p. 477. 
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seriously - even if this seriousness is but momentary for the Nephew - 
and to suggest that the Nephew is at fault precisely because he mistakes 
his 'reflections' and 'explanations' for something which is not an 
explanation at all, but merely an expansion of the performative gesture 
into the discourse of commentary. Explanations, the accusation would 
hold, such as those which seek to explain the beauty of a work of art by 
referring to its *beautiful' properties (and thus not explaining its beauty 
at all), and which seek to explain the virtue of a heroic deed with 
reference to examples of virtue (and thus in no way explaining what 
vitue is), are not real explanations. For they fail to grasp the matter at 
hand. They fail to reduce the phenomena described to concepts whose 
consistency can be vouched for without reference to the phenomena 
themselves: they fail, in other words, to be like dictionary definitions. 
Thus it is here that the narrator's identity as philosophe, as a 'human 
scientist", comes to the fore. For it is precisely when the objects of the 
performance relate to moral concepts rather than aesthetic ones that the 
philosopher perceives the need of some kind of real explanation, some 
kind of definition. And it is his own inability to grasp such definitions, I 
would argue, that irks him, that makes him nauseous, and not the 
inability of the Nephew for whom such things really do not matter, his 
fictional status having relieved him of the possibility of providing any 
real explanations. It is only, in other words, when the Nephew's 
irreducible mimetic apparatus invades the moral sphere and its 
perceived reliance on proper explanatory discourse, that the narrator 
succumbs to the impression that this loss of control of the 'ought' is a 
worrying, indeed sick-making, state of affairs. 
For this reason the narrator is relieved - his nausea is substituted by 
the less moral, more aesthetic sensation of ridicule - when the 
conversation turns to 'explanations" of the efficacy of musical imitation 
because the subject matter is less important to him. It doesn't matter to 
him - just as it matters only momentarily to the 
Nephew - why music 
should be beautiful: it simply is, and that is all there is to say about it. 
Having escaped with the exposure of his weakness unobserved, he too 
can delight in the Jolassatice of the mystery of mime's success. 
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What then, is this weakness of the narrator? Why should he display 
this guilt? He is asked, if we remember, what a tune was. His response 
was that the question baffled him: 
Voilý comme nous sommes tous. Nous Wavons dans la m6moire que des mots que 
nous croyons entendre par Fusage fr6quent de Yapplication rnýme juste que nous 
en faisons; dans Fesprit, que des notions vagues. Quand je prononce le mot chant, 
je Wai pas des notions plus nettes que vous et la plupart de vos semblables quand 
ils disent: r6putation, blame, honneur, vice, vertu, pudeur, d6cence, honte, 
ridicule. 109 
There is something odd here: we probably could, if we wanted to, 
define a 'chant' with some degree of adequacy. The problem is more 
that we would have difficulty in providing such a definition of 
melodiousness: it is the beauty of a tune we can't define. Could we, 
though, give an adequate definition of such concepts as 'vice, virtue, 
modesty, decency', and the rest? Is our control of such things any better 
than our control over beauty? Are we any better at handling them than 
we are at handling 'des mots que nous croyons entendre par Fusage 
frequent de Vapplication meme juste que nous en faisons; dans Fesprit, 
que des notions vagues'? 
The correct application of a word can, in its rhetorical context, be 
affirmed in reference to its grammatical function and its syntactical 
arrangement. But that is not at all to say that we are deploying the 
correct concepts when we arrange them in this manner. We can, then, 
correctly use words independently of our feeble grasp of the strange 
and arbitrary paths through their various and "frequent" usage. But it 
seems to be the case that it is in this various and frequent usage that the 
moral concepts they can be understood to denote are bound to remain 
iinless we can bring these concepts to rest happily in some formulation 
which doesn't involve those words and their various and frequent 
usage. And does this 'unless', this guarantor of Wittgenstein's first 
account of the concept of understanding, obtain in the case of vice, 
309 Diderot (1946), pp. 480-1. Cited above, p. 140. 
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virtue, and the rest? Are our moral concepts reducible to anything that 
does not either involve their exemplification or some reference to some 
other irreducible moral concept, such as when we define vice as the 
opposite of virtue? It seems to me in this respect that Diderot gave his 
narrator's game away in that we are dealing, in both the aesthetic and 
moral cases, with concepts that do not survive the loss of contact with 
the arbitrary history of their usage. The 'moral', as it were, cannot 
separate itself from the "mceurs. 
Are these concepts, then, not precisely those, identified so adequately 
by Wittgenstein, to which some instance of their representation is 
necessary for them to be there at all; such concepts which, in other 
words are only rendered intelligible at all through the instances we have 
of their exemplification, but which, despite this apparent disability, are 
still to be understood as concepts? It seems possible, too, that 
something like this is the reason that Wittgenstein seemed so insistent, 
seemed to want so much, that we retain his second account of the 
concept of an understanding for which the best example he had to hand 
was the aesthetic sign. Might part of the value of the aesthetic for 
Wittgenstein here be that it provides a model for what turns out to be 
equally true in the moral case: namely, that the concept of the good 
cannot be exhausted by the instrumental concept of the goodfor? If this 
is highly debatable with respect to Wittgenstein, the idea is certainly one 
that is central to Rousseau's understanding of this area, for it is in 
Rousseau, I shall argue in the next chapter, "O that the conception of 
aesthetic experience is so firmly linked to the moral awakening of the 
self. We need, according to Rousseau, aesthetic experience, not for its 
limitless illusory possibilities, but for precisely the opposite: we need it 
because it puts in touch with moral reality, in touch, that is, with a 
sphere of necessity in which we can, and perhaps should, play a part. 
310 And as we saw in the context of Rousseau's narration of his childhood at Bossev. 
See Chapter I above, pp. 72-9. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The main conclusion to be drawn from Diderot's seemingly scandalous 
invasion of the austere discipline of music theory is a blunt one: despite 
the fact that Nephews 'musical performance' was but a mime, it 
nonetheless had precisely the effects contemporary music theory would 
have demanded from a genuine performance. As the narrator reports, 
'[aldmirais-je ? Oui, jadmirais I Etais-je touche de pitie ? J"etais touche 
de pitie; mais une teinte de ridicule etait fondue dans ces sentiments et 
les denaturait. "" Furthermore, the central argument on the idea of 
musical imitation, in so far as one is presented, centres around the claim 
that music is to be judged solely on the basis of its apparently 
immediate effects on the listener, an explanation of which is neither 
desirable nor, strictly speaking, possible. 
The question remains, however, of whether there is anything 
important about the narrator"s report that is "teinte de ridicule", and 
whether this has any connection with the Nephew"s effective 
aestheticisation of the moral world. This question, rephrased, will be 
asked of Rousseau in the following chapter. 
311 Diderot (1946), pp. 485. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF PRESENCE 
I 
THE MORALITY OF MUSICAL IMITATION 
A. IMITATION IN THE DICTIONNAIRE 
We saw in the previous chapter that Rousseau"s conception of "Musique 
Imitative' provides the normative measure for the evaluative aspects of 
his musical "science. Imitative music, as we saw, in Rousseau's words, 
/ par des inflexions vives accentue'es, et, pour ainsi dire, parlantes, 
exprime toutes les passions, peint tous les tableaux, rend tous les objets, 
soumet la Nature entiere a ses savantes imitations, et porte ainsi 
jusqu'au coeur de Yhomme des sentiments propres a Femouvoir. -'312 We 
also saw that one of the sources of musical imitation's power in these 
respects lay in something like the opacity of the musical signifier, in the 
refusal of imitative music to dissolve into a system of 'rapports certains". 
However, on the strength of the article on "Musique.,, no positive 
account was given of the structure of musical imitation. Rather, we 
were provided with two central examples of whatMusique Imitative' 
was not; it approximated neither to a model of physical resonance, nor 
to one of a'signe memoratif". 
T'he article on 'Imitation" is a little more specific. Again, however, the 
specificity is provided courtesy of another negative example. In this 
case, the negative point of comparison is provided by the idea of 
imitation in painting. The article begins by questioning whether 
imitation, "ce principe commun [auquell se rapportent tous les Beaux- 
Arts, "" works in the same way in each case. Among the fine arts, 
312 'Musique', Dictionnaire, OC V, p. 
313 'Imitation', Dictionnaire, OC V, p 
918. Cited above, p. 109. 
860. 
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Rousseau initially cedes the highest place to poetry, the imitation of 
which he describes as having no limits: 'Tout ce que Fimagination peut 
se representer est du ressort de la Poesie. 314 Painting, however, by 
contrast is held to be restricted by being able to imitate only those things 
which the eye can see. The importance of this restriction, from the point 
of view of Rousseau's comparison, is that although music 'sembleroit 
avoir les memes bornes par rapport a Votfie, such limits are illusory: 
/par un prestige presque inconcevable, elle semble mettre Yoeil dans 
Yoreille' . 315 Where painting cannot "sing, in other words, music is 
nonetheless capable of 'painting', a point which he proceeds to 
elaborate. As the negative comparison gathers force - for some reason 
the model of poetic imitation discarded - the account of musical 
imitation presented is an elaboration of d'Alembert's outline in the 
Discours prffiminaire. 316 
[L]a Musique agit ... sur nous en excitant, par un sens, des affections semblables 
celles qu'on peut exciter par un autre; et, comme le rapport ne peut kre sensible 
que Vimpression ne soit forte, la Peinture d6nu6e de cette force ne peut rendre 6 la 
Musique les Imitations que celle-ci tire d'elle. Que tout la Nature soit endonnie, 
celui qui la contemple ne dort pas, et Yart du Musicien consiste ý substituer ý 
Firnage insensible cle Fobjet celle des mouvemens que sa pr6sence excite dans le 
coeur du Contemplateur ... U ne repr6sentera pas 
directement ces choses, mais il 
excitera dans Fame les m&mes mouvemens qu'on 6prouve en les voyant. 317 
Courtesy of an adaptation of d'Alembert"s model, the reach of musical 
imitation is seemingly endless; "' the limits envisaged seem to have 
more to do with the imagination of the 'Contemplateur' than any 
particular specifically musical property. 
3140C V, p. 860. 
315 OC V, p. 860. 
316See Chapter 2 above. 
317 OC V'p. 861. 
3", There are numerous passages in the Dictionnairc, and indeed elsewhere in the 
musical writings, where the power of musical imitation is invoked in a similar way. 
See especially the passage already cited from 'Musique', OC V, p. 918, and Essai, OC V, 
p. 42 1. 
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The article concludes by cross-referencing two of the other key 
articles, 'Harmonie", and 'Melodie", pointing the reader towards the 
latter for a further explanation of the principle 'que Marmonie ne 
foumit pas'. "' We will postpone for now a discussion of the importance 
of the other pole the comparison - pictorial imitation - which Rousseau 
rather literally leaves dead in the water at this point in the discussion. 
The force with which painting is 'fenced in, however, should serve as a 
clue to the possibility that the seemingly rigid opposition between 
musical and pictorial imitation may perhaps not be as stable as 
Rousseau would have us believe. 
The article on melody distinguishes two principles which correspond 
to the underlying distinction between "Musique Naturelle' and 
'Imitative'. The first is that the tonal organisation of melody has its 
source in harmony, 'puisque c'est une analyse harmonique qui donne 
les Degres de la Gamme, les Cordes du Mode, et les loix de la 
Modulation'. 110 This principle is responsible, however, only for 
providing the means to flatter 'Foreille par des Sons agreables', 111 and in 
a manceuvre that is by now becoming very familiar, Rousseau denies it 
any place in the production of 'des effets moraux qui passent Yempire 
322 immediat des sens". For the second principle, which is derived from 
'la Nature ainsi que le premier", Rousseau"s account differs very little 
from that presented in the Lettre sur la musiquefranpise: 
Ce principe est le mýme qui fait varier le Ton de la Voix, quand on parle, selon les 
choses qu'on dit et les mouvemens qu'on 6prouve en les disant. Cest Faccent des 
Langues qui d6termine la Wodie de chaque nation; Cest Faccent qui fait quon 
319 OC V, p. 861. It is interesting to note that for the reference to'Harmonie', Rousseau 
seems to expect his reader to have already read the article, whereas the reference to 
'M61odie' takes the usual form of a prompt to consult it, suggesting something of an 
expectation on Rousseau's part that his reader would be reading the dictionary in 
alphabetical order. 
"O'M61odie', OC V, p. 884. 
321 OC V, p. 884. 
322 OC V, p. 885. 
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parle en chantant, et qu'on parle avec plus ou moins d'ýnergie, selon que la Langue 
a plus ou moins d'Accent. 323 
The argument presented, then, cannot really be said to offer a 
significant advance over that given in "Musique; merely, the same 
distinctions are repeated and clarified a little without any genuine 
attempt at justifying the claim that the moral effect of musical imitation 
derives from the principle of imitation and that the principle of 
imitation governs that which is expressive in melody. No more is such 
an account to be found in two further articles which participate in the 
system of cross-references. In "Accent, or rather more properly, with 
regards to "I'Accent pathetique et oratoire, qui est l'objet le plus 
immediat de la Musique imitative', there is an important distinction 
made between "I'Accent universel de la Nature qui arrache a tout 
homme des cris inarticules' and "I"Accent de la langue, qui engendre la 
Melodie particuliere a une Nation. "324 This distinction was not present 
in the argument of the Lettre, and yet the crucial problem of how the 
accents used in conventional communication are related to the universal 
accent of nature is no more than pointed to. Rousseau"s conclusion 
seems like a familiar recourse to the circularity encountered in the 
article on "Musique", namely that the cause of the moral effects of music 
owe themselves somehow to the intentions of the composer: 
Rien ne peut donc suppl6er dans la recherche de IAccent path6tique ý ce g6nie qui 
r6veille ý volont6 tous les sentimens, et il n'y a d'autre Art en cette partie que 
d'allumer en son propre coeur le feu qu'on veut porter dans celui des autre. 325 
At the cross-reference for 'Genie', the trail seems to run colder still: 
'Ne cherche point, jeune Artiste, ce que Cest que le GMie. 1326 
Interestingly, however, it is in this article, where the mystery is 
identified as such, that the evaluative strand of Rousseau's theory is at 
323 OC V, p. 885. 
324 'Accent', Dictionnalre, OC V, p. 614. 
3 250C V, p. 616. 
321, 'G6nie', Dictiontiairc, OC V, p. 837. 
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its most blunt. The spirit of genius is said to be found in the 'chef- 
d'oeuvres' of Jomelli and Pergolesi with no less vehemence than it is 
denied to French opera: 
[S]i les charmes de ce grand Art te laissent tranquille, si tu Was ni d6lire ni 
ravissement, si tu ne trouves que beau ce qui transporte, oses-tu demander ce 
qu'est le GMie ? Homme vulgaire, ne profane point ce nom sublime. Que 
t'importeroit de le conno^itre ? tu ne saurois le sentir: fais de la Musique 
Franýoise. 327 
The paragraph which this passage concludes is nothing if not 
persuasive, but the manner of persuasion, far from being an explication 
of the source of imitative music's power, is almost exactly the same as 
the strategy employed by Rameau's Nephew: 'Comment peut-on porter 
a sa tete une paire d"oreilles et faire une pareille question? "" More 
importantly still, it is precisely this question of the genius of Italian 
opera and the aesthetic poverty of French music that Rousseau's music- 
philosophical project was intended, partly, to assess and justify; and yet, 
here, at the bottom of the justification, regardless of the numerous 
oppositions between natural and imitative, and melody and harmony, 
an appeal is made on a defacto basis simply to the aural evidence of 
Italian music's superiority. 
Perhaps it is not surprising the Dictionnaire does not provide what is, 
after all, a rather complex explanation of the relation between the 
musical material and its 'effets moraux". The text is, after all, a 
dictionary, and even in respect of its status as a "treatise-dictionary' such 
an explanation would hardly have been perceived as necessary given 
that the theory elaborated is consistent in all other respects. 
Nonetheless, it is precisely such an account that is required in order for 
the evaluative and prescriptive strata of the Dictionnaire to be 
supported. 
3270C V, p. 837. 
121Cited above, P. 143. 
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B. FROM IMITATION TO THE PRESENCE OF THE OTHER IN THE ESSAI 
The Essai sur Vorigine des langues oý 11 est parlý de la melodie et de l'imitation 
musicale contains a considerably more extended treatment of musical 
imitation than the one provided in the Dictionnaire. It is also widely 
understood - in terms at least of the history of Rousseau's music theory 
- as the text that provides the theoretical underpinnings of the Lettre. 111 
The highly valorised distinctions made in the Lettre and developed in 
the Dictionnaire between French and Italian opera, harmony and 
melody, purely sensual pleasure and moral/aesthetic significance are all 
deepened and their theoretical relations re-enforced. The discussion of 
musical imitation occurs in the wider context of what is ostensibly the 
Essai's main aiml which is to relate the contemporary linguistic and 
musical practices to their origin, or the natural setting in which they 
arose. Rousseaus intention in this is consistent with the intention 
behind his philosophical project as a whole. That is to say, it has the 
primarily moral aim of explaining the basis of social practices with 
reference to a model of man-s natural goodness, and distinguishing on 
this basis between morally good and morally bad instances of such 
practices. "' 
Though now looked to for the provision of the definitive statements 
of Rousseau's musical theory and philosophy, the Essai is more widely 
discussed in terms of its contribution to the history of the philosophy of 
language . 331 The central project of the 
Essai is to relate contemporary 
329See Kintzler (1988), p. 144: '1] est impossible, et il serait malhonn&te, de lire la Lettre 
... sans avoir 
ý Yesprit I'Essaz sitr Vorigine des langites. C'est que Mistoire de la 
d6g6nerescence de la musique que Rousseau retrace dans ce dernier ouvrage fournit 
apr&s coup 1'6tayage th6orique sur lequel il fond ses attaques contre Yop6ra franýais. ' 
O'Dea (1995) and Wokler (1 987b) also make this point, albeit in less vehement terms. 
I'll We have already discussed briefly the moral content of Rousseau's conclusion to the 
Essal. See Chapter 2 above, p. 112. 
33, The Essai gives effective demonstration of conventional language being a system of 
negative signs - signs, that is, that identify objects in the world and our concepts of 
them simply by being different from each other. For an account of this, see Derrida 
(1982). 
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music and language to a joint origin: both Tune et Fautre eurent la 
meme source et ne furent d"abord que la meme chose. "" The purpose 
of this, then, as suggested above, is to relate contemporary practices to 
this original model in a way that allows for a moral valorisation of 
certain such practices, and a castigation of others. The term 'origine", 
accordingly, is employed by Rousseau not just in its historical sense but 
also in a normative sense: the origin of music and language is, qua 
communicative model, that to which modem communicative practices 
ought to be adequate. For Rousseau"s aims in the Essai to be realised, 
not only does this relation of the origin to contemporary practice have to 
be coherent, but the origin itself also has to be shown to be constitutive 
of moral goodness. 
The element of moral goodness that attaches itself to the origin is 
problematic - we glimpsed this briefly in Chapter 1 above"' - and we 
will explore it presently in relation to its formulation in the Essai and in 
the second Discours. It is important to recognise, however, that it is to 
the underlying moral hierarchy that the evaluative strata of the Essai are 
accountable. Before exploring this area, crucial to our overall 
investigation, we will first examine the account of musical imitation in 
the Essai in order to see how it is constructed in relation to the origin 
and thus to the moral sphere. 
The Essai revises the cursory account of musical imitation provided in 
the Lettre and seemingly retained in parts of the Dictionnaire. Music is 
understood not so much to imitate language and its accents directly as 
imitate the kinds of sign that are held to be 'naturally' productive of 
'effets moraux" in man: Ta melodie en imitant les inflexions de la voix 
exprime les plaintes, les cris de douleur ou de joye, les menaces, les 
gemissemens; tous les signes vocaux des passions sont de son ressort. '131 
Here, for the first time in the material we have covered, Rousseau 
becomes explicit as to the nature of the cause of the "effets moraux" of 
332 OC V, p. 411 
333See above, pp. 
3, ý4 OC V, p. 416. 
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imitative music. He argues that in explaining this process we often 
confuse physical causes with moral ones: 
L'homme est modifi6 par ses sens, personne Wen doute; mais faute de distinguer 
les modifications nous en confondons les causes; nous donnons trop et trop peu 
d'empire aux sensations; nous ne voyons pas que souvent elles ne nous affectent 
point seulement comme sensations mais comme signes ou images, et que leurs 
effets moraux ont aussi des causes morales. 335 
For a 'signe' thus to be productive of 'effets moraux', its physical cause - 
that which allows us to sense it at all - must be supplemented by a 
moral cause. Importantly, therefore, nothing in this process is to be 
explained purely in terms of sensation - in terms, that is, of material 
causes and effects - because it is not the material properties that are 
primarily important in this case but rather the signification. The 
implication in the explicit circularity between moral causes and moral 
effects is thus that the causal process cannot be reduced to physical 
explanations: in just the same way as the should of musical imitation 
supplemented the is of 'natural' music, so too the supplementary sphere 
of moral cause and effect must already be present for such explanations 
to be effective. 
What kind of explanation, then, does Rousseau provide of the sphere 
of 'causes morales' and their effects? Arguing that language and music 
do not originate from physical needs but instead from 'besoins moraux' 
or'passions', Rousseau claims that[c]e West ni faim ni la soif, mais 
Famour la haine la pitie la colere qui leur ont arrache les premieres 
VoiX. "336 The distinction between need and passion, then, follows the 
distinction between the moral and physical causes of imitative and 
'natural' music. 
Rousseau"s account in the Essai of why the original music-language 
should be considered to have 'causes morales' - desires, in this case, 
335 OC V, p. 412. 
336 OC V, p. 380. Rousseau omits punctuation here, perhaps because he wants to 
emphasise what is continuous about such emotions - their moral status, that 
is to sav - 
-at the expense of what is different about them. 
The Ethics and Aesthetics of Presence - 165- Fhe Nloralitv of Musical 
Imitation 
typically for other people rather than things - is difficult to understand 
without situating the text in relation to the second Discours, the text 
from which, on Rousseau"s account, the Essal was developed as a kind 
of extended footnote. 337 For now, however, it suffices to say that the 
Essai does not, of itself, provide any account of these'causes morales" 
except in so far as it becomes (uncomfortably) clear that the moral 
sphere proper to such original music-language comes into being at 
precisely the same time as the music-language itself. No explanatory 
account, in other words, is given of the passage from natural desire to 
moral desire, and since it is this latter which is taken to be co-extensive 
with the origin of signification itself, we are no nearer to understanding 
the "proper' of imitation in music and language except in terms of 
reference to its (already moral) causes and effects. The origin of the 
supplementary element proper to "Musique imitative" - that element 
which supplements the physical cause and physical effect of sounds and 
allows it to mediate between a moral cause and a moral effect - cannot, 
according to Rousseau, be reduced further than the origin of morality 
itself: the terms of moral relation, that is to say, must always already be 
present if they are to be manifest in an intermediary sign. 
Rousseau's interest in Condillac's account of 'natural signs' is 
perhaps aroused by the requirement to face up to this problem. In an 
understanding of vocal signs which are at once symptoms and signs of 
inner states, "' the aural form taken by the natural sign cannot be said to 
be conventional because it occurs, in Condillac's words, 
'independamment du choix que nous avons fait. "" In this way, the 
moral cause and effect - of Tamour la haine la pitie la colere' - that the 
natural sign mediates between cannot be said to bear an arbitrary 
relation to the sound made. If this solves the problem of mediation, and 
337 In its published version, the Discoiirs was supplemented by a series of extensive 
footnotes. When he was planning finally to publish the Essat, on the advice of 
Malesherbes, in 1763, the short preface notes that the text 'ne fus aussi d'abord qu'un 
fragment du discours sur Yin6galit6 que j'en retranchai comme trop long et hors de 
place. ' OC V, p. 373. 
"I For a discussion of this, see I iobson (1980), pp. 2S4f t. 
330Condillac (1947), p. 19. 
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suggests an imitative model for music to follow in which the 
relationship between the sound and the moral effect is not arbitrary but 
pseudo-natural, it does not solve the problem of how the sphere in 
which such moral causation can be said to have come into existence. 
To the extent, therefore, that Rousseau is clear that the distinctively 
moral sphere comes into being only at the same time as the means of its 
mediation, one cannot speak of a properly causal relationship between 
the moral and the physical sphere. Consequently, even at the very first 
instance of 'signs' being produced as simple natural symptoms, we are 
still left without any explanation of imitation in music of a kind that 
does not simply rely on the circumstantial evidence of such and such a 
type of effect being, somehow, produced. For just as the Dictionnaire 
held that the 'Physique des Sons' cannot contain within its own system 
the imitative supplement of music, so neither does the 'rapport certain' 
between natural beings provide of itself the existence of the moral 
sphere. Nevertheless, it is clear that the model of the natural sign - and 
its implication of some kind of non-arbitrary relationship between 
physical matter and moral effect - provided Rousseau with a model on 
which to ground his music-aesthetic theory. We can see that Rousseau 
wanted music to imitate the natural sign because the implied relation 
between physical sound and 'moral' effect is precisely that relationship 
which the article on "Musique' determined in a negative fashion. 
'Musique imitative' should be neither the simple resonance of the 
"Physique des Sons, nor should it be the arbitrary association of the 
'signe memoratif'. Instead, it seems that it should be like Condillac"s 
"natural sign' to the extent that its "effets moraux' are manifest because of 
the experience of the music itself rather than the music simply being an 
arbitrary element in a relation between a moral cause and effect 
independent of it. If this much is clear, however, what is not clear is 
how legitimate such a manoeuvre can be said to be. How can 
Rousseau's aesthetics be justified by a circular argument in which 
neither the 'moral sphere' nor the 'natural sign' are properly speaking 
causal of the other, but where both are understood to require the 
presence of the other in order to be at all? 
The Fthics and Aesthetics of Presence -167- The Morality of Musical 
Imitation 
One clue as to Rousseau's intended basis for the derivation of 'causes 
morales' emerges in the Essai rather along the same lines as we 
suggested in our discussion of Condillac in Chapter 2. Here Rousseau 
suggests that the value of the musical sign lies in a kind of imitation of 
human presence. The notion of the presence of others in the musical 
sign does crop up in the accounts of musical imitation in the 
Dictionnaire, but there Rousseau's concern with the extent of music's 
imitative reach take priority. In the Essai, however, the notion seems to 
assume a more radical explanatory role. 
[S]it6t que des signes vocaux frapent v6tre oreille, ils vous annoncent un &re 
semblable ý vous, ils sont, pous ainsi dire, les organes de Fame, et s'ils vous 
peignent aussi la solitude ils vous disent que vous n'y 6tes pas seul. Les oiseaux 
sifflent, Yhornme seul chante, et Yon ne peut entendre ni chant ni simphonie sans se 
dire ý Finstant; un autre &tre sensible est ici. 310 
While, as we have seen, there are numerous passages - elsewhere in the 
Essai, in the Dictionnaire, the Lettre and other texts - in which music's 
seemingly unlimited imitative power is attested to, this expression 
identifies what Rousseau takes to be the source of this power: music 
makes the listener aware of human presence. Furthermore, its 
achieving this "announcement' of presence is taken as providing the key 
to its imitative richness. 
With what kind of presence is Rousseau concerned here in his 
characterisation of music as its 'announcement', and what kind of music 
may act in this way to announce such a presence? The answer to the 
second of these questions returns us to the problem of musical 
imitation: the contrast between the noise of birds and the song of man 
echoes the now familiar distinction between "musique naturelle" and 
pure noise on the one hand, and 'musique imitative". Before returning 
to examine how the notion of presence may support this distinction, we 
should explore further what is at stake in the notion of presence here. 
-140 Essai, OC V, p. 421. The passage that 
follows from this quotation is almost ideritical 
to the passage partially quoted from the Dictionnal'n, article on 'Imitation'. 
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A striking and in my view rather telling feature of the passage is the 
use of the notion of solitude to characterise the negative of presence. 
There are a number of passages in Rousseau's musical writing where 
music's power to present or represent its negative is attested, but the 
term normally chosen is silence . 341 Here, by contrast, vocal music is held 
to paint not silence but solitude. What is the significance of this 
substitution, and what is the significance of effected opposition between 
presence and solitude? The significance, for our purposes, lies in the 
crucial role that the notion of solitude plays in Rousseau, particularly in 
the context of his analysis of the state of nature and the origin of culture. 
In the state of nature - as in the state of self-communion represented in 
the ReverieS342 - solitude is made to stand for a certain kind of self- 
sufficiency of being. Solitude was considered thus to be a state of 
equilibrium in which whatever lies beyond awareness also lies beyond 
desire, whether this curtailing of desire is the boundary of natural 
consciousness (as in the state of nature) or an act of will (Reveries). A 
clue to the kind of presence that Rousseau is talking about, then, is that 
it may be considered as the opposite, not of absence per se, but of this 
state of solitude. Presence is thus perhaps, at bottom, to be considered 
in terms of that which penetrates this solitude. 
To consider Rousseau's understanding of presence in this way is to 
be somewhat at odds with the dominant strain in Rousseau studies that 
follows Jacques Derrida"s analysis of the subject. 343 We shall examine 
Derrida's discussion of the problem of presence further below, but we 
should note at the outset that his characterisation of presence in 
Rousseau is construed, broadly speaking, in epistemological terms: his 
objection, specifically to Rousseau-s Essai as well as to the history of 
philosophy in general, is to the idea that presence is the mark of true 
knowledge. By contrast, the characterisation that will be offered here, 
and during the course of this chapter, is primarily a moral and aesthetic 
311 Not least in the paragraph following the one from which the quotation is taken. See 
also'Imitation, Dictionnaire, OC V, p. 861. 
34 2See the discussion in Chapter I above, pp. 66-71. 
343 In Derrida (1976). 
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one. Indeed, the notion of presence thus construed lies at the very heart 
of Rousseau"s understanding of morality. 
C. THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE ORIGIN OF MAN 
Rousseau's analysis of the 'state of nature', and man's emergence from 
it, is advanced in the second Discours and to a certain extent, the Essai. 344 
The discussion is, in my view, Rousseau's most important contribution 
to the history of philosophy. There are numerous commentaries and 
extended discussions of this area of the two texts, and most of them 
address the question of the continuity between them in respect of the 
account of the state of nature and the origin of a distinctively human 
mode of being. 341 Rather than attempt to provide an extensive 
commentary of my own, my account will take the form of a systematic 
outline of what I understand to be the central features of Rousseau's 
analysis. I will also, in agreement with Derrida's assessment of the 
relation between the Discours and the Essai, assume a basic continuity 
between the two texts in respect of this central analy SiS, 346 except in so 
far as each maintains a different evaluative emphasis on the notion of 
the origin: in the Discours, the origin is construed as one of social 
inequality and thus of the root of iniquity and falsehood and is for this 
reason discussed in largely negative terms; in the Essai, the origin is 
considered in respect of the birth of music and language and Rousseau's 
344The analyses provided in Eiinle are, on occasion, even more expansive than those of 
the Discoiirs and the Essai. 
34', The most important of these I take as being contained in de Man (1979), pp. 135-169, 
and (1983a); Derrida (1976), pp. 141-316; Hobson (1992); Starobinski (1971), pp. 319- 
379, and (1995); Wokler (1987b). 
346See Derrida (1976), esp. pp. 192-4. The analysis in Starobinski (1971) is at odds with 
Derrida's assessment, but later, in his introduction to the PIýIatic edition - see 
Starobinski (1995) - Starobinski states his eventual agreement with Derrida. Note that 
the debate is nominally concerned with the chronology of the Essai, but that the 
evidence in each case is drawn from analysis of the conceptual continuity between the 
two. 
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efforts are directed towards identifying that which is both good and bad 
about the origin. 
Rousseau begins by describing the importance of the state of nature 
to moral and political philosophical enquiry, and immediately offers a 
suggestion as to why none of his predecessors ever succeeded in 
offering a genuine analysis of it: 
Les Philosophes qui ont examine les fondemens de la socik6, ont tous senti ]a 
n6cessit6 de remonter jusqu'ý Fkat de Nature, mais aucun d'eux n'y est arriv6. Les 
uns Wont point balanc6 ý supposer ý Momme dans cet 6tat, la notion du juste et 
de IInjuste, sans se soucier de montrer qu'il dfit avoir cette notion, ni m6me qu'elle 
lui ffit utile: Dautres ont park du Droit Naturel que chacun a de conserver ce qui 
lui appartient, sans expliquer ce qu'ils entendoient par appartenir ... Enfin tous, 
parlant sans cesse de besoin, d'avidit6, d'oppression, de desirs, et d'orgueil, ont 
transport6 ý 1'6tat de Nature, des Wes qu'il avoient prises dans la SoCi6t6. J47 
Rousseau's own method, by contrast - which he introduces with the 




strip from his analysis all the trappings of human institution and to 
place man among the animals. This he does, employing the well-tried 
Cartesian understanding of mechanistic nature: 
je ne vois dans tout animal qu'une machine ingenieuse, 6 qui la nature a donn6 des 
sens pour se remonter elle m&me, et pour se garantir, jusqu'ý un certain point, de 
tout ce qui tend A la d6truire, ou 6 la d6ranger. J'apperýois pr6cisement les m&mes 
choses dans la machine humaine, avec cette diff6rence que la Nature seule fait tout 
dans les operations de la Me, au-Iieu que Yhornme concourt aux siennes, en 
qualit6 d'agent libre. 349 
While there is nothing particularly radical about this passage taken by 
itself - the identification of free will as the 
basis of distinguishing man 
from the animals was commonplace - the novelty of Rousseau's account 
stems from his attempt to substitute the tradition divine generation of 
free will with an anthropological and epistemological derivation. The 
347Discow-s siir VbiýgalW, OC 111, p. 132. 
34', OC I 11, p. 132. See the discussion of this passage in Chapter I above, p. 
15. 
3411 OC I 11, p. 14 1. 
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distinction between man and animal is maintained as analytic, but the 
operation of free will in man when in the state of nature is purely latent 
and imperceptible: 
L'Homme Sauvage, livr6 par la Nature au seul instinct, ou pKitot d6dommag6 de 
celui qui lui manque peut-6tre par des facult6s capables s'y suppl6er d'abord, et de 
I'61ever ensuite fort au-clessus de celle 1ý, commencera donc par les fonctions 
purement animales: apercevoir et sentir sera son premier 6tat, qui lui sera commun 
avec tous les animaux. Vouloir et ne pas vouloir, d6sirer et craindre, seront les 
premi6res, et presque les seules operations de son ame... Ses desirs ne passent pas 
ses besons PhysiqueS. 350 
The functions of the soul, that most mysterious of human properties, is 
held in the state of nature to be indistinguishable from the functions of 
the body. 
The question, then, is how the -supplement' of man's soul comes to 
be manifest. Before examining Rousseau's complex and innovative 
account of this, we should first explore the conditions of existence 
entailed by the state of nature. We have already seen that the 
consciousness and perception of natural man is governed by purely 
bodily appetites: his sole mode of awareness is one of wanting and not 
wanting, desiring and fearing. According, then, to the basic instinct of 
"sa propre conservation, 351 the phenomenal world of natural man may 
be understood as a simple expression of his self-interest. 
In addition to this understanding of the world expressed as self- 
interest, Rousseau incorporates a second phenomenological principle 
into his analysis of the state of nature. He introduces this second 
principle as part of a rebuttal of Hobbes" famous analysis of the natural 
depravity of man. Wallons pas surtout conclure avec Hobbes-', 
Rousseau argues, "que pour n"avoir aucune idee de la bonte, Yhomme 
soit naturellement mechant': 111 
350 C)C 111, pp. 142-3. 
351 OC 111, p. 140. 
352 OC 111, p. 153. 
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11 ya d'ailleurs un autre Principe que Hobbes n'a. point appero et qui, ayant 6t6 
donn6 ý Yhomme pour adoucir, en certaine circonstances, la. f6rocit6 de son amour 
propre, ou le d6sir de se conserver avant la naissance de cet amour, tempere 
Fardeur qu'il a pour son bien-kre par une r6pugnance inn6e ý voir souffrir son 
semblable... Je parle de la Piti6, disposition convenable ý des kres aussi foibles, et 
sujets 6 autant de maux que nous le sommes; vertu d'autant plus universelle et 
d'autant plus utile 6 Yhomme, qu'elle pr6cede en lui Fusage de toute r6flexion, et si 
Naturelle que les B&tes m&mes en donnent quelquefois des signes sensibles. 353 
In speaking of pity as a virtue, however, Rousseau is clear that he is not 
being inconsistent, and introducing a properly human institution into 
the state of nature. For the 'pitie naturelle'354with which he is 
concerned at this point is simply an impulse, as immediate to natural 
perception as the instinct for self-preservation. Thus he ascribes it 
equally to natural man and animals, and is explicit that its perceptual 
immediacy is greatest in the state of nature: 
En effet, la commiseration sera d'autant plus 6nergique que Vanimal Spectateur 
s'identifiera plus intimement avec Vanimal souffrant: Or il est 6vident que cette 
identification a d6 kre infiniment plus 6troite dans 16tat de Nature que dans Ykat 
de raisonnement. 355 
The principle of natural pity, then, may simply be considered as a 
logical extension of the first principle of self-preservation to the extent 
that the identification of the individual with his species or'semblables' 
is complete. Pity is thus simply an extension of the self-preservation 
instinct in the sense that man's 'self', and consequently the sphere of 
interest that emanates from it, does not, in the state of nature, permit of 
an individuation sufficient to distinguish it from those whom it is 
naturally given to him to consider as being like himself - Man"s self- 
interest encompasses that of his species to the extent that its members 
are like him; consequently there is no phenomenological distinction 
353 OC 111, p. 154. 
3'; 40C 111, p. 155. 
355 OC 111, pp. 155-6. 
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between the world as it appears good or bad to the individual, or good 
or bad for his species. 
It follows, then, that natural man's awareness of the world is one that 
may be characterised in terms of the perception of pure value. Relating 
simply to the appearance of objects in the world as they concern the 
instinct for self-preservation, this value has no cognitive content. And, 
for obvious reasons, this awareness of value extends to things also as 
they concern his instinctive natural sympathy, or instinct for species- 
preservation. The good, in the state of nature, is thus that which 
registers as such according to these instincts as, either, good for him 
personally, or, good for his kind. Simply speaking, man finds his 
"goodness-for-himself' reflected in his prey in so far as he can catch it, 
and his 'badness-for-himself' reflected in that which preys on him, in so 
far as it can catch him. Similarly, by extension, such goodness and 
badness is also reflected in his wider sphere of awareness of those who 
are like him. The sense of all such goodness and badness, by which is 
meant the world as it is perceived by man in the state of nature, is given 
by nature. It does not permit of reflective thought, but is simply a kind 
of phenomenological mirror of what is naturally the case. 
Now, such a sense of goodness and badness is neither moral nor, in 
the modem sense of the term, aesthetic. It is not these things because it 
neither prompts the question of why nor permits it to be asked. To put 
the matter simply, there are no questions in nature. So how, then, does 
natural man enter into a relationship with the moral and aesthetic 
spheres, or gain, in other words, a sense of the kind of value which both 
prompts and permits of questions? How does natural man become 
human? 
The answer to this is not easy. It is difficult in particular because 
Rousseau did not really provide an answer, at least in so many words. 
The gap between the equilibrium of the state of nature and the dynamic 
state of properly human consciousness seemed to him to be so difficult 
that his reflection on the subject usually takes the form either of 
ignoring the question, or of pondering it openly without conclusion. 
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Often, this pondering takes the form of considering the familiar paradox 
of language. In the Discours, Rousseau expresses this as follows: 
[S]i les Hommes ont eu besoin de la parole pour apprendre ý penser, ils ont eu bien 
plus besoin encore de savoir penser pour trouver Fart de la parole; et quand on 
comprendroit comment les sons de la voix ont k6 pris pour les interpr6tes 
conventionnels de nos Wes, il resteroit toýijours ý sýavoir quels ont p6 kre les 
interpr6tes m&mes de cette convention pour les Wes qui, Wayant point un objet 
sensible, ne pouvoient s'indiquer ni par le geste, ni par la voix, de sorte qu'ý peine 
peut-on former des conjectures supportables sur la naissance de cet Art de 
communiquer ses pens6es, et d'6tablir un commerce entre les Esprits ... il n'y a 
point d'homme ass6s hardi, pour assurer qu'il y arriveroit jamaiS. 356 
An answer to this problem is, however, suggested by two areas of 
Rousseau"s discussion. The first concerns the vocal sign we have just 
been told could not have become conventionally attached to an idea 
without that idea already being present to the mind. The second 
concerns the question of imitation, and its role in the consciousness of 
natural man. Rousseau begins the Discours by observing one, crucial, 
distinction between natural man and the animals, and this distinction is 
initially expressed in terms of imitation: 
Les Hommes dispers6s parmi [les b&tes], observent, imitent leur industrie, et 
s'616vent ainsi jusqu'ý Finstinct des B&tes, avec cet avantage que chaque esp&ce n'a 
que le sien propre, et que Yhomme Wen ayant peut-&tre aucun qui lui appartienne, 
se les approprietoUS. 357 
From the notion that man is naturally imitative, Rousseau is able to 
identify the possible source of dynamic disruption within the otherwise 
perfect stability of man's natural consciousness. For if man is naturally 
endowed with the faculty of acquiring modes of behaviour that are, 
originally, alien to his instinctual makeup, then it follows that he is able 
to acquire appetites and physical needs for which his instinct does not, 
35(, OC III pp. 147-8. 
357 OC III, p. 135. 
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originally, account. 358 If the notion of man's naturally imitative state is 
extended, in other words, Rousseau can trace a path to a state in which 
man is no longer equal to himself. 359 
It is from this that he derives the account of free will on which the 
definition of distinctively human being was seen to depend. In keeping 
with the secular and anthropological terms of his narrative, however, 
the notion of free will - with its associations of divine origin - is 
substituted for a dynamic structure which Rousseau argues is central to 
the consciousness of natural man. 110 
[I]l ya une autre qualit6 tr&s sp6cifique qui les distingue [I'homme et I'animall, et 
sur laquelle il ne peut y avoir de contestation, c'est la facult6 de se perfectionner ; 
facult6 qui ý Faide des circonstances, d6velopp6 successivement toutes les autres, et 
r6side parmi nous tant dans 1esp6ce, que dans Findividu, au lieu qu'un animal est, 
au bout de quelques mois, ce qu'il sera toute sa vie, et son esp6ce, au bout de mille 
ans, ce qu'elle 6toit la premiere ann6e de ces mille ans. Pourquoi Yhomme seul est 
il sujet ý devenir imb6cile? 
Rousseau's neologism of 'perfectibilite'll' thus performs the function of 
laying the groundwork from which man's consciousness can emerge 
and assume its dynamic state. However, it cannot account for this 
emergence by itself: as a kind of second order instinct in natural man, its 
structure is still co-extensive with the equilibrium of nature. 
The second element that allows for Rousseau's origin to occur is the 
vocal sign; or rather, a vocal sign of the particular kind that we 
discussed in Chapter 2. Te premier langage de Fhomme, Rousseau 
writes, 
358C. f. Etinle, OC IV, p. 313: Te foridement de Fimitation parmi nous vient du d6sir de 
se transporter hors de soi. ' 
350 If the condemnation of inequality in society and social consciousness effected in the 
second half of the Discotirs were not SO far reaching, it would be tempting to read the 
text purely in terms of the idea that inequality is the origin of man q11a human being. 
360 For the relation of the concept of 'perfectibilit6' to free will, see Derrida (1976), p. 
183. 
3W The term, invented by Rousseau, slowly became part of the French language, and 
Nvas entered into the Dictioniiairt, de I'AcadMue in the 
fifth edition of 1798. See OC III, p. 
1317, n. 3. 
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[Ile langage le plus universel, le plus 6nergique, et le seul dont il eut besoin, avant 
qu'il fallut persuader des hommes assembl6s, est le cri de la Nature. Comme ce cri 
n'6toit arrach6 que par une sorte d'instinct dans les occasions pressantes pour 
implorer du secours dans les grands dangers, ou du soulagement dans les maux 
violens, il n'6toit pas d'un grand usage dans le cours ordinare de la vie, oiJ regnent 
des sentimens plus moder6s. 362 
The key to this passage lies in Rousseau's characterisation of the 'cri' as 
a symptom only of immoderate passion. It arises, that is to say, only in 
circumstances where the desire for self- or species-preservation is 
heightened, circumstances which, as Rousseau has pointed our earlier, 
are rare "dans Yetat de Nature, ouý toutes choses marchent d'une 
maniere si uniforme'. 363 He is specific, too, about the nature of these 
rare circumstances: 
Cela peut kre ainsi pour les objets qu'il ne conno^it pas, et je ne doute point qu'il ne 
soit effray6 par tous les nouveaux Spectacles, qui s'offrent ý lui toutes les fois qu'iI 
ne peut distinguer le bien et le mal Physiques qu'il en doit attendre, ni comparer 
ses forces avec les dangers qu'iI aý courir. 164 
The structure within natural consciousness of which the 'cri-' may be 
considered an expression, then, is to be understood in terms of a 
challenge to the equilibrium, or, alternatively, a failure within the 
system of natural consciousness. For what is being described is, in 
effect, a failure of the natural being to be equal to itself. This may be 
understood, as in the situation Rousseau describes as giving rise to the 
cry of nature, as a failure of natural man in respect of his instinct for 
self-preservation (his own extreme suffering). It may equally be 
understood, however, as registering a failure in respect of his instinct 
for species-preservation (the extreme suffering of one of his 
3(, '- OC 111, p. 148. 
363 OC 111, p. 136. 
364 OC III, p. 136. The passage quoted is not adjacent to the passage about the'cri de la 
nature' and forms, ostensibIV, part of a different discussion. Nevertheless, the 
underlYing structure in each case is the same. 
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/ semblables'). In this case - where the cry is thus one of natural pity - 
the import of the situation for the perceiving subject is more clear, for 
cases where his own extreme suffering is involved may not become 
objects of sustained perception in quite the same way. 311 As Rousseau's 
analysis makes clear, however, this experience of failure is analogous in 
structure, if not in degree, to the situation in which natural man 
' 366 confronts objects which do not correspond to his innate 'ideas, or, 
rather, the value of which does not register properly in his perception. 
The situation which gives rise to the natural cry of sympathy, in other 
words, is analogous to one in which something like a question is posed. 
For the analogy may be grasped simply: the first situation involves a 
being in the state of nature failing to be equal to itself; the second 
involves the state of nature appearing to fail to be equal to itself. The 
result in each case is the same: natural man is forced to ask himself what 
is present to his consciousness. 
Rousseau returns to this situation during one of the number of 
different narrations of the origin of language in the Essai. Here, the 
element of question-posing is made explicit: 
Un homme sauvage en rencontrant d'autres se sera d'abord effray6. Sa frayeur lui 
aura fait voir ces hommes plus grands et plus forts que lui-mýme; il leur aura 
donn6 le nom de GMns. Apr&s beaucoup d'exp6riences il aura reconnu que ces 
pr6tendus G6ans n'6tant ni plus grands ni plus forts que lui, leur stature ne 
convenoit point ý Vid6e qu'iI avoit d'abord attach6e au mot de G6ant. 11 inventera 
donc un autre nom commun ý eux et 6 lui, tel, par exemple, que le nom d'homilic, et 
laissera celui de GMnt ý l'objet faux qui Favoit frapp6 durant son illusion. 367 
365For the simple reason that the death of the subject is the most likely result. 
Rousseau comments on the notion that his own death may not be an object of 
perception for natural man: 'ils s'6teignent enfin, sans qu'on s'apperýoive qu'ils 
cessent d'&tre, et Presque sans s'en appercevoir eux m&mes' (OC III, p. 137). 
Derrida 
discusses the importance of this idea at length. See Derrida (1976), pp. 184ff. 
366Rousseau speaks of both animals and man in the state of nature as having'Wes' 
(OC 111, p. 141), but is clear that these have no cognitive content and simply correspond 
to states of instinctual desire. 
3670C V, p. 381. 
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What is important about this description is not the process by which the 
savage is held to substitute one name for another according to a process 
of re-evaluation of one and the same object. As Paul de Man points out, 
the savage's expression of the signifier "gean' can hardly be taken as a 
sign per se: 'the coinage of the word "'giant"" simply means "I am 
afraid. ", " and 'displaces the referential meaning from an outward, visible 
property to an "'inward"' feeling. "311 The important feature is, rather, 
twofold. Firstly, we witness the transformation of the other man from 
the state in which he is the object of a purely evaluative appraisal to one 
in which he is the object of an appraisal with a smattering of cognitive 
content. "' Secondly, we witness the passage of one and same entity 
entering the subject's field of awareness as what one might call an object 
of aesthetic perception, and leaving it as what one may call an object of 
moral evaluation. 370 
This idea picks out what I consider to be one of the most significant 
features of Rousseau"s analysis: namely that the account of the 
generation also provides an account of the relation of aesthetic to moral; 
and further, that both accounts presuppose a structure of engagement 
with an object of consciousness that is other to it. The element of 
otherness may be understood as follows. The passage in question may 
be read in two ways. The first reading, which is the one pursued by 
both Derrida and de Man, characterise the episode as an encounter with 
the other and the subsequent assimilation of this into the comparative 
relations that are held to govern the framework of linguistic 
understanding. De Man's account is more immediately intelligible; he 
writes that Rousseau"s ascription of the generative role of fear is 
mistaken, a mistake which is understood (by both Derrida and de Man) 
to derive from Rousseau's reliance on Condillac's example of the 
368De Man (1971), p. 150, following Derrida (1976), pp. 276-7. Rousseau's intention in 
the example was to demonstrate the Nvay in which figural language (the term'g6an' is 
taken as a metaphor) precedes literal ('I'homme'). 
3690n the svmbiotic relation between the awareness of others and the capacity for 
symbolic representation, see Derrida (1976), pp. 165ff. 
370 This characterisation of aesthetic and moral is the focus of subsection D below. 
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generation of language in his fable of the -babes in the woods'. 371 Fear is 
taken to imply the wrong structure because, being a purely animal 
function commensurate with Rousseau's account of the pure state of 
nature, it precludes awareness of otherness. Thus de Man has it that, 
since 
[iln Rousseau's vocabulary, language is a product of passion and not the expression 
of a need ... Iflear would hardly need language and would be best expressed by 
pantomime, by mere gesture... [Fear] could never, by itself, lead to the 
supplementary figuration of language; it is much too practical to be called a 
passion. The third chapter of the Essai, the section on metaphor [just cited], should 
have been centered on piý/. 372 
While this reading seems reasonable enough - and the substitution of 
the concept of pity is certainly very relevant - both Derrida and de 
Man's accounts see the passage as one in which the origin of language 
and the possibility of perceiving otherness has already taken place. But 
if Rousseau's analysis of the state of nature is taken as coherent, and 
pushed to its limits, this possibility of perceiving another as other does 
not yet exist: the structure of natural man's consciousness only allows 
for the registration of objects of perception in terms of their sameness or 
difference, where this is regulated by instincts for species-preservation. 
If, on the other hand, we attribute the "mistake" to nature, then the 
scene we are presented with describes, not the generation of conceptual 
content after the event of the origin of language, but the origin of 
language itself. In this reading, the other being initially referred to as 
"gean' is simply wrongly valued. And during the series of encounters - 
and Rousseau's explicit statement that there were many such 
encounters over a long period of time purposefully echoes his account 
in the Discours of the passage from the state of nature to the origin of 
human being - the behaviour of the 'gean" fails to be commensurate 
with the savage's naturally or instinctively endowed idea of him. The 
371 In Condillac's Essai siir Vorigint, des conTiaissaiiccs luo? iaines, 11, §1. 
372De Man (1983), pp. 134-5, my italics. 
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structure is not, in other words, one of the assimilation of the other, but a 
fuller one in which is described the individuation of another being as 
other and, further, the savage's subsequent attempt to reconcile this 
otherness with his natural consciousness. The event of individuation as 
other may be understood in terms of the savage's awareness of his re- 
evaluation over time: initially encountered as purely 'different", the re- 
evaluation results not in pure sameness but in the pseudo-conceptual 
identification of the 'gean" as having passed from "different' to "same', 
for which a more convenient term than 'Thommewould beami'. 
In so far as the process of comparative identification described by 
Rousseau does indeed entail the activity of pity, this instance of pity is 
not consistent with the 'pitie naturelle' identical with the natural instinct 
of species-preservation. Rather, it is an instance in which the object of 
this pity is understood as other to the savage's immediate sphere of self 
interest, and the movement this pitiful identification describes is the 
savage's attempt to reconcile the interest of the other to his own interest. 
The attempt is thus to assimilate the other being into sameness, but the 
result is that being's individuation as other. And this structure is, 
properly speaking, a moral one. 373 
373 We saw also that the analysis of pity has clear epistemological relevance in the 
sense in which it prompts a partly conceptual individuation of the object of that pity. 
This is born out in Rousseau's discussion of the difference between physical attraction 
and (moral) love, the second of which 'est ce qui d6termine ce d6sir et 
le fixe sur un 
seul objet' (OC III p. 157). It is on the epistemological and linguistic 
implications of the 
structure that De Man and, to a large extent, Derrida focus in their 
discussions. My 
account privileges the implications for morality, not only 
because that is the focus of 
mv thesis, but also because I argue that Rousseau's interest 
in the epistemological 
implications is secondary to the moral ones. 
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D. MORAL AND AESTHETIC AWARENESS: THE ECONOMY OF PITy374 
Rousseau's analysis of pity as the characterisation of the faculty through 
which man becomes aware of others is developed further in the Essai. 
In order to understand Rousseau's construal of the idea of pity in the 
following passage, we need to bear in mind that the concept of "pitie' 
deployed here is not the 'pitie naturelle" immanent in natural man's 
instinctual makeup, but one in which awareness of the other is already a 
375 feature of consciousness. 
La piti6, bien que naturelle au coeur de Yhomme resteroit 6ternellement inactive 
sans Fimagination qui la met en jeu. Comment nous laissons-nous 6mouvoir 6 la 
pitiO En nous transportant hors de nous-m&mes; en nous identifiant avec 1'&tre 
souffrant. Nousne souffrons qu'autant quenousjugeonsqu'il souffre; cen'est pas 
dans nous c'est clans lui que nous souffrons. Qu'on songe combien ce tranport 
suppose de connoissances acquises! Comment imaginerois-je des maux dont je Wai 
nulle We? Comment souffrirois-je en voyant souffrir un autre si je ne sais pas 
m&me qu'il souffre, si j'ignore ce qu'il ya de commun entre lui et moi? Celui qui 
n'a jamais refl6chi ne peut kre ni clement ni juste ni pitoyable: il ne peut pas non 
plus kre m6chant et vindicatif. Celui qui Wimagine rien ne sent que lui-m&me; il est 
seul au milieu du genre humain. 376 
There is a clear sense, then, in which Rousseau"s fable of the giants 
would have been more adequate if it had referred to the idea of moral 
pity as the attempt "en nous identifiant avec I"&tre souffrant, and thus 
made explicit the role of this structure in enabling the faculy by which 
371 'The economy of pity' is, as is well known, Derrida's phrase, used to describe 
Rousseau's deployment of the concept of pity to underwrite his analysis of human 
morality and epistemology. I have employed the phrase because my discussion has 
the same object as Derrida's, but I have preferred to keep my account separate from 
his in the interest of simplicity. In respect of the application of the concept of pity to 
Rousseau's epistemology, however, Derrida's account is considerably more detailed 
than mine. See Derrida (1976), esp. pp. 171-194. 
375 It is this distinction - and the fact that Rousseau is unclear about it - that 
forms the 
centre of the debates about the text's chronology referred to earlier. See above, p. 170, 
n. 346. 
376 OC V, pp. 395-6. Rousseau's conception of the imagination is essentially an 
extension into the human realm of the 'natural' property of 'perfectibilit6'. 
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man is aware of the other. 377 It would have been more adequate still, 
perhaps, had he reintroduced the notion of thecri naturell as that 
which prompts the reflective activity constitutive of pity. For it is 
wholly consistent with Rousseau's conception of the vocal sign, as the 
expression of immoderate passion (or the event of another being failing 
to be equal to itself), that it acts in such a way as to penetrate the 
percipient's sphere of self-interest with a demand to reconcile his own 
interest with that of his semblable . 371 The 'cri', once the moral sphere 
becomes active, is what prompts an attempted reconciliation by the 
perceiving subject of the self-interest and the species-interest initially 
given by nature. However, this 'omission" notwithstanding, the account 
remains a coherent one. 379 
The awareness of the 'suffering other' is deployed in the Essai as the 
key instance of the presence of an other to consciousness that we saw 
Rousseau intended as providing the ultimate ground of musical 
imitation. I shall discuss in the next section what is involved in this 
notion of presence and its corollary in the idea of pity construed as the 
awareness of such presence. Before proceeding to this discussion, 
however, it is necessary to elaborate further on the notions of the 
aesthetic and moral spheres that our account has enabled. This may be 
done in reference to the separation of self-interest and species-interest 
that occurs at the origin of humanity as distinct from man in the state of 
nature. 
During the time that mankind"s population extended itself over the 
earth - according to Rousseau"s model in which awareness of the other is 
377The fact that the object of moral pity is the otlier rather than someone with whom a 
complete identification is made is important. See Derrida, pp. 190-2. 
37,1 This, as we shall see in the following section is the basis for Rousseau's distinction 
between vocal signs and gestures, and his moral valorisation of the former. 
379 Indeed, the fact that it remains coherent without reference to the 'cri' constitutes an 
important pointer to a problem concerning the relation between the idea of the 
presence of the 'suffering other' and the vocal sign Rousseau - or so he seems, at 111\' 
rate - upholds as necessary 
for the manifestation of such presence. This problem N%, Ill 
be explored in the following sub-section on musical imitation and the problem of 
presence. 
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introduced into consciousness - the equilibrium between an 
individual's sense of self-preservation and his sense of species- 
preservation was eroded. His immediate sense, that is, of being like 
others decreased and his immediate sense of being merely like himself, 
in contradistinction to these others, grew. As man becomes distanced in 
this way from the state of nature, so it becomes possible to say that the 
goodness of mankind becomes distinct from the individual's sense of 
what is good for himself. It is no longer guaranteed by the equilibrium 
of nature, then, that personal self-interest will cohere with the species 
self-interest. However, a sense of this species self-interest, or the 
goodness of mankind, is still retained, and it comes to be identified with 
a return to the harmonious equilibrium distinctive of the state of nature. 
Deep down, to put the matter as simply as possible, because man knows 
his survival depends upon the coincidence of his own interests with 
those of his species, he retains a sense of his wider goodness being 
linked to regaining the state of nature. 380 
Now the important feature of this structure is as follows. Man's 
awareness of this wider goodness - this species self-interest as distinct 
from his personal self-interest - becomes problematic because there is 
no longer an immediate and naturally given correlation between the 
two spheres. Man continues, that is to say, to have an immediate 
awareness of what is good or bad for him, but is no longer immediately 
aware of the wider goodness of mankind. He retains some awareness of 
it, but this awareness is a limited and mediate one. He retains this 
mediate awareness for the reason that it is implicit in the structure of 
consciousness from which his own distinctly human consciousness has, 
over time, emerged. 
Man's mediate awareness of his wider good thus takes the form of a 
kind of moral and aesthetic value which may be understood as follows. 
As we saw, the perceptual event that prompts man's moral awareness is 
characterised in terms of a sign of immoderate passion evocative of pity. 
380 This awareness captures the problematic nature of the relation, about \%, hich 
Rousseau \vas ambiguous, between natural and moral pity. 
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The aesthetic aspect of this event, then, is simply that about the sign 
which requires a sustained perceptual engagement. That which is 
aesthetic about the perception of the sign, in other words, is its credible 
announcement of presence - typically, the presence of the suffering 
other. This credibility, which accounts for the degree of sustained 
engagement, is accounted for by the fact that the sign registers an 
expression of immoderate passion significant of a sphere of interest that 
is, at the time of perception, other to that of the percipient. The aesthetic 
sign, that is, is such that it seems to pose a question the correct response 
to which is not immediately known. 
In turn, this structure of distinctively aesthetic perception becomes 
moral when the process of reflection it prompts in the percipient comes 
to be experienced as a demand to act. Now in the state of nature, as we 
saw, no separation of aesthetic and moral is necessary, or even possible, 
for the reason that this demand to act is commensurate with the instinct 
for species preservation. Once this instinct is lost, however, as man 
enters the domain of the human, the situation differs in virtue of the fact 
that the sense of species-preservation - or the general good of mankind 
- is no longer instinctual but is present to the mind as a residual notion. 
The moral action, therefore, no longer immediately and unquestioningly 
dictated by natural (amoral) instinct, requires a process of deliberation. 
A key feature of this account of the moral sphere is that it is 
grounded neither in a determinate concept of nor a blind instinct for the 
good of mankind. Rather, it is grounded in the residual notion man is 
understood to have of this general good. 381 The content of this residual 
notion is, at bottom, evaluative and non-cognitive in character. This is 
so for the reason that man"s original sense of such goodness was itself 
purely evaluative. The implication of this is that the sense of goodness 
may attach itself to more determinate notions in the guise of their 
evaluative aspect, and thus enable a repertoire of properly moral 
concepts. 
381 C. f. Enule, OC IV, p. 288: Ta conscience qui nous fait aimer fle bienj et hair lie mall, 
quoiqu'ind6pendante de la raison, ne peut donc se developer sans elle. ' 
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The brief account given by Rousseau in the Discours of the derivation 
of moral concepts from the structure of pity is consistent with this. In 
the pure state of nature, natural pity 'tient lieu de Loix, de moeurs, et de 
vertu, avec cet avantage que nul n'est tente de desobeir ý sa douce 
voix'. 111 When it comes to the moral sphere this natural 
commensurability of pity with the law and morality becomes one in 
which law and morality derive it: it is from this 'seule qualite [de la 
pitie] decoulent toutes les vertus sociales ... 
En effet, quest-ce que la g6n6rosit6, la Clemence, Mumanit6, sinon la Piti6 
appliqu6e aux foibles, aux coupables, ou 6 Fesp6ce humaine en g6n6ral ? La 
Bienveillance et Farniti6 m&me sont, 6 le bien prendre, des productions d'une piti6 
constante, fix6e sur un objet particulier. 383 
And in the absence of this contact with the originary moral awareness of 
pity, the moral quality is forfeit only with dire consequences. In a dig at 
the philosophical materialism of his contemporaries, Rousseau charges 
philosophy with the accusation of distancing man from his moral 
awareness: 
C'est la Philosophie qui Fisole [de la pitiý]; c'est par elle [que l'homme] dit en 
secret, ä l'aspect d'un homme souffrant, peris si tu veux, je suis en surW. 11 ny a 
plus que les dangers de la sociýtý enti&e qui troublent le sommeil tranquille du 
Philosophe, et qui Farrachent de son 
lit., 384 
The moral sentiment of pity as the proper relation of aesthetic and 
moral consciousness - and the dynamic relation with the wider good of 
mankind that Rousseau"s analysis makes a central feature of it - is held 
to underwrite the entirety of human morality. If Rousseau"s account is 
accepted, the main difficulty for moral philosophy (both historical and 
OC 111, p. 156. 
OC 111, p. 155. 
384 OC III, p. 156. The accusation bears a strong relation to Hume's account of the 
problem, approached of course from the opposite side to Rousseau, of the relation 
between reason and morality: 'It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of 
the whole world to the scratching of my finger'. Hume (1978), 11,3: §3. 
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contemporary) becomes one of the irreducibility of moral concepts 
because of the purely evaluative content at their core. 311 For Rousseau, 
however, this facet is indispensable because it is only by maintaining 
the evaluative character of moral concepts that they retain their 
connection with the desire to act. In this, Rousseau-s clear heir - and in 
that respect his most judicious eighteenth-century reader - is Immanuel 
Kant whose own analytic formulation of morality was aimed squarely 
at addressing this problem. "' 
E. IMITATION AND THE PROBLEM OF PRESENCE 
We saw, in our brief discussion of imitation in the Essai earlier in the 
present section, that Rousseau intends to ground his aesthetics of music 
in the notion of human presence. We have seen, too, that this same 
notion of human presence, considered as the corollary of moral pity, 
underwrites the core of his moral philosophy. The question we must 
turn to now, then, is whether this deployment of one and the same 
principle confers a moral authority on Rousseau's account of musical 
imitation. Do Rousseau's musical aesthetics, in other words, genuinely 
provide an account of the good of music? 
I remarked briefly on the fact that the Discours and the Essai are to be 
differentiated primarily in respect of the context in which the analysis of 
origins is deployed. 387 In the Discours, the accounts of the economy of 
pity and the notion of the presence of the other are developed primarily 
in order to describe the emergence of social and moral man from his 
natural state. And while the work does outline, as I have argued, an 
extremely powerful and wide-ranging moral philosophy, social man is 
nonetheless brought to the limelight primarily for the purpose of his 
385 A difficulty encountered, it may be remembered, by Diderot's narrator in Le Neveii 
de Raiwati. See above, pp. 155-6. 
386 An excellent argument for the importance of Rousseau's moral philosophy 
for Kant 
is given in Cassirer (1954). See also Henrich (1992). 
3S7 See above, pp. -170- 1. 
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extensive and effective castigation. In the Essai, on the other hand, 
Rousseau is concerned equally with the good and the bad in human 
social institutions. He facilitates this 'splitting" of the origin into good 
and bad by discerning, as we saw, two origins of music-language. The 
good origin is understood to derive from the immoderate passion of 
love and pity; the bad derives from the origin of language considered as 
the expression of need. 
Derrida argues at length, and brilliantly, that this dual origin is to be 
understood as, at best, wishful thinking and, at worst, a seriously 
flawed example of what he calls "logocentrism', or the privileging of the 
spoken voice as the implied carrier of truth at the expense of writing. In 
what remains of this section, I shall assess the extent to which Derrida 
must be agreed with on this point; and, further, identify which features, 
to put it bluntly, of the wrecked remains of the account of musical 
imitation in the Essai may be recovered for the purposes of my overall 
project. 
There are numerous narrations of the origin in the Essai. Perhaps the 
most beguiling, and certainly the most frequently cited, is the 'scene by 
the well'. Describing the water holes where primitive men and women 
would gather, Rousseau carefully delineates a situation in which the 
natural coincidence of desire and need begin to come apart. "' 
[Par des puits] se form6rent les pr6miers liens des familles: M furent les pr6miers 
rendez-vous des deux skes. Les jeunes filles venoient chercher de Yeau pour le 
m6nage, les jeunes hommes venoient abreuver leurs troupeaux. Lý des yeux 
accoutum6s aux m&mes objets d&s Venfance commenc6rent d'en voir de plus doux. 
Le coeur s'6mut A ces nouveaux objets, un attrait inconnu le rendit moins sauvage, 
il sentit le plaisir de n&tre pas seul. L'eau devint insensiblement plus necessaire, le 
b6tail eut soif plus souvent; on arrivoit en h5te et Fon partoit ý regret. Dans cet 5ge 
heureux o6 rien ne marquoit les heures, rien n'obligeoit ý les compter; le terns 
Wavoit d'autre mesure que I'amusement et Yennui. Sous de vieux chýnes 
vainqueurs des ans une ardente jeunesse oublioit par d6gr6s sa f6rocit6, on 
s'apprivoisoit peu ý peu les uns avec les autres; en s'efforýant de se faire entendre 
on apprit ý s'expliquer. Li se firent les pr6mi6res f&tes, les pieds bondissoient de 
388 These, as we saw above, Nvere understood to be the terms in which the origin could 
be located. 
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joye, le geste empress6 ne suffiosoit plus, la voix Vaccompagnoit d'accens 
passionn6s, le plaisir et le desir confondus ensemble se faisoient sentir ý la fois. LA 
fut enfin le vrai berceau des peuples, et du pur cristal des fontaines sortirent les 
pr6miers feux de Varnour... Les pr6mi6res langues, filles du plaisir et non du 
besoin, port6rent longtems Venseigne de leur p6re; leur accent s6ducteur ne s'effaýa 
qu'avec les sentimens qui les avoient fait naitre, lorsque de nouveaux besoins 
introduits parmi les hommes forc6rent chacun de ne songer qu'ý lui-m&me et de 
retirer son coeur au dedans delUi. 389 
In the passage, the inexorable movement towards the event of song- 
speech is built into the writing of the passage: it literally 'moves' us 
there, rather as a piece of music seems to carry us to what it presents as 
the inevitable. The object of the passage is to describe, in terms 
commensurate with the idea of moral love outlined in the Discours, the 
primitive humans' gradual awareness of a species of desire that reaches 
far beyond the realm of need and immediate awareness and confers 
upon the objects present to their senses a framework of significance in 
excess of their appearances. The desire experienced by the characters in 
Rousseau's pastoral may be expressed simply: they desire each other, 
coming to experience for the first time the sense of lacking essential of 
the human being - or the lack that defines being human - as that which 
is sought in love. Love, that most poetic of the emotions, is precisely 
that from which the poetry of the original speech-song is bom, and 
Rousseau's longed-for 'societe intime' is profoundly in focus. 110 
This lack of othemess, or the desire towards an other, characteristic of 
the human institution, moves us away from what is immediate to what 
is necessarily mediate. For the primitives by the well, the object of 
desire that gives birth to the act of naming lies beyond the sphere of 
what is obviously desirable; the naming constitutes an act of 
transgression. Importantly, too, the experience of the primitives is 
characterised in terms of experimentation, an experimentation that is 
only linguistic in so far as it is sexual; the nature of what is desired 
becomes clear at the same moment as the vocal accent that signifies this 
38Q [-ýý; Ijj"OC V, pp. 405-7. 
3L)OSee the Introduction, pp. 6ff above. 
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desire. The 'pur cristal' that characterises the transparency of the water, 
marks at the same time the moral and epistemic relations of the scene: 
there is no misunderstanding, no shame, the transgression of 
boundaries is purely good and humane, purely towards humanity. Their 
utterances are 'bare-faced', the semantic content of their rising tones 
seemingly limited to the mixture of the strikingly obvious and strikingly 
new 'I am here: love me'. 
The fact that original speech-song translates as 'aimez-moi', and not 
Rousseau's more desolate alternative, "aidez-moi, captures a distinction 
we touched on briefly earlier in this section. This distinction lies at the 
very heart of Rousseau"s theory: 'aimez-moi, which amounts to the 
content of Rousseau"s preferred and, as we saw, lyrically privileged 
origin of language, refers only to the speaker and her desire; "aidez- 
moi', by contrast, refers in addition to some object in the world. The 
passionate utterance of 'aimez-moi',, in other words, inaugurates only a 
relation between two putative lovers; "aidez-moi", on the other hand, 
appropriates the world, objectifies it. 
The conclusion of the passage, which reflects the more pessimistic 
ramifications of Rousseau's general account of the origin, introduces a 
stirring note of melancholy into the pastoral: "nouveaux besoins 
introduits parmi les hommes' obliterate the leisured community of 
lovers, forcing 'chacun de ne songer qu'a lui-meme et de retirer son 
coeur au dedans de lui. ' just as soon as it had been opened, the human 
heart closes again. The economy of needs once again precludes the free- 
play of passionate desire. 
The foreclosure of human consciousness to an unhappy replica of 
natural consciousness is echoed by the structural comparison of "aidez- 
moi' and 'aimez-moi". The vocal sign that Rousseau translates as 
laimez-moi' is suffused with the 'seductive accent' coterminous with the 
pleasurable feelings that caused them to be uttered; the vocalised 
gesture translated as "aidez-moi' was, as Rousseau says, harsh and 
gutteral. 'Aimez-moi' is melodious. 'Aidez-moi' is not. But the 
sonorous similarity of these two phrases is also intended by Rousseau to 
point us towards a structural similarity: ý%, hat originates as the object of 
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passionate desire may all too quickly transform itself to being needed, 
to being perceived as necessary rather than freely desired. It is in this 
respect that the scene by the well shows the origin of music and 
language at its most delicately poised, at its most fragile. Before the 
withdrawal of the heart into the self, and away from the other, is 
described at the end of the scene, Rousseau briefly comments on the 
conditions which allowed the fragile and seemingly momentary origin 
to be stretched and tarry. It would seem that these limiting conditions 
were finely balanced indeed: '11 n'y avoit la rien d"asses anime pour 
denoiier la langue, rien qui put arracher asses frequemment les accens 
des passions ardentes pour les tourner en institutions! 
Alive both to the richness and beauty of this passage, as well as its 
compromising fragility, Derrida elegantly disarms Rousseau's attempt 
to stretch out the origin 
This then is the story. For the history that follows the origin and is added to it is 
nothing but the story of the separation between song and speech. If we consider 
the difference which fractured the origin, it must be said that this history, which is 
decadence and degeneracy through and through, had no prehistory. Degeneration 
as separation, severing of voice and song, has always already begun. We shall see 
that Rousseau's entire text describes origin as the beginning of the end, as the 
inaugural decadence. Yet, in spite of that description, the text twists about in a sort 
of oblique effort to act as if degeneration were not prescribed in the genesis and as if 
evil supervened upon a good origin. As if song and speech, which have the same act 
and the same birthpangs, had not always already begun to separate themselveS. 391 
If the triumph of need over passion characteristic of the process by 
which the primitive 'withdraws his heart within himself' results in the 
separation of speech and song - produces, that is, music and language 
both of which are unmelodious - why then, Derrida asks, is it not true 
to say that the birth of speech-song is not also equally the birth of their 
separation? How can one insist on the necessity of the birth as union 
without identifying what is also apparently necessary, namely 
disunion? And given that it seems that Rousseau could not have 
301 Derrida (1976), p. 199. 
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answered this question of Derrida"s - since it is partly Rousseau who 
asks it in the first place by identifying the fragility of the crystal of the 
well - why then does he continue to write "as if-' it were not so? 
As we saw, the category of the voice is valorised in Rousseau's scene 
as the primary carrier of human presence. All that is human, and this 
includes both moral and aesthetic awareness, derives from the originary 
consciousness of otherness in the form of a perception of a need that is 
not our own which we freely choose to respond to. According to this 
model, the category of the voice enjoys a special prominence in relation 
to the visual field in that the cry of suffering, or the cry for love, comes 
from beyond what is immediately present to awareness. The origin of 
language, for Rousseau, must have come from the voice, and not from 
the visual gesture and its originally strictly need-based system of 
organisation, because only the voice may penetrate the immediacy of 
natural perception. The voice, in other words, must have been that 
which carried the original human significance. 
In his analysis of the account of musical imitation and linguistic 
signification in the Essai, Derrida's primary target is this notion that the 
voice is privileged as the carrier of human presence, and thus, as we 
have seen, employed as the ground of his argument. Before we 
investigate some of the substance of this objection, however, we should 
note that the book in which Derrida's concern with this aspect of 
Rousseau finds expression - the 1967 work Of Grammatology - is 
concerned with attacking this idea in general. That is to say, the work 
that Derrida intended his book to undertake was a general reassessment 
of a strain in the history of philosophy, running from Plato to Heidegger 
and beyond, characterised by him in terms of the 'metaphysics of 
presence" and identified by the recurrent tendency to grant 
epistemological as well as moral priority to speech at the expense of 
writing. 
Derrida's choice of Rousseau's Essai as the vehicle for his own 
insights into problems characteristic of the history of philosophy as a 
whole follows from three specific assessments of the text and its 
relationship with philosophical tradition. Firstly, in general, Derrida 
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understood the philosophical writing of mid-eighteenth-century France 
as circumscribing a critical point in the history of philosophy where 
social and scientific optimism is held to confront problems specific to 
the understanding of language and signification, an understanding of 
these things being precisely that which would, in its recalcitrant nature, 
threaten such underlying optimism. 191 Secondly, Derrida understands 
Rousseau as providing the textual locus in which this confrontation is at 
its breaking point. Rousseau's Participation with this strain in French 
eighteenth-century thought is after all, at least, severely limited and, at 
most, tantamount to open warfare; Derrida finds in Rousseau a 
powerful ally in this way, consistently finding his own work partially 
undertaken in Rousseau's texts. Thirdly, Rousseau"s explicit project in 
the Essai is very close to Derrida's own in its valorisation of linguistic 
signification by virtue of the presence or absence of the linguistic 
subject. The force of the confrontation between the positivism typical of 
eighteenth-century French thought and the scepticism of Rousseau - 
Derrida's eighteenth-century ally, as it were - is understood by Derrida 
to be the main reason for the problematic status of the Essai. Its internal 
inconsistencies are conceived as being the result of philosophical good 
faith in the face of an epistemological aporia, that of the discussion being 
restricted to the terminology of the presence and absence of the subject 
in the linguistic sign. 
Because of this aporia, Rousseau, for Derrida, "straining towards the 
reconstitution of presence: 
[Rousseau] valorizes and disqualifies writing at the same time. At the same time; 
that is to say, in one divided but coherent movement. We must try not to lose sight 
of its strange unity. Rousseau condemns writing as the destruction of presence and 
as disease of speech. He rehabilitates it to the extent that it promises the 
reappropriation of that of which speech allowed itself to be dispossessed. But by 
3'2 For an analysis of the difficulties faced by eighteenth-century philosophers in the 
context of their understanding of the power or danger of rhetoric, see Paul de Man, 
'TTie Epistemology of Metaphor', in On Metaplior, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 11-28. The similarity between de Man's views 
-and Derrida's own in this context can be taken as read. 
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what, if not already a writing older than speech and already installed in that 
place? '91 
Pure presence cannot occur within language because language (where 
the term language may be taken to refer to all systems within which 
signification occurs), as Rousseau seemed to understand better than his 
contemporaries, is built upon difference. In seeking therefore to define 
presence in terms of a plenitude of significance, or in reference to the 
moment at which signification properly speaking occurs for the first 
time, Rousseau is considered to be at fault because signification, 
properly speaking, is itself that which by its own structure compromises 
the possibility of presence: to express the matter as simply as possible, 
for something to signify is for it never to be purely and simply itself. 
Derrida's reading of Rousseau forces us to question Rousseau"s 
account of the origin as a moment of presence, and he demonstrates that 
in the enormous variety of contexts invoked by Rousseau the origin is 
always fractured. just as the structure of signification seems to preclude 
presence, imitation fares no better. Discussing chapter fourteen of the 
Essai, Derrida problematises Rousseau's valorisation of music over 
painting by cancelling out the putative disanalogy in their modes of 
imitation. 
Imitation duplicates presence: it is added to the presence of the entity which it 
replaces. It transposes what is present into an 'outside' version of this presence... 
Whatever their differences, music and painting both are duplications, 
representations. Both equally partake of the categories of outside and inside. The 
expression has already begun to move the passion outside itself into the open and 
has already begun to paint 
it. 3Q4 
As we saw in the context of the originary union of speech and song that 
the degenerative process by which the two become separated, each 
losing their claim to presence, is always already inscribed in the 
structure of the origin: 'Degeneration as separation, severing of voice 
393 Derrida (1976), pp. 141-2. 
31)4Derrida (1976), p. 289; cited bv de Man (1983), p. 126 
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and song, has always already begun. We shall see that Rousseau's 
entire text describes origin as the beginning of the end, as the inaugural 
decadence. ' And yet, despite the fact that the realisation of this, at many 
points in the Essai, is Rousseau's own, he continues nevertheless to 
identify this fictional moment as the mark of man's truth. As Derrida 
put it, 'the text twists about in a sort of oblique effort to act as if 
degeneration were not prescribed in the genesis ... ' Because of this, 
Rousseau's normative origin, the norm that regulates Rousseau"s entire 
system of values, forfeits any claim to epistemological validity. 
If we accept Derrida on this point, and this is an acceptance that I feel 
must be undertaken, the normative and evaluative strata of Rousseau"s 
account of language and music seems to 'totter". The basis for the 
valorisation of speech over writing, of accent over articulation (of 
concepts as well as vowels) is seemingly forfeit: 
A speech without consonantic principle, what for Rousseau would be a speech 
sheltered from all writing, would not be speech; it would hold itself at the fictive 
limit of the inarticulate and purely natural cry. Conversely, as speech of pure 
consonants and pure articulation would become pure writing, algebra, or dead 
language. The death of speech is therefore the horizon and origin of language. 395 
Similarly, the priority of melody over harmony, of vocal over 
instrumental music, which are only, as Derrida shows, applications of 
the same distinction between speech and writing, accent and 
articulation. -"' 
One point of ambiguity in Derrida's account concerns the extent to 
which Rousseau was aware of these difficulties. 'Articulation, ' he 
argues, "which replaces accent, is [also] the origin of languages. 
Altering ... through writing 
is an originary exteriority. It is the origin of 
31)'; Derrida (1976), p. 315. 
3')6 Derrida's discussion of the musical component of the Essai occurs mostly at the 
beginning of his 'deconstruction' of it, and is thus relatively expository in character 
(the Essai, at the time Derrida wrote Of Graiin? iatolo, ýýI, had a distinctly marginal status 
among Rousseau's works). For this reason, there are few convenient quotations 
spelling out the implications of the impossible origin for Rousseau's music theory, but 
the point is clear nonetheless. 
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language. Rousseau describes it without declaring it. Clandestinely. 1397 
If, then, Rousseau's project was thus esoteric, and completely aware of 
what its account of the origin was (un)doing, the question still remains 
as to why he should have struggled so to keep alive the myth of 
presence? Was it purely out of spite for Rameau? Why did he use 
much of the considerable force of his pen to perpetuate what he realised 
could only ever enjoy the status of a mythical fiction? 
The answer to this question can only be given if we ourselves slightly 
exceed Derrida's context in Grammatology. This may be done if we 
consider the fact that Rousseau's position within the history of the 
'metaphysics of presence' is a slightly odd one in that presence, for 
Rousseau, cannot simply be assumed to be the mark of truth. Presence, 
in Rousseau, is not quite the mark of epistemological certainty that 
bears the brunt of Derrida's critique, but is rather, as I have argued for 
the major part of this section, a mark of the moral. And in this respect 
the epistemological problems that arise from the ascription to it of a 
normative status may be said to be less shattering than Derrida leads us 
to believe. For although epistemological certainty, as we saw, plays a 
part in the crystaline atmosphere beside the well, the story that is being 
told is not one of the correctness of naming but of the credible 
perception of the need to name, of the requirement to love and the 
requirement to be loved. All Rousseau asks of his "primitive lovers", in 
other words, is that they believe each other to present through their 
signs of love, or that they believe in the otherness of what is present to 
their senses. It is not asked, however, that this belief be a true one, 
merely a credible one. 
A glimpse of Rousseau's understanding of this may be gained from 
briefly considering another passage from the Essai in which moral 
presence is represented as the work that music-language is born to 
undertake. Here it is clear that the presence of others is not simply to be 
397Derrida (1976), p. 315. De Man (1983) goes, famously, one step further than Derrida 
in suggesting Rousseau's full complicity in the partial undoing of 
his own project. For 
the best of the mariv accounts of the relation between Derrida and 
de Nian's 
interpretation, see Bernasconi (1992). 
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equated with the plenitude that would mark the unveiling of true 
presence. 
L'impression successive du discours, qui frappe ý coups redoubl6s vous donne bien 
une autre 6motion que la pr6sence de Fobjet rnýme o6 d'un coup d'ceil ý, ous avez 
tout vfi. Supposez une situation de douleur parfaitement connile, en voyant la 
personne afflig6e vous serez difficilement 6mu jusqu'ý pleurer; mais laissez-lui le 
tems de vous dire tout ce qu'elle sent, et bient6t vous allez fondre en larmes. Ce 
West qu'ainsi que les sc6nes de trag6die font leur effet. La seule pantomime sans 
discours vous laissera presque tranquille; Le discours sans geste vous arrachera 
des pleurs. Les passions ont leurs gestes, mais elles ont aussi leurs accens, et ces 
accens qui nous font tressaillir, ces accens auxquels on ne peut d6rober son organe 
pen6trent par lui jusqu'au fond du cceur, y portent malgr6 nous les mouvemens qui 
les arrachent, et nous font sentir ce que nous entendons. Concluons que les signes 
visibles rendent Fimitation plus exacte, mais qu l'int6rest s'excite mieux par les 
sons. 198 
Here we are given a double scenario. The second of these is familiar to 
us. The accents of the suffering narrator's speech telling us ho7v he 
came to be in his parlous state move us to pity, not the pure knowledge 
of this state, a knowledge which Rousseau says is captured immediately 
in a "coup dceil'. And his conclusion - again the familiar one that visual 
signs convey knowledge but only vocal signs unlock the moral presence 
of the suffering other and the moral-evaluative component contingent 
on it - is precisely the one Derrida's account has 
disabled. 
The first scenario, however, is rather different. Here, language is said 
to return to its origin as the figure in which the suffering other re- 
presents itself, and it is clear that this state of the narrative's good faith 
with the origin implies an acceptance of and a subscription to the rules 
of language's fallen state. Presence here occurs in the guise of the 
aesthetic force of a skillfully constructed narrative. Thus Rousseau, in 
this passage, seems to make it perfectly clear that the "moral' relation 
involved here is not, as it were, an immediate one between 'accent' and 
'coeur". Rather, it involves a fissure in the narrative that the listener 
finds echoed in his own 'heart", and what is this heart but a matrix of 
los OC V, pp. 377-8 
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interior narratives in which his relation to the sense of the wider good of 
mankind is constituted? Presence here is simply a point of entry into a 
narrative whose aesthetic force demands and rewards moral 
engagement. 
The awareness of music's similarly (necessarily) fallen state is also 
visible at times. Pleasant sounds, which owe themselves to the 
"Physique des Sons", despite their insufficiency for aesthetic imitation 
are nonetheless, as we saw, still necessary. Take away the negative 
valorisation of the idea of "purement physique, and the opening of the 
Essai's discussion of harmony is of a beauty and clarity that would have 
been no meagre adornment to Rameau's work: "La beaute des sons est 
de la nature; leur effest est purement physique, il resulte du concours 
des diverse particules d"air mises en mouvement par le corps sonore ... 
peut-etre a Finfini ... [T]ous les hommes de Yunivers prendront plaisir 
ý 
I ecouter de beaux sons. "" The familiar limitations of this appeal 
"purement physique" are then turned to in the same manner as in the 
article on 'Musique' and elsewhere, but the conclusion of his discussion 
puts the present matter extremely clearly. 
[11faut toujours dans toute imitation qu'une esp6ce de discours suppl6e ý la voix de 
la nature. Le musicien qui veut rendre du bruit par du bruit se trompe; il ne 
connoit ni le foible ni le fort de son art; il en juge sans gofit, sans lumi6res; 
apprenez-lui qu'il doit rendre du bruit par du chant, que s'iI faisoit croasser des 
grenouilles il faudroit qu'il les fit chanter; car il ne suffit pas qu'iI imite, il faut qu'il 
touche et qu'il plaise, sans quoi sa maussade imitation West rien, et ne donnant 
d'int6rest ý personne, elle ne fait nulle impression. 400 
just as presence in language required the skill of the narrator, so too 
does imitation in music rely on the inventiveness of the musician. 
Imitation is play within the laws of musical sound, regardless of 
whether these laws are naturally or conventionally derived. And 
imitation, as skilful play within the laws of nature: what was this but 
300 Essai, OC V, p. 415. 
400 OCV, p. 417. 
The Ethics and Aesthetics of Presence - 198- 
The Morality of Musical Imitation 
Rousseau's account of the origin of human consciousness and the 
possibility of presence? 
Even in the crucial passage in the Essai in which it is shown that 
musical imitation derives from presence, Rousseau cannot keep himself 
from excluding purely instrumental music: 'on ne peut entendre ni chant 
ni simphonie sans se dire a Finstant; un autre etre sensible est ici. '101 The 
apparent castigation of purely instrumental music offered in the 
Dictionnaire article on the 'Sonate", undertaken in the guise of a citation 
of Fontenelle's famous question 'Sonate, que me veux-tu?, seems 
-'clandestinely', as Derrida put it, in fact to identify its secret strength as 
the posing of a question that cannot immediately, nor ever, be 
answered. 
Rousseau's origin, understood as the structure of the credible 
perception of the presence of the other, owes its normative status to an 
aesthetic good. This aesthetic good, in turn, owes its sustenance to the 
moral good that it provokes. The literal truth of the words is at no point 
appealed to except in so far as they prompt us to assess whether our 
pity is appropriately elicited. Indeed it is this, at times, that seems to 
constitute the basis for Rousseau"s continuing investment in the idea of 
music: music obliterates the appeal to literal truth because there is none 
to be found there; and in this sense, it can only, for Rousseau, be good 
for language. 
Taking Rousseau"s conception of presence as the moment of aesthetic 
force, and his conception of the good of presence in the moral good 
demanded by this force, one surely must need to revise many of the 
conclusions he draws from his story about music and language and the 
regressive loss of force observable in the history of each - the category 
of the voice, most particularly, loses the priority which his music- 
theoretical writing seeks to preserve for it - but there seems little sense 
in which the structure is itself irreparably compromised. Rousseau"s 
4010C V, p. 421 (my emphasis), cited above, p. 168. For an account specifically 
directed towards the problem of purely instrumental music in Rousseau, see 
Dammann (2005). 
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account therefore meets Diderot's, in Le Neveu de Rameau, head on. The 
moral fault of the Nephew"s orchestral mime lies, not in its attempt to 
substitute gesture for musical sound, but in the lack of credibility of the 
other which his ironised and boundless mimicry also plays out. What 
for Diderot was the source of ridicule is, for Rousseau, the source of 
shame. The myth of presence, and the attempt to reconstitute it in the 
musical and linguistic systems culture hands down to us, is one that it is 
morally vital to keep alive, since it is from the credible perception of the 
other's being present to us in the signifying medium that we owe, for 
Rousseau, our being human. That is to say, it is to the myth of presence 
that we owe our ability to think, to question, to judge, and to act freely. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Even though Rousseau's analysis of the origin, and the concurrent 
account of the origin and relevance of aesthetic and moral experience 
that we have drawn from it, cannot support the stylistic prescriptions 
and modal distinctions proffered in the Essai and Dictionnaire, it is 
nonetheless still a model of enormous significance both to the history of 
music theory and, more importantly for my purposes here, to our 
understanding of music as a human institution. His account offers us a 
powerful model by which to affirm the value of music in which a 
credible other is present. - For this credible other to be present means, 
more or less, simply that the music is such as to avoid decoding into a 
system of 'certain rapports' in which the aesthetic and moral spheres 
may become redundant. Construing his account of musical imitation in 
the way our account of the article on -Musique" seemed to lead us - that 
is, in construing presence as an indissoluble signifier thus prompting 
moral or quasi-moral intellectual activity - does provide a way of 
authenticating what is held to be good music (that which is necessarily 
itself) in moral terms. Rousseau"s prejudice against non-vocal music 
and painting simply derives from the fact that Rousseau finds these 
display a tendency to lack for him what vocal music offers. They tend 
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to become transparent, to resolve into a closed system, too quickly; but 
the fault of this lies with the skill of their practitioners and with 
Rousseau's own taste, nurtured, as the Confessions told us, in the church 
of Saint Chrysostome: 402nothing, after all, calls one to attention quite 
like the high register of a soprano. Perhaps the reason, then, for 
Rousseau"s secrecy in his report of that musical conversion was simply 
that he wanted to indicate the generality of his example? Perhaps he 
was simply referring to the idea of good music? 
402See the discussion in Chapter 1, pp. 82-5. 
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PYGMALION AND THE UNCOVERING OF ART 
A. THE ORIGIN OF ART 
The scene by the well also contains a description of the origin of art. By 
the pure crystal of the water, art is bom as the arabesque of love, an 
ornament to the origin of language: Ta se firent les premieres fetes, les 
pieds bondissoient de joye... La fut enfin le vrai berceau des peuples, et 
du pur cristal des fontaines sortirent les premiers feux de Yamour. -'403 
The first art was opera, music, language and dance all united in the 
expression and ornamentation of the figure of love. 
As we saw in our discussion of this passage, the origin, valorised and 
stretched in a manner that was found to be both necessary and 
impossible, concludes with a closure of the heart; the singers and actors 
go back, as it were, to the needs-oriented humdrum of their daily lives, 
drawing water for life rather than love. In his description of the origin 
in the second Discours, the operatic arts are given a less optimistic gloss, 
not as the flowering of love but as the first growth of 'amour-propre", or 
the false pride that derives from incorporating others' awareness of us 
into our self-image. 404 
On s'accoutum5t ý s'assembler devant les Cabanes ou autour d'un grand Arbre: le 
chant et la danse, vrais enfans de I'amour et du loisir, devinrent I'amusement ou 
plCit6t Foccupation des hommes et des fernmes oisifs et attroup6s. Chacun 
commenýa ý regarder les autres et ý vouloir kre regard6 soi-m&me, et Yestime 
publique eut un prix. Celui qui chantoit ou dansoit le mieux; le plus beau, le plus 
fort, le plus adroit ou le plus 6loquent devint le plus consid6r6, et ce fut 1ý le 
403Essai, OC V, pp. 406. See above, p. 188. 
404 My thesis has not given an account of the crucial concept of 'amour-propre' in 
Rousseau's thought. The idea may be understood simply, however, as a perversion of 
the self-love coextensive with the natural instinct for self-preservation. The perversion 
is accounted for by the functioning of such self-love in the social sphere where the 
subject's desires including those concerning his sense of his own good, are 
unregulated by the economy of pity. For an excellent account of amour-propre in 
Rousseau, see O'Hagan (1997). 
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premier pas vers Yin6galit6, et vers le vice en m6me tems: de ces premi&res 
pr6f6rences n5quirent d'un c6t6 la vanit6 et le m6pris, de Fautre la honte et Venvie; 
et la fermentation caus6e par ces nouveaux levains produisit enfin des compos6s 
funestes au bonheur et ý Finnocence . 405 
Here, art occurs not as the flowering of love but as the inverse of that 
origin in the figure of a self-love unconstrained by the economy of pity. 
In both accounts, the origin of art occurs as an expression of the being of 
the community. But where the bonds of the community in the Essai are 
those of love, those of the community in the Discours are alienation. 406 
The first witnesses the harmony in the barely perceptible but established 
difference between self-love and the general good of mankind; the 
second witnesses the irrevocable establishment of the same difference, 
but the mismatch clashes in an ugly dissonance. Just as the origin of 
language "always already, as Derrida put it, contains the seeds of its 
degeneration, so too the origin of art has this Janus face. 
This ambiguity at the centre of Rousseau"s concept of art accounts for 
the ambivalence of his treatment of the subject. The basis of this lies in 
the idea that the aesthetic experience central to art is divorced from its 
connection with moral reality, a connection which, as we saw earlier in 
the chapter, is a function of the origin of the aesthetic. Throughout 
Rousseau's work, there are two distinct themes concerning this 
separation in art of the aesthetic and the moral. The first centres on the 
fact that, although the imitative and dramatic arts do have ostensible 
moral content - in depicting, for example, virtuous heroes and moral 
dilemmas - the process by which we identify with the characters or 
concepts represented is that of pity. However, in exercising this pity 
they only succeed in betraying it: the purely passive role of the listener 
or viewer removes from them the possibility and responsibility of 
405Discoiirs sur 1'ziiýgalW, OC 111, p. 169-70. 
406See the development of this idea in the Lettre ý d'Aleiiibert, esp OC IV, p. 16: 'L'on 
croit s'assembler au Spectacle, et Cest 1, ý que chacun s'isole; c'est 
Iý qu'on va oublier ses 
amis, ses voisins, ses proches, pour s'int6resser 
ý des fables, pour pleurer les malheurs 
des morts, ou rire aux d6pends des vivans. ' 
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undertaking the corresponding moral action. 407 This (moral) danger of 
the aestheticisation of reality at the expense of morality is the one we 
glimpsed in the discussion of Le Neveu de Rameau. Rousseau's own 
fiction of aestheticisation - his 'scene lyrique" Pygmalion - will be the 
subject of the remainder of this chapter. 
The second theme concerns the positive effect that (purely) aesthetic 
experience may have on the subject in developing the kind of faculties 
required for engagement in moral reality. Thus although the 
condemnation of 'mere' taste is a common theme throughout Rousseau, 
he nonetheless considers the cultivation of artistic tastes essential for the 
very subject - namely 
tmile 
- he wishes to isolate from the alienating 
forces of an aestheticised and immoral society. After a discussion of our 
modem enslavement to the realm of taste, in which it is implied that 
this enslavement is the result of forgetting the moral element, he asks 
what kind of society of taste he should introduce tmile to as part of his 
aesthetic education. 
Si pour cultiver le gofit de mon disciple j'avois ý choisir entre des pays oil cette 
culture est encore ý naitre et d'autres oii elle auroit d6ja d6g6n6r6, je suivrois Yordre 
r6trograde, je commencerois sa tourn6e par ces derniers et je finirois par les 
premiers. La raison de ce choix est que le goýit se corrompt par une d6licatesse 
excessive qui rend sensible ý des choses que le gros des hommes Wapperýoit pas: 
cette d6licatesse m&ne 6 Yesprit de discussion, car plus on subtilise les objets plus ils 
se multiplient... On peut apprendre ý penser dans les lieux oii le mauvais gofit 
r&gne; mais il ne faut pas penser comme ceux qui ont ce mauvais gofit... 11 faut 
perfectioner par leurs soins Finstrurnent qui juge en 6vitant de Femployer comme 
eux. je me garderai de polir le jugement d'Emile jusqu'A Yalt6rer, et quand il aura 
le tact ass6s fin pour sentir et comparer les divers gouts des hommes Cest sur des 
objets plus simples que je le ram6nerai fixer le sien. 408 
407This account of the 'perversion' of pity is a central feature of Rousseau's Lettre ý 
d'Alcii&ert. In the Lettre, where Rousseau's argument is nominally directed towards 
advising the city of Geneva to resist building a theatre, he suggests an alternative in 
which the spectators are part of the spectacle; a form of art, that is to say, very similar 
to the origin described in the Essaiin terms of the expression of being in a community. 
See the Lettre, OC V, pp. 109-11 ]. 'The perversion of pity'is Philip Robinson's phrase. 
See his chapter on 'Theatre, or the perversion of pity' in Robinson (1984), pp. 125-165. 
408 OC IV, p. 074. 
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This is a curious passage, and Rousseau's choice for Emile would have 
surprised most of his contemporary readers. The message, however, is 
clear. Despite the fact that aesthetic taste permits of no rules 1 4014 there is 
still a sense in which we can render our tastes accountable to ourselves 
in a way that is commensurate with the partly indeterminate nature of 
moral concepts . 41 1 This project - which is as much a moral one as it is 
aesthetic in tmile - is what he has in mind for the pupil. However, 
Rousseau explicitly states that this process of rendering taste 
accountable requires beforehand a submission to the tastes of others so 
that we can develop our aesthetic sensibility. For it is only in doing so - 
only in becoming able to 'subtilise[r] les objets" and discussing them - 
that we can acquire a sensibility more in line with the taste for 
simplicity that Rousseau thinks it preferable to have. Now the question 
of whether Rousseau feels that his own is justifiable in this way is not 
important here. What is important is that this taste - the taste that we 
feel we can justify to ourselves - only comes through the practice of 
aesthetic experience. Only in doing so can we perfect the instrument of 
judgement. 
It is clear, both from the text and the context, that Rousseau's 
connotation in his account of the aesthetic education of Emile is a moral 
one. The aesthetic case provides a model for the pattern of discernment 
and judgement that the student will have to go through in order to 
become a responsible moral agent. To arrive at the moral one must 
subject the 'moeurs' to critical interpretation, and one can only do this 
by participating in the customary and habitual framework in which 
moral and aesthetic consciousness is regulated. And the only way in 
which such critical access is provided is by reference to the physical 
manifestations of such consciousness: these must be present in order for 
the work of interpretation to take place. 
409 An eighteenth-century orthodoxy which has its most profound culmination 
in Kant. 
See also Rousseau's further discussion of this in Eim1c, 
OC IV, pp 672: '1] ne faut pas 
disputer des gouts. ' 
110 See mv discussion of this above, p. 186. 
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The question of an aesthetics in which moral, other-directed 
sentiments are the primary model thus comes into focus as the ground 
of that process in which the perception of moral need for action comes 
to be both felt and understood to be credible. Aesthetics here can be 
understood as the distinctive sphere in which certain objects are felt to 
be good in a way that cannot simply be reduced to the'good for" of 
utility concepts. The work of interpretation which seeks somehow to 
understand this mysterious irreducibility of the aesthetic good is thus 
the same work involved in the attempt to translate the moral reality of 
the aesthetic object (its representation, that is, of the other in a credible 
form) into intelligible terms. It thus seeks to restore a connection 
between the order of the rational and the order of moral sentiment, a 
connection, that is, which is coterminous with the origin of the moral 
sphere itself and its production of a rational, comparative faculty. The 
origin, in other words, with which aesthetic interpretation can be said to 
reconnect us, is that very origin, the "premiere sentimen de Mumanite', 
in which desire for the other finds its physical manifestation in the 
aesthetic sign, a sign which though in many ways inexplicable still 
nonetheless entails a mode of access in which its credibility can 
somehow be determined. 
This account of our engagement with the aesthetic sphere indexes the 
importance of our considerations, given in Chapter 2, of the idea of 
necessary signs. In the absence of any evident moral content for a given 
aesthetic perception, it is this sense of the aesthetic sign's necessity that 
accounts for the continuation of the percipient"s engagement with the 
aesthetic sphere. On a Rousseauan account, the reason for this is that 
the sign requires this perceptible necessity in imitating the vocal sign C3 - 
that is its original model: the "cri naturel" which, in accordance with the 
equilibrium of nature, necessarily takes the perceptual form it does. The 
sense of necessity is that, which as we saw in the first section of the 
present chapter, underscores the credibility of the other's presence in 
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the musical sign and prevents it from collapsing into a system of 
determinate 'certains rapports. 111 
After Le Devin du Village of 1752, Rousseau did not compose another 
opera. 412 He did, however, compose a work which inaugurated the 
genre of melodrama. The 1762 text for the "scene lyrique" Pygmalion, "' 
one of the first products of Rousseau"s period in exile, dramatises the 
story of the legendary artist whose sculpture of the nymph Galath6e 
comes to life. The framework in which I would like to proffer a reading 
of this text is that of the problematics of art as an expression of both 
communal and personal desire. As Rousseau"s dual origin of art shows, 
while artistic practice occurs as the expression of community, it is also 
'always already' the symptom of the fracturing of that community in 
witnessing the separation of self-interest from species-interest. The 
problem of the indissoluble autonomy of personal taste thus testifies to 
the alienation of the individual from the interests of his community. 
And yet, such taste, born of love, has as its object the obliteration of just 
this alienation; the desire immanent in art is directed towards re-forging 
the forgotten bonds of community. The raison d"etre of art lies in its 
attempt to provide the image of a state of being in community, a 
replication of the state which ought to be but is not; and the central 
problem of art thus conceived lay in the question of how this ought to be 
might be authenticated. 
Pygmalion concludes with another retelling of the origin of language. 
As the statue steps down from her pedestal, her coming into life is 
signified not by movement but by speech. Her words, however, which 
411 This sense of necessity, as an imitation of the original sign, accounts for the one area 
of Rousseau's work in which his historiography of artistic practice has an optimistic 
element, namely the article on'Op6ra' in the Dictionnaire, pp. 948-962. For an account 
of this important article in which the redemptive element is in 
focus, see O'Dea (1995), 
pp. 61-8. For a more general exploration of the redemptive potential of music 
in 
Rousseau, see Simon (2005). 
412Some experiments in this area, however, were attempted with one of 
his 
increasingly few friends in his final years, Eduard de Corancez. See Corancez (1798) 
for an account of these. 
413The text \,,, as intended to be set to music. The music was written, mostly 
by the 
Lyonnais composer Horace Coignet, in 1770. 
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appear to express her awareness of herself as distinct from her creator, 
conclude with a curious inversion of Rousseau"s originary speech-song. 
Rather than singing her being into presence, she announces its fading 
with a sigh: 'Galathee avec un soupir - "'Ah! Encore moi. - 
"414 
B. DIGRESSION: THE "CRI DE LA NATURE" AND THE'SOUPIR' 
As the term in French for a crotchet rest, "soupir" has a distinct 
advantage over the English term in that it supplements the negative 
sense of the absence of motion or 'rest" with a positive emotional 
connotation: a sigh is positively expressive where "rest' Suggests the 
absence of expression. As if purposefully reflecting the well-established 
understanding that durations of silence within a musical line or work 
do have positive expressive value, "soupir" appears to demand audience 
in a way that "rest' does not. This positive value is of course 
compromised by the fact that the rest must be configured in the context 
of a musical continuity, but in this case the element of compromise is no 
greater than, and arguably little different from, that which characterises 
the sounded durations which we call notes. For the 'soupir' to register, 
in other words, it must have a rapport within the intentional structure 
of which it forms a part, just as the notes themselves must also. And so 
to speak of the expressive value of both the note and the rest implies 
that this value is negative in so far as it arises largely from its occurrence 
within a field of other occurrences to which it relates somewhere on a 
scale between the same and the different. 
Beyond this similarity between the rest and the note, where both can 
be understood as events within a system of musical difference, one may 
say that a sound is understood to be something in itself in a way that 
rest is not. In so far as it is more 'in the world' in a way in which the 
absence of sound is not - in terms of perceivable properties, a sound 
positively is some thing - of the two the sounded note would appear to 
414 PlIgIlItIll'oll, ()C 11, P. 1231. 
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possess a greater degree of positivity. If we recall our discussion in the 
previous section of the particular kind of status that Rousseau imparts 
to sound as something of which we can be aware even when its 
occurrence has no origin within our world expressed as self-interest, the 
distinction between the rest and the sounded note can be drawn in 
terms of the latter's possession of a greater degree of rapport beyond the 
signifying structure of which it forms a part. 
Within the musical structure, this "rapport beyond', or rapport au-delý 
as I shall henceforth refer to it, is of course barely appreciable except in 
cases where particular musical events employed within the differential 
structure seem to exceed its resources. 415 In such cases one may speak of 
the rapport au-delý replacing the rapports en-deqý, but this replacement 
is necessarily exceptional. 416 In fact it is most proper to speak of musical 
events being characterised by a supplementary relationship between the 
en-deqý and the au-deM, and to speak within this supplementary 
framework of the difference between sounded notes and rests as being 
characterised by the quality of au-deM being more prominent in the 
former. 417 The degree of compromised positivity would thus appear to 
be greater in the case of a musical event characterised by the term 
-'soupir" than in the sounded note. 
The situation is reversed, however, when we exchange the musical 
context of 'soupir' for its quotidian sense of "sigh". As we remarked at 
the beginning, a sigh positively has emotional content. By this we mean 
not just that the term "sigh' or "soupir' refers to something understood to 
have emotional content, in which case it is no different from other terms 
415Speaking of such cases inevitably brings a further complexity, the nature of which 
we can hint at by observing that extended silence during a piece of music is just as 
much 'excessive' in this sense as an excessive noise event. 
416 In the sense that for a differential structure to be such, it must consist primarily of 
rapports eii-(k, (a. The choice of French terminology for the two paradigmatic 
relationships of 'beyond' and 'within' is made partly for economy. 
My use of them 
derives from their function in Emmanuel Levinas (1984). 
417 'Supplement' here is used in Derrida's sense of the term, where what is 
supplemented is added to but is never in fact completely replaced so much as 
hidden 
from view by a transformation of its apparent structure. 
See Derrida (1976), esp. pp. 
141 ff, and pp. 195ff. 
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with emotional significance, but that the sigh itself as a sonorous and 
bodily event can be understood as a symptomatic expression of an 
emotional state in a way that conventional terms cannot. As an 
utterance that arises from a certain situation, a certain kind of 
relationship between the person who sighs and the world within which 
she exists, the sigh is something that is neither chosen, intended nor 
performed: its utterance is both involuntary and the form of its 
utterance is necessarily itself. 
In this way we can speak of the sigh as being something more 
positively in itself than a word. Just as a musical sound is something 
more in itself than the absence of musical sound, so too by contrast the 
sigh is less contingent, less qualitatively arbitrary, than the word, 
because its utterance points primarily to itself as qualitatively 
something in itself, something there in the world. Should this not be the 
case, then the sigh ceases to be itself. It becomes instead a conventional 
term, an utterance, that is, which is chosen as something that refers to 
something else. For the ontology of the conventional sign is defined 
negatively, its being consisting primarily in its differential relation to 
other signs with which its discursive environment is structured . 41 1 For 
this reason, conventional terms can never be fully themselves in the way 
that the sigh is, simply, necessarily itself. 
In terms of the previous discussion, the sigh is therefore something in 
which the latent au-deM of the discursive event is more prominent. 
Within a discursive structure such as a spoken sentence, the occurrence 
of a sigh is 'excessive" in pointing to itself at the expense of the more 
conventional signs pointing primarily to each other. And in pointing to 
itself in this way it is excessive in that it points beyond the sentence qua 
discourse to something beyond it: towards, in this instance, the physical 
418 The arbitrary nature of the sign is fundamental for both Rousseau's understanding 
of linguistic communication and for Saussurian and post-Saussurian linguistics. The 
arbitrary nature of a sign, where we understand an object to be arbitrary by virtue of 
its being replaceable by another object that would fulfil the same function, is 
considered to be the means by which language is able to do its work of meaning. For a 
commentary on this, and on Rousseau's relationship with Saussure in this connection, 
see Derrida (1982), pp. 137-1,55. 
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presence of the speaker. As a sonorous event, it demands the hearer to 
interest him or herself in the speaker as the (bodily) origin of the 
sentence. To speak therefore of the occurrence of a sigh as a sign is to 
speak of the sign that is necessarily itself, or the sign that is original and 
whose expression precedes the conventional apparatus characteristic of 
signifying systems in general. The sigh exceeds itself qua sign. 
Irreducible to the negative principle of difference which governs the 
ontology of conventional signs, the sigh"s (comparative) ontological 
positivity supplements this principle of difference with its irreconcilable 
otherness to this principle. Necessarily itself, it is for this reason 
essentially au-dela. 
In this play of positive and negative, the soupir may in turn be 
considered as the negative of the 'cri de la nature" constitutive of 
Rousseau"s origin of language and music. As we saw, the experience of 
the demand of otherness in the cri was understood to be central to 
Rousseau"s conception of the original sign as a moment, or movement, 
of opening the closed structure of rapport en-dqý that characterised pre- 
social consciousness. The otherness disclosed by the cri in this original 
context, its appearing as au-delý, however, was understood to be 
contingent on the percipient"s having already acquired a sense of 
otherness, some sense of other interests beyond the sphere of his world 
expressed as self-interest. 
The circularity of this situation, which as we saw was one that 
confronted Rousseau in his work on originS, 419 presents an intractable 
problem while we remain with an historical or pseudo-historical model 
of emerging from the state of nature. The advantage of Rousseau"s 
cautions in respect of the state of nature as a kind of 'necessary fiction 1420 
is that we can stop asking how the emergence from the state of nature 
occurred and simply take the fractured nature of human consciousness 
as our starting-point. The state of nature is not so much that which 
necessarily has been as that which necessarily ought to be. For the 
41P See above, p. 175. 
420See above, p. 55. 
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simple reason that it provides a model in wl-dch there ceases to be a 
distinction between an "ought' and an "is", the fiction of the state of 
nature is that which provides for us the concept of necessity itself. 
Following this reversal of focus from a past utopia to a future one, 
Rousseau's focus on the cri as the ground of language is subject to the 
same reversal. Rousseau"s intention had been to establish the cri as that 
which is repeated into language: in the temporal axis of the signifying 
chain whose importance Rousseau"s proto-linguistics did so much to 
establish, the cri was supposed to be that which is not a repetition but is 
purely itself. The problem here, of course, was that it is precisely this 
lack of a prior referent on the temporal axis, this lack of lack, as it were, 
that prevented the cri from ever being itself fully a part of the signifying 
chain of language. However, within the signifying chain, the notion of 
the cri as the sign that is necessarily itself retains this original power: no 
longer claiming to originate or start the process of signification which 
always already must have been started, it claims instead to arrest it, to 
stop it in its tracks. It is original, then, only in the sense of coming from 
the beyond that is the unknowable before of language, and it carries this 
origin by virtue of appearing, in and of itself, to be an original sign of 
the perfect good. 
Bearing in mind this altered conception of the original sign as not so 
much a moment of passage from the state of nature to a state of being 
characterised by the lack of natural equilibrium - but rather a 
movement within a reflective consciousness already established as that 
very lack of natural equilibrium - we can posit a difference between the 
cri as the catalyst of natural sympathy within the state of nature - the cri 
en-de(ý - and the cri au-dela that acts as the catalyst for the moral 
emotion of pity. Natural sympathy being one of the mechanisms by 
which the species controls its own equilibrium, the call comes only from 
within as a rapport eiz-dqý. The cri au-deM, by contrast, presupposes on 
the part of the percipient an awareness of the otherness of the interests 
the caller. The cri au-dM no longer claims to bring us back into an equal 
community of being together. Rather, its power comes from its calling 
us to a place, or a state of being, where the uncertainty of alienated 
. 
ýniahon and the Uncovering of Art Elie Ethics and Aesthetics of Presence Pl/, II 
being is eclipsed by the implicit certainty of the equal community. The 
cri au-delý, Rousseau's original sign, is the event in which the experience 
of pity is encapsulated as the play of sameness in otherness and 
otherness within sameness. The sameness of the cri lies in the quality of 
the sound: it is the sound that we make necessarily and involuntarily in 
the experience of failing to be ourselves. The otherness lies in its 
origination from beyond the hearer's immediate sphere of awareness. 
The experience of pity in the cri au-delý not only provides the terms of 
our relationship with others, but also presents this relationship in terms 
of a desire for what ought to be: namely, the sense of unquestionable 
trustworthiness of belief that characterises the epistemic and moral 
certainty of being in the equal community. 
Like the cri, the soupir registers as the utterance of the caller failing to 
be himself, or being in a state of desiring to which it is not equal. But in 
so far as the soupir is qualitatively different to the word in its being more 
positively in itself, more au-delý, it also differs qualitatively to the cri in 
being in many respects its negative. Just as we considered the musical 
rest to be the absence of the note, so too the soupir can be considered as 
the absence of the cri: its sound does not carry and does not escape the 
scene of failure. Rather than translating as 'I am here, help me, love 
me', the soupir is instead the impossibility of this saying. It translates as 
"I am nearly not here, beyond help, beyond love'. A negative cri, the 
sound of the soupir has no 'body, but is instead the dern ier soupir of the 
body passing beyond desire to rest. 
In so far as the cri is understood to bring the caller into presence, and 
thus provided the locus for the hearer"s orientation in desiring the good 
of us, this presence is denied by the soupir, whose body is that which is 
passing out of presence to absence. Thus the soupir is something whose 
source must be provided by the hearer even though its essential 
necessity remains intact. The cri au-Ma, even though it originates as a 
sign of the other, nonetheless brings with it the promise of legitimating 
and grounding our pity in its disclosure of presence; it suggests, that is 
to say, a course of action bound by the morality of the equal community 
it seeks to restore. The souj)ir, by contrast, rescinds this promise; its call 
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suggests only the failure of this community to be equal to itself. The 
soupir, in its irrevocable obliteration of its source, is to be understood as 
the origin of art. 
C. PYGMALION: THE SCENE 
Rousseau's Pygmalion is an example of that particular kind of artwork 
devoted to considering its own nature, a work of art about the work of 
art. The self-reflexive scene is set in Pygmalion-s workshop. In our first 
encounter with the artist, however, he is not at work. In fact, we meet 
him in a situation of creative paralysis. The severity and import of this 
failure of the artist to do his work we can surmise from the implications 
of the sculptor"s legendary status. The ancient setting is one, for 
Rousseau, in which the artist is in full command of his material: the 
modem divisions between form and intention are minimised in 
antiquity, and an artist knows what he says and is confident that he will 
be understood. On his own evidence, too, Pygmalion is at pains to 
point out to us that he has overcome all ulterior motivation - pride, 
glory, even the notion of posterity - in his creative work. 
The situation to which the audience bears witness is therefore one 
which could be described as representing the ideal environment for 
both the production and consumption of art. We understand that the 
artist does and can create great works of art, and that furthermore his 
evaluative relationship to his own works is sufficiently stable and 
confident to relieve him of any need to rely on the judgement of others 
in relating to them. The fact that the society in which his works appear 
is also confident about their greatness is hinted at but is nonetheless 
disregarded as irrelevant for Pygmalion's understanding of himself and 
his works. The drama of creative paralysis is therefore heightened by its 
occurring in the context of these assumptions of confidence, mastery 
and greatness, as we find that Pygmalion finds himself now surrounded 
by his 'chefs-d" oeuvre de la nature que mon art osoit imiter' which even 
though they were filled with the intense heat of his genius, now leave 
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him cold . 421 The claustrophobia of 
his situation catches up with him in 
the realisation that he is both unable and unwilling to leave the room - 
he cannot escape from his confrontation with his sculptures, which, now 
they are finished, he no longer desires. The reported authority of his 
evaluation of his own works seems compromised. 
There is one statue, centrally placed, and covered by a sheet, upon 
which he now fixes his attention: maybe this, his sculpture of the 
nymph Galathee, this great monument to the glory of his hands 1 422 Will 
help him recover the life of his talents. From fear, however, Pygmalion 
initially shrinks from the deed of exposing the sculpture, but then 
convinces himself by appealing to the fact that all he will uncover is his 
working material: Vest une pierre; Cest ton ouvrage. Qu'importe? On 
sert des Dieux dans nos temples qui ne sont pas d'une autre matiere et 
qui Wont pas ete faits d'une autre main' . 421 Regrouping, he uncovers the 
statue, exclaims that he has surpassed the beauty of the Gods. Still, 
however, Pygmalion perceives a fault: the statue is yet still covered for 
him, clothed in an illusory cloth of his own making. He moves to carve 
away the clothing that obscures the full glorious nudity of the object, 
chips a small piece, but then recoils in horror: "Dieux! je sense la chair 
palpitante repousser le ciseau! ". 424 Recovering his senses, as it were, 
Pygmalion then decides that the appearance of living flesh is simply the 
result of the trembling of his now mal-assured hands, and that this 
uncertainty of touch stems from his almost instinctive sense that the 
statue is fact already complete: he cannot or must not touch that which 
is already perfect. The statue lacks nothing. 'Mais il te manque une 
ame ... 
Que Yame faite pour animer un tel corps doit &re belle! '. 425 
Pygmalion thus falls in love. Can he really be in love with a statue? 
No, it is not the statue which he loves, but a living being which the 
421 OC 11, p. 1225. This opposition of cold and hot oscillates through the text as a 
destabilising force. 
4-22 OC 11, p. 1225. 
423 OC 11, p. 1226. 
414 OC II/ p. 1227. 
4-25 OC 11, p. 1227. 
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statue represents. But since there is nothing there but stone, Pygmalion 
decides that he must be in love with himself. If only the statue were 
alive, then he would love not himself but her. He reflects upon the 
injustice of the human condition, on the unreachable quality of any 
object worthy of his love. All he has is this stone. If only it were alive. 
He appeals to the Goddess of love to free him from this state and inject 
her 'chaleur vivifiante" into the statue: 'Tous tes feux sont concentres 
dans mon coeur et le froid de la mort reste sur ce marbre; je peris par 
1'exces de vie qui lui manque... Deesse de la beaute, epargne cet affront 
I a la nature, qu'un si parfait mode'le soit Vimage de ce qui West pas'. 
426 
Attempting to come to his senses once more, Pygmalion abandons his 
fruitless prayer, and withdraws a little from the statue, resolving to cure 
himself of the folly of imagining the object of art to be susceptible of 
becoming reality: 
Je reprends mes sens... Ainsi le sentiment de notre d6pendance sert quelque-fois 
notre consolation. Quelque malheureux que soient les mortels, quand ils ont 
invoqu6 les Dieux, ils sont plus tranquilles... 
Mais cette injuste confiance trompe ceux qui font des voeux insens6s... Uespoir 
qui nous abuse est plus insens6 que le desir... 
Honteux de tant d'6garemens, je Wose plus m&me en contempler la cause. 427 
However, at the moment of this melancholy resolution, Pygmalion 
sees, or believes he sees (and we the audience share this vision), the 
statue come to life. He hears her speak, as she touches herself: "Moi. ' 
Pygmalion, transported, affirms her diagnosis: 'Moi. ' Galathee agrees: 
"Cest moi. ' Pygmalion addresses himself: "Ravissante illusion qui 
passes jusqua mes oreilles, ah! nabandonne jamais mes sens. 428 
Galathee approaches a statue, touches it - 'Ce n'est plus moi' - 
approaches Pygmalion who takes her hand, covering it with kisses and 
426 OC 11, pp. 1228-9. 
427 OC 11, p. 1229. 
428 OC 11, p. 1230. From Pygmalion's reference to his ears, rather than his eyes, as the 
perceptual field into which Galath6e's coming to 
life is manifest, xve may take it that 
Galath6e's utterance, rather than her moving around the room, is the central 
experience. 
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pressing it to his heart. At the moment of contact, or at the moment 
which the audience might assume to be that of an authentic point of 
contact with the other, Galathee confirms with a soupir, "Encore moi'. 
Pygmalion provides an enigmatic response to Galathee's sigh and the 
assertion of identity which it accompanies: 'Oui, cher et charmant objet: 
oui, digne chef-d"oeuvre de mes mains, de mon coeur et des Dieux... 
clest toi, c'est toi seule: je t'ai donne tout mon etre; je ne vivrai plus que 
par toi. "119 
D. THE GREATNESS AND FOLLY OF SOLITUDE 
As a reflection of the essential ambiguity of the aesthetic signifier, 
Galathee"s soupir is difficult to decipher. In as much as Galathee's 
speaking constitutes the sign of her being alive, and her sigh that of her 
being alive as a desiring body, the combination of the two would 
suggest a disparity between the two states, where the sigh indicates the 
preserved transcendence of her true self over her attempt to identify 
fully with her creator as 'moi'. In this respect, the sigh appears to 
present Galathee's own uncertainty about being. As to why she sighs at 
her origination of language rather than emits the traditional eighteenth- 
century "cri-, we must leave the exploration of this particular 
uncertainty until we have a better idea of what it is that Galathee is 
supposed to be. 
One clue to this we can assert beforehand: Galathee is supposed to be 
a work of art. Indeed, her being so is almost the only certainty operative 
in the text, and even this is threatened by her appearing to come to life 
at the end. 110 The assumption that follows closely from this - namely 
42') OC 11, p. 1231. 
430 In his famous reading of the text, Goethe characterises this 'threat' as a betrayal of 
art: 'We see an artist, who has achieved perfection, and yet finds no satisfaction in 
externalizing his idea according to the rules of art, granting it a higher life. No! It is 
also to be dragged down to his level into this mundane 
life. lie wants to destroy the 
highest that spirit and deed have wrought by the lowest act of sensuousness. ' Cited 
and translated in Harries (1991), pp. 33-72, p. 70. 
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that Pygmalion is an artist - is also somewhat problematic, although 
this would not appear immediately to be the case. Pygmalion's being a 
sculptor is the very first thing that would be noticed by any audience or 
reader of the work. 
Although by the time Rousseau came to write his Pygmalion there 
had been something of a tradition of adapting the myth to a theatrical 
setting, Ovid's 'original' treatment of the story would also have been 
prominent as the point of reference . 431 And by contrast with Rousseau's 
treatment (and that of most modem writers), Ovid's Pygmalion is not a 
sculptor. Rather, he becomes one during the course of his story. 
Ovid's scene, in fact, seemingly tells the story of the origin of 
sculpture. Venus, scorned by the women of the Propoetides, punishes 
them by removing their sense of shame, by taking away, that is to say, 
the virtue from beauty. In the absence of any truly beautiful (i. e. 
virtuous) woman, Pygmalion decides he should remain a bachelor. Still 
a lover at heart, however, he decides to make an image of the kind of 
woman no longer in existence in the Propoetides. He produces a 
sculpture in ivory, and Ovid comments that, 'so cleverly did his art 
conceal its art, that 'it seemed to be alive, to want to move, did not 
modesty forbid. 1432 Venus, as impressed by Pygmalion's skill as by the 
purity of his motivation, decides to reward him by bringing the statue 
to life. 
So what kind of 'origin of sculpture' is being narrated here? Clearly 
there is a sense of Pygmalion's desire for a world, at present lacking to 
him, in which virtue and beauty are conjoined, and a sense in which he 
is not complete in himself until this beautiful other is created. More 
curiously, perhaps, given that Ovid's purpose was to bring old stories 
431 Rameau's one-act opera-ballet of 1748, Pigiiiallon, is the most obvious contemporary 
point of reference, both in general terms for its being the 
first treatment of the story in 
the French music-theatrical tradition (the story had been prominent in the Italian 
tradition before that), and in particular for being by Rousseau's adversary. For a 
recent comparison of Rousseau's and Rameau's versions, see 
Court (2000), pp. 68-71. 
For a general history of the Metaiwrplioscs and 
its reception, see Hardie et al (1999). For 
a more detailed treatment of the Pygmalion story 
in particular, see Hardie (2002). 
132 Ovid (1955), p. 23 1. 
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back to life by unfolding them within a finely wrought artistic fabric, we 
are given a Roman equivalent of the aesthetics of vralsemblance, of 
artistry rendering itself invisible in the interests of being more fully 
itself. Furthermore, this facet of being more fully itself is presented, 
appropriately enough, as an excess of modesty: modesty, or virtuous 
shame, which is given as that which prevents the sculpture from coming 
to life without divine intervention, is the same virtuous shame that 
provides Pygmalion's motive for making a sculpture in the first place. 
Art's reward is therefore a simple one: it fills the lack of the virtuous 
other on condition that it is virtuously (beautifully, modestly) made and 
virtuously (beautifully, modestly) conceived. 
To be sure, this reward is situated firmly in a distant age when the 
Gods still walked the earth. 433and where, as it might be put, truth 
enjoyed worldly presence, albeit in the form of the miraculous; but the 
structure of Pygmalion's proximity to art's positive originary 
motivation towards the truly beautiful survives the translation to the 
434 Augustan setting and beyond. Consequently, art is taken in terms of 
providing its own reward, humanly modest or divinely transfigured, 
and the value (pleasure, happiness) drawn from it relates directly to the 
value (virtue, virtuosity) invested in it. 
In contrast to Ovid's Pygmalion, then, Rousseau's sculptor is not an 
/amateur' but a professional, whose first action in the drama is to take 
up the 'outils de son art" . 431 By 
'professional" I do not mean that 
Pygmalion sculpts for money, but more that his sculpting defines his 
being in its doing. As we saw, however, during the course of the 
monologue, Rousseau's Pygmalion does nothing. Moreover, this 
absence of doing comes to define his being as a sculptor who can no 
433Venus was present at Pygmalion's subsequent marriage to Galatea. Ovid's 
Mctaiiiorplioscs are set, for the most part, in the 'Age of Heroes', an age of man in 
which, though the Gods have already withdrawn from the world and gone to live in 
Heaven, they still nevertheless visit the earth from time to time. 
4,340ne of the implicit fables behind Book 1 of the Metaiiiorplioses is that the supposed 
divinity of Augustus Nvas understood to constitute something of a glorious return to 
the period when Gods still Nvalked. 
435 ()C 11, p. 122-5. 
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longer sculpt. Nor can he leave the scene of his (non-)sculpting: 
'[rletenu dans cet attelier par un charme inconcevable, je n'y sais rien 
faire, et je ne puis men eloigner. J'erre de groupe en groupe, de figure 
en figure. Mon ciseau foible, incertain, ne reconno^ 436 it plus son guide'. 
Rousseau's Pygmalion thus stands in direct opposition to Ovid's. 
Despite the fact that the former's being a sculptor is positively affirmed 
as the sine qua non of the drama, the moment of this being to which the 
audience bears witness is utterly negative: non-being (failing to be) 
defined by non-doing. Furthermore, in the sense in which the latter's 
taking up the chisel arises from a direct relationship with the motivation 
towards the truly beautiful, the former exists in a state completely 
alienated from this originary motivation: 'Tout mon feu s"est eteint, mon 
imagination s'est glacee, le marbre sort froid de mes mainS. 1437 The 
virtuous origin of sculpture which is present to Ovid's Pygmalion as 
both his motivation and reward is completely lacking to Rousseau"s, 
and his relation to his completed works comes to be defined negatively, 
variously as the drama unfolds, as uncertainty, mistrust and an 
unattainable desire 'grounded' in groundless beliefs. And to reinforce 
this sense of self-alienation, Pygmalion has hidden away his greatest 
work, of which he can still affirm that it is his 'immortel ouvrage, even 
though it stands concealed under a veil. Surely if he is in a position to 
affirm this hidden work's intrinsic excellence he should still be in touch 
with the call within himself to produce? And yet he suggests that it is 
precisely this hidden work that is preventing him from continuing in his 
doings (which is not to say that his hiding it has actually helped): 'J'ai 
craint que Yadmiration de mon propre ouvrage ne causat la distraction 
que j'apportois a mes travaux. je Fai cache sous ce voile... mes profanes 
mains ont ose couvrir ce monument de leur gloire. Depuis que je ne le 
vois plus, je suis plus triste, et ne suis pas plus attentif. " 438 
436 OC 11, p. 1225. 
437 OC 11, p. 1224. 
438 OC Ilf p. 1225 . 
..... here represents an actual caesura in the text, not an elision in m-" 
quotation. 
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As it turns out, however, it is precisely Pygmalion's mastery in this 
respect - his previously unquestioned and autonomous power to affirm 
the work's intrinsic excellence - that is the source, if not of the problem 
in its entirety, then at least of its claustrophobic intensity: he cannot 
leave the workshop because his being, expressed either as doing or non- 
doing, is entirely restricted to that location. In a statement which 
resonates strongly with the project of self-justification that characterises 
Rousseau's autobiographical mode, Pygmalion declares his voluntary 
alienation from society to be the means to achieving a self- accountable 
or authentic system of values through which his motivation towards the 
beautiful and the good can take objective form. 
Tyr, ville opulente et superbe, les monuments des arts dont tu brilles ne m'attirent 
plus, j'ai perdu le gofit que je prenois ý les admirer: le commerce des Artistes et des 
Philosophes me devient insipide; Ventretien des Peintres et des Poiýtes est sans 
attrait pour moi; la louange et la gloire n'61event plus mon ame; les 6loges de ceux 
qui en recevront de la post6rit6 ne me touchent plus; Vamiti6 m6me a perdu pour 
moi ses charmeS. 431) 
Although alienated from Ovid's virtuous origin of art, Rousseau's 
Pygmalion seems to have made a virtue out of art itself. In this he 
mimics his precursor's withdrawal from the world of false values by 
doing so, in the interests not of the preservation of his good self, but in 
those of becoming a good artist. He wants to create rather than 
procreate, as it were. 
Only in the closing remark about friendship does Rousseau disclose 
the lonely truth that underwrites the life-project of rendering one's 
values - that is, one's structure of 
beliefs about desirable objects - fully 
accountable to oneself: the voluntary alienation in the interests of 
knowing the good leads to a state of involuntary alienation in which the 
world of others has lost all its attraction, all its power to move. 
Friends, 
despite their very possibly good intentions, do not emerge as the work 
430 ()C 11, pp. 1224-5. 
-1 
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of his own hands, as that whose goodness he can account for, and have 
no value for him. 
In other respects, Pygmalion"s self-affirmation as true artist, true 
author of the object of his desire, is little different to the more 
immediately personal confession made in Rousseau's Preface to the 
another of his Ovidian theatrical conceptions, Narcisse. 
J'avoue qu'il ya quelques g6nies sublimes qui savent pen6trer ý travers les voiles 
dont la v6rit6 s'enveloppe, quelques ames privil6gi6es, capables de r6sister ý la 
b6tise de la vanit6, a la basse jalousie, et aux autres passions qu'engendre le gofit 
des lettres. Le petit nombre de ceux qui ont le bonheur de r6unir ces qualit6s, est la 
lumi6re et Fhonneur du genre humain ... S'il reste quelque difficult6 ý ma 
justification, Yose le dire hardiment, ce West vis-6-vis ni du public ni de mes 
adversaires; c'est vis-ý-vis de moi seul: car ce West qu'en m'obseirvant moi-m&me 
que Je puis Juger si je dois me compter dans le petit nombre, et si mon ame est en 
6tat de soutenir le faix des exercises litt6raireS. 440 
The brave ('j'ose le dire hardiment) face that Rousseau here puts on his 
lonely project of becoming solitary, and the strongly affirmative mode 
that dominates the Preface to Narcisse throughout, becomes, in 
Pygmalion, simply one of a number of polar oppositions struggling for 
affirmation in a work where all affirmation seems to be immediately 
destabilised. Thus the systematic negation of the original virtuous 
motivation of Ovid's sculptor is thereby seen to have been arrived at 
simply through a series of repetitions from illusion to disillusion and 
back again. Pygmalion's genius for making sculptures has become its 
own self-fulfilling beginning and end to the act of sculpting as the 
sequence of failures (Galatea, upon her completion, failing to be what 
she ought to be) to maintain the illusion of the artwork itself being that 
other. And this self-fulfilment in genius and its acts of material 
expression has more or less completely effaced the origin of artistic 
genius in the virtuous desire for another virtuous being. Desiring what 
ought to be where this 'ought' is required to be self-authored and fully 
440Pr6face to Narcissc, OC 11, pp. 970 & 972. Rousseau's Preface is dated 17/52, but the 
text of the play itself dates from considerably earlier. See OC 11, pp. 1858-1865. 
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accountable to his own understanding, Pygmalion essentially cuts 
himself off from the possibility of experiencing what art ought to have 
been, namely the representation of the virtuous other. In other words, 
Pygmalion's pathological focus on the ought to be of his works is 
precisely that which prevents them being, for him, what they ought to 
be: namely, other. His insight to this state of affairs is why, in falling in 
love with the statue, he is so quick to conclude he must be in love with 
himself. 
Of course, Rousseau leaves some possibility of moving forward 
dramatically from this impasse in the suggestion that the statues 
Pygmalion now surveys were merely steps on the path to true 
greatness. The original hope of doing sculpture, in other words, 
remains intact. But the irreconcilable framework of the 'ought' that has 
only one author and one judge remains as the both the beginning and 
the end of the drama, monitoring the dialectical adventure with the 
unanswered question: can the self produce its other at the same time as 
holding its value accountable to itself? 
All attention, Pygmalion's and the audience's, turns to the veiled 
object where this 'true greatness' might lie. That 'true greatness' - 
which the audience cannot fail to understand as the monologue 
continues in its exploration of existential uncertainty - proves subject to 
precisely the same absence of positive affirmation: the object of desire 
remains hidden, as it is bound to do in art, disappearing from view with 
Galathee's final soupir. 
E. THE DRAMATISATION OF UNCERTAINTY 
In as much as Pygmalion has the work of art as its subject, as an artwork 
itself it also reflects the negative being of art in its own structure. The 
existential uncertainty, typical of the indeterminate demand implicit in 
aesthetic experience, operates at all levels of the dramatic material. This 
is enacted through the representation of alternating emotional states. 
These are represented (imitated), variously, in the language through 
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which the hero discloses how he is feeling at various moments, in the 
nature of things in which his disquiet finds root, in the claustrophobia in 
which the hero first establishes the degree of his alienation from society 
as something positive, only to undermine any sense of the worth of this 
condition by gradually revealing the degree of his alienation from 
himself. As the emotional imagery moves from external description 
(hot, cold) to internal (ironie amere", "exces d"accablement'), the 
progress of the drama is to be understood in terms of the continual 
transformation of the representation of uncertainty, and not of any 
overcoming of this uncertainty. 
This dramatisation of uncertainty is, fittingly, presented in a genre 
which, as its inherent modesty became more culturally desirable, came 
to be called 'melodrama. 441 One of the fundamental principles of this 
genre is the apparent abnegation of any desire to present its dramatic 
material as fully integrated. The music and the text are not allowed to 
participate simultaneously in the action as if the efficacy of even this 
ancient and hallowed means of dramatic representation is questioned. 
In short, the whole drama resonates almost violently with the 
uncertainty whose nature it is the object of the work to represent. 
And yet, the work presents itself as one of so unassuming a nature 
that this violent resonating is curtailed even before it has had a chance 
to do much resonating in the audience. Pygmalion is, and has often been 
taken as being"442 something of a ditty; and though we may greet its 
441 Pyginalion is often cited as being the first melodrama, or at least the source of 
reference for the subsequent flowering of this genre in Europe. See especially, Waeber 
(2005), and Van der Veen (1955). 
442We may note in this connection that two of the work's most fruitful modem 
commentators, jean Starobinski and Paul de Man, both intimate that Pygniallon is not 
to be taken too seriously as a work of art. See Starobinski (1971), pp. 84-101; and de 
Man (1979), pp. 160-187. To these we may add that Rousseau's own almost complete 
lack of comment on the work in the face of the various controversies surrounding his 
lack of permission for stage representations of the work in Paris, and those concerning 
the authorship of the music, could very well be taken as an avowal of his indifference 
to its artistic quality, and a tacit admission that its importance for him lay in some 
unrecognised 'moral' or philosophical message. For example, a reference to Pilginalion 
in the Dialogiics reads: 'on vlent de mettre, a Paris, Pyginalion, malgr6 lui, sur la sc&ne, 
tout expr&s pour exciter ce risible scandale qLii n'a fait rire personne et dont nul n'a 
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presentation, as Pygmalion does that of Galathee, as something 'dear', 
'charming' and momentarily captivating, even going so far as to call it a 
'ravishing illusion, we would most likely leave the theatre with little 
more than the memories of these momentary reactions. The existential 
depravity to which the work bears effective witness is not, then, really 
permitted by the work itself to ramify much beyond the walls within 
which the drama is enacted. The form and content of Pygmalion are 
pitted against each other, the one seeming'always to exceed the other. 
This contrasts strongly with the version of the myth presented by 
Ovid. Here, Pygmalion's doing (sculpting) is a direct expression of the 
virtuous nature of his desire - that is of his desire towards the objects in 
the world being appropriately oriented - and his being (a sculptor) is the 
direct expression of the virtuosity of his doing. The structure of the 
reward is similarly conceived: Pygmalion, lacking any appropriate 
object for his virtuous desire, is eventually rewarded by the presence of 
a creature who corresponds exactly to this desirý, and their union is 
affirmed in the reciprocal desire in the virtuous consummation of 
marriage. The closing situation is of two beings who complement each 
other in shared plenitude (being together), and for each of whom the 
authenticated value-structures remain intact: he is beautifully virtuous, 
she is virtuously beautiful, and the certainty that is reflected in this 
ideal, or 'original', situation, is reflected in Ovid's unequivocally happy 
ending. 
In Rousseau's version, although the basic structure of initial lack is 
the same - "deux etres manquent a la plenitude des 
choseS'443 
- and the 
necessity of preserving the relationship between virtue and beauty in 
the figure of the good is similarly paramount, the result of the enormous 
effort to preserve this relationship is rewarded not by 'plenitude' and a 
happy marriage, but by the transfiguration of the state of alienation 
from others into a state of alienation from self. 
senti ]a comique absurdit6. ' See Dialogiic TroiszMie, OC 1, p. 964. 
443 OC 11, p. 1228. 'Choses' have 'pl6nitude' by virtue of being considered as sufficient 
in themselves. Rousseau's 'existentialism' in this context cleark, chooses to do without 
the phenomenology that twentieth-centurv existentialism takes as its starting point. 
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Reading the text at face value, the reward for Pygmalion"s avowal of 
the completion of his work and his request for divine intervention from 
the 'principe de toute existence" is the loss of his own being ('je ne vivrai 
plus que par toi. 
'), 444a 
state of affairs he himself has previously 
discounted as meaningless if not impossible: "Si j'etois elle, je ne la 
verrois pas, je ne serois pas celui qui Yaime! Non, que ma Galathee 
vive, et que je ne sois pas elle. Ah! que je sois toujours un autre... 1445 
However one reads the ending, clearly, Pygmalion's prayers have not 
been answered. Merely, his self-delusion has been rewarded by the 
effacement of his self in a charade of being fully other. His alienation, 
conceived in the interests of the good, is rewarded by the complete 
alienation of his self qua doing and judging subject from his self qua 
desiring being. The closure of the drama bears witness to the 
completely delusory nature of Galathee's statements of identity and 
non-identity and Pygmalion's assent to them as relationships beyond 
being. Galathee's being escapes the identifying relationship in her final 
sigh, Pygmalion"s more simply in the fact that he is still present to 
continue the self-deluded rhetoric of self-effacement and identification 
which, a moment before, he renounced. The consummation of Ovid's 
Pygmalion's doing in his eventual being-in-plenitude therefore suffers a 
complete reversal in Rousseau's much more uncertain landscape: here 
Pygmalion's non-doing consumes itself in eventual non-being. 
F. GALATHEA's FIRST SPEECH 
An analysis, such as that just undertaken, which concludes that 
Rousseau's Pygmalioii is essentially a negation of Ovid's tale of the 
positive origin of the art in the construction of the appropriate object a 
virtuously conceived love, could take that process of negation as an end 
in itself. Perhaps Rousseau's dramatisation of the problems of creative 
444 OC 11, p. 1231. 
445 OC 11, p. 1228. 
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activity, underscoring the difficulty of combining an artistic calling with 
a commitment to truth and 'the good', had a simple dramatic end: the 
work is hard, it gets harder, and one sometimes has to go through these 
kind of histrionics merely in order to get on with it, so to speak. 
Certainly, one of the things that Pygmalion does very well is present 
episodes which exemplify the kind of excesses of optimism and 
pessimism that anyone engaged in academic or artistic poiesis can 
identify with, and much of its comic success must result from the 
audience's private acknowledgement of this to themselves . 441 However, 
the growing body of commentary on Pygmalion, from 1770 to the 
present day, has tended to ignore this "comique absurdite " 447 and instead 
has preferred to highlight the work's appearance of being an example of 
some kind of philosophical position or theoretical statement on art, 
music or just (and for the most part) plain existence. Which is to say, 
the excessive tension in the relationship between form and content in 
Pygmalion are usually taken to be somehow expressive of or accountable 
to Rousseau's larger project, whether this project is taken to be a theory 
of music and drama 441 a movement towards the necessity of 
autobiography as modem selfhood '449a programme for proto-romantic 
aesthetiCS"450 or some kind of existentialist theory of the self as linguistic 
trope . 451 
And one of the questions the work inevitably asks is that of 
whether it does indeed have any philosophical content, or whether the 
representation is simply one of creative delirium: we are forced to ask of 
Pygmalion, 'is there anything thereT just as Pygmalion is forced to ask 
this same question of Galathee. This question, for our own purposes, 
may be put as follows: does what is excessive in Pygmalion tell us 
anything more than this tale of negation? Does the dramatisation of the 
problematics of authenticity conceived in terms of an expression of self 
446Spink (1980) gives an instructive documentary appraisal of Rousseau's own 
experience of the vicissitudes of literary-philosophical writing. 
447See above, p. 225, n. 442. 
I'S See, for instance, Waeber (1997). 
441) See, for instance, Starobinski (1971). 
450Weber (1968), pp. 900-18. 
45 1 See de Man (1971). 
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being true to self involve anything other than the exemplification in the 
artwork of these very problems? Or does this excess intend something 
in itself: how can we respond to Galathee"s sigh? 
The very earliest critical accounts of the work, whether positive, 
negative or neutrally inclined, emphasise the understanding that the 
metaphysical language and histrionic gestures of the work somehow 
exceed its dramatic landscape. For instance, Jean-Baptiste-Antoine 
Suard, commenting on his attendance at the work's Parisian premiýre, 
remarked: 'Dailleurs les discours de Pigmalion [sic] sont refroidis par 
un jargon metaphysique bien contraire au langage de la passion... 
Jamais un homme ivre d'amour Wa parl' ce langage . "451 Despite the e 
enormous success enjoyed by the work during and immediately 
following the first Parisian performances, such criticism of the lack of 
vraisemblance in Pygmalion remains a constant feature of the press 
notices. In one of the earliest critical accounts of the work, Friedrich 
Melchior von Grimm, who is reporting in his Correspondance liWraire on 
the basis of a second-hand account of the earlier Lyon premi&re, makes 
something a little more positive out of the same observation regarding 
Pygmalion's excessively metaphysical apparatus, taking this as a cue to 
engage the work on its own terms. He comments in particular on his 
surprise at the style of the exchange that marks Galathee's birth into 
language: 
Cela est peut-&tre un peu entortiII6, un peu m6taphysique; le inoi est un terme bien 
abstrait pour une premi&re pens6e ou un premier sentiment. Ce qui existe rapport 
tout ý son existence par une loi immuable et n6cessaire, mais sans le savoir. Pour 
d6couvrir cette v6rit6, aujourd'hui commune, il a fallu une longue suite 
d'observations et une long exercise de nos facult6s intellectuelles. Comment une 
statue m6tamorphos6e trouverait-elle, dans le premier instant, un r6sultat si 
compliqu6, et qui suppose tant de combinaisons et de rapports aperýus? Le 
452The Parisian preiiiiýre for the public took place on 301h October 1775. The first private 
performance of the melodrama took place in Lyon in April 1770. 
Rousseau was 
understood to take great pleasure from the performance. 
This does not alter his 
equivocal statement following the first 1775 performance 
in Paris, reported by Suard, 
that he could neither gi%, e nor refuse permission for the work's performance. 'Aii rcste, 
a-t-11 ajout6,1'c zviis an, dis qii'il i/ a wit, sottist, 
daiis la j7iýcc. ' See CC XL, p. 27. 
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premier mot d'un kre subitement anim6 serait sans doute quelque expression 
passion6e, imp6tueuse, douloureuse; Faspect de Funivers le troublerait; il s'en 
croirait menac6, sa propre 6nergie lui ferait peur. 453 
Grimm, who by this point in his career was on distinctly unfriendly 
terms with Rousseau, is nevertheless prepared to give him the benefit of 
the doubt concerning his novel treatment of the famous story"454and 
foregoing the opportunity to criticise the lack of vraisemblance, he 
instead takes this as a cue for treating seriously the apparent 
philosophical content of Galathee's statements. These, as he suggests, 
seem to him to be fundamentally misconceived. For surely, as Grimm 
argues, the first words of a newly bom creature would not be 
statements of self and other identification? Surely, her first 'linguistic' 
expression of self-hood would be something akin to the cry of nature, 
/passionee, impetueuse, douloureuse, ' rather than the dry commentary 
of an already self-conscious and philosophically literate being. 
One could counter Grimm's accusation by saying that the words 
/ moi, 'non" and 'encore' do not reflect the acquisition of a vastly 
sophisticated metaphysical vocabulary, and rather that it is Pygmalion 
and his audience's understanding of these simple words that provides 
their philosophical content. I think, however, that it is more fruitful to 
take this objection further and question whether Galath6e's statements 
of identity and non-identity are indeed really linguistic utterances. For 
us, of course, they are language, and their metaphysical and even 
metaphorical content are overwhelmingly complex. Taking Galathee on 
her own terms, we can be sure that she is uttering sounds, but are they 
to be understood as words? 
453Grimm in Tourneux (1877), IX, p. 23. Grimm's account mistakenly describes the 
drama as a kind of op6ra-comique, but the aim of his point in that respect is that the 
intrinsic ambiguity of a genreo6 Yon parle et chante alternativement, is ill-suited to 
the exposition of such material (p. 24). 
454Certainly he is willing to envisage the work's popularity: 'malgr6 la justesse dont je 
crois ces observations, je suis persuad6 que les trois mots de la statue de M. Rousseau 
feront fortune au th6tre, qui est en possession de faire applaudir des choses bien 
autrement fausses. ' Toumeux (1877), IX, p. 23. 
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Perhaps we can understand her short statements better as 
expressions, similar in content to Rousseau's 'gean' of Chapter III of the 
Essai. This, as we saw, was not in fact a word at all, but merely a sound 
produced in response to, and then associated with, the fear experienced 
in the (deluded) confrontation of what amounted to'non-moi'. Are, 
then, Galathee's statements of identity and non-identity not simply the 
representation for us of the kind of mental operations proper to the 
being in the state of nature, a being whose existence is defined by such 
circular structures of beliefs about and desires for objects which appear 
purely in terms of their (trustworthy) values? The scale of value from 
/moi' to 'non-moi' (same to not same) was, as we saw, one of the 
principle axes that controlled the circular equilibrium of nature, and 
was therefore precisely that which prevented its emerging into 
language? Before she was able to "speak, Galathee would surely have 
taken the surrounding statues to be 'moi-' rather than her adoring 
creator; but apart from this exchange of values attributed to differing 
material objects, the structure of identity and non-identity remains 
unaffected by her birth into life. 
In this respect, Grimm's objection to the effect that surely a great deal 
of 'reflective time' would have been necessary before Galathee could 
begin to make such statements, is apposite but wrongly targeted. For, 
as we saw, Rousseau's insistence on there being a great deal of reflective 
time necessary for the production of language as a system of negatively 
defined terms took place only in order to progress beyond the 
circularity of identification and non-identification. Indeed, as we saw, 
Rousseau was so hard-pushed to come up with any explanation for how 
we ever left the state of nature that the 'great deal of reflective time' was 
in the end his best shot at a sufficient explanation. 455 Galathee's proto- 
linguistic resources are, if we apply Rousseau's own analysis of the 
455For instance: 'Apr&s beaucoup d'exp6riences il aura reconnu que ces pr6tendus 
G6ans n'6tant ni plus grands ni plus forts que lui'. 
Essal, OC V, p. 381. See the 
discussion in the first section of this chapter, p. 179. 
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origin of language, surely still trapped in the circular realm of the state 
of nature. 
Reading the end of Pygmalion thus, we can begin to make more sense 
of Galathee's soupir. The sigh escapes her, not as an accompaniment to 
her first movements or to her first gesture of self-affirmation as "moi", 
but comes instead with her statement of identification with her creator- 
lover Pygmalion in "encore moi. ' If we take Galathee's original linguistic 
utterance to be located, as Rousseau would direct us to do, in the sign 
that is necessarily itself and involuntarily uttered, there is no significant 
difference between the version of events narrated by Rousseau in the 
Essai and that suggested by Galathee's experience. The transference of 
value from one material object to another as result of mistaken 
identification was not, as we saw, sufficient in itself to produce 
language: the production of language was dependent on the memory of 
this having been done, where this memory necessarily involved some 
prior insight into the object itself. Where, however, in the story of the 
origin of language, the original cry experienced as the other's failing to 
be itself acted as a catalyst for pity, as the differentiated emotional 
structure which allowed for there to be language beyond moi/non-moi, 
here we are presented with the situation in reverse. Galathee's 
moi/non-moi never were trustworthy: they occur rather as the 
reciprocation of the latest version Pygmalion's existential self-delusion. 
Rather than a being failing to be itself, we have instead non-being failing 
to be itself - 
For, even if we assume that Galathee, created explicitly as 
Pygmalion's object of love-desire, exists fully to reciprocate this, and 
consequently desires to experience this full identification with her own 
appropriate beloved in just the same way as Pygmalion, the sigh 
escapes her as a sign of her not being equal to precisely this desire. 
Even if we assumed all this reciprocation, and forcefully read the sigh as 
being an expression of the ecstatic relief of having found herself in 
Pygmalion at last, still the sound of her body"s involuntary expression 
evades any hope of full identification as the unassimilated otherness of 
her body asserts itself, however feebly, and she falls to progress beyond 
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I moi' and 'non-moi-' to the never uttered "toi'. And just as we must 
understand Pygmalion"s final soliloquy of abandonment to the 
excessive self-delusion of a similar statement of identification ("je t'ai 
donne tout mon &tre; je ne vivrai plus que par toi") as the expression of 
an enraptured state enabled simply by his forgetting his previous 
scepticism (Non, que ma Galathee vive, et que je ne sois pas elle'), so 
Galathee's last sigh registers the failure of this false circularity to 
encompass the full being of either Pygmalion or Galathee. Both 
characters clearly exceed this tentative dýnouement. Pygmalion survives 
through the interruption but not resolution of his existential dialectic. 
Galathee, taken on her own terms, is indeed born into language, but this 
new being is already beyond itself: her linguistic utterance is not the cry 
of the new-born being but merely the dernier soupir of one already 
passing beyond being. 
G. THE UNCOVERING OF ART 
Grimm's instructive and already finely nuanced interpretation of this 
ending could not have benefited from a reading of Rousseau's own 
theory of the origin of language "451 and hence could not be reasonably 
expected to see that Galathee's birth does not, in fact, jar with 
Rousseau's version of eventS, 
457 but merely with one inherited from 
Condillac, whose treatment of the subject enjoyed enormous currency at 
the time. The situation now, however, is somewhat reversed. 
One of the principal contributions to this reversal, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, came with the publication of Derrida's De la 
grammatologie and its extended analysis of Rousseau's Essai. In our 
discussion of Derrida, we saw that the idea of the other being present to 
us was incompatible with the epistemological structures Rousseau 
4'; (, The Fsý; (Iiwas not published until after Rousseau's 
death. 
457, With the reservation, of course, that Galath6e's 'original' sign 
here is a Smipir and 
not the crv of nature. 
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himself establishes in the Essai. As we saw, because this presence can 
never be apparent except through the filter of structures of signification 
such as language, otherness becomes the product of a fissure within a 
supposedly systematic structure to which we, as its users, are not fully 
adequate: otherness becomes the broken representation of self to its self, 
whether recognisable as such or not, and the presence of others to us 
becomes indistinguishable from states of auto-affection. Nevertheless, 
so we argued, Rousseau's insistence on maintaining the myth of 
presence - at the expense, pace Derrida, of logical consistency - was 
upheld precisely because, for Rousseau, this presence of others was 
understood by him to be not simply the only possible origin of 
language, but also that which provides the moral and evaluative 
grounds for its appropriate usage. 
Given the 'godfather-like' stature of Derrida's analysis within the 
subsequent history of Rousseau studieS, 411 and given the explicit relation 
between the structures at work in the Essai and that at stake in 
Pygmalion. 459 it is not surprising that we find spectres of Derrida's 
discussion of the former work in recent analyses of the latter. The 
conclusion of Louis Marin's "Glose sur Pygmalion', entitled'Le moi et les 
pouvoirs de Fimage', is exemplary in this respect., despite the absence in 
the article of even rudimentary documentary apparatuS. 411 Elaborating 
a theory of 'conscience esthetique" as something rooted in the self- 
definition of "moi, where this definition is obtained in the erotic desire 
of 'moi' for "I"autre, Marin marries Derrida's concept of auto-affection 
with the strain of Rousseau interpretation that focuses on Rousseau as 
philosopher of the self in order to establish the auto-erotic as the focal 
construct for Pygmalion. After quoting in full the final 'dialogue' with 
which the work finishes, Marin concludes: 
458Which is to say that if Derrida's study is ignored, it is ignored studiously. 
45' This'structure' could be summarised as the configuration of 'moi', 'non-moi' and 
Tautre'. 
4,0 Marin (1992), pp. 659-672. 
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Dans une parole et un geste originaires, Galath6e exhibe ý son Auteur'son' 
origine auto-6rotique (Yune e(s)t Vautre sc&ne) qu, rejoue dans le sentiment 
fusionnel, entre toucher et regard, celle de Narcisse et d'Echo. 
Elle se touche et dit: 'Moi, ' mot primitif dont Pygmalion est le simple 6cho 
sonore: 'Moi! ' et lorsque dans le contact avec le marbre d'une statue, Galath6e 
d6couvrira le monde ext6rieur, comme r6p6tera 'Moi' ('Ah! c'est encore moi'); mais 
cette fois 1'6cho de ce'Moi' dans la bouche de Fartiste sera 'toi, ' ('C'est toi, Cest toi 
seule') un'toi'qui en v6rit6 estMoi. ' 
Pl6nitude sensitive du moi qui est la fin de puissances de l'Image dans loeuvre 
d'art. 461 
The self receives its fullness (its presence to itself) in its erotic 
communion with an image of its own making, or in other words, with 
its own image. The 'reality' of Galathee's coming to life was therefore, 
for Marin, never part of the question: her coming to life is simply the 
fulfilment of Pygmalion's recognition of his own (erotic) desire for 
selfness given material reality in the work of art. Similarly, the apparent 
lack of vraisemblance in this coming to life (towards which, as we saw, 
Pygmalion's contemporary critics expressed distrust), and the contingent 
issue of the (inappropriate) metaphysical language employed by the 
artist and his creation, cease to be a problem in Marin's reading 
precisely because the representational content of the sculpture is 
understood to be the sculptor's own erotic cogito: je m'aime, donc je suis. 
We can understand, therefore, Marin to be taking Pygmalion's own 
explicit statement of auto-affection at face value -je madore dans ce 
que jai fait' - despite the cautionary tone of the preceding remark to the 
effect that the subscription to such auto-affection risks vanity: 'Vanite, 
foiblesse humaine! je ne puis me lasser admirer mon ouvrage; je 
m'enivre d'amour-propre. 1462 Faced with our earlier question as to 
whether Pygmalion is a philosopher or an artist (or whether Pygmalloll 
is philosophy or art), one can conclude that he, if his understanding of 
461Marin (1992), p. 672. 
4b2 OC 11', p. 1226. 'Vanity' here can be taken to refer 
both to the fundamental but self- 
deceiving emotion so despised by Rousseau (and Pygmalion), as well as to the 
property of simply being pointless or 
impossible. In both senses, its description as 
'foiblesse humaine' seems appropriate. 
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the situation cohered with that of Marin, has quite simply abandoned 
his dialectical search for the truth of the matter, and given himself, 
whether deluded or not, to affirming the relationship between artist and 
artwork to be one that is essentially vain. The extremes of 
interest/disinterest and certainty/uncertainty that Pygmallon's dramatic 
structure articulates, thereby become similarly vain: a series of now 
redundant mental operations which, f6r whatever reason, the artist does 
or perhaps must put himself through in order to reaffirm the nature of 
his original relationship with his creations. Further than ever from 
Ovid's Pygmalion, the origin of sculpture is presented not as virtue but 
as vanity. 
One could effectively conclude the discussion here by agreeing with 
Marin, and by relating this reading effectively to Rousseau's famous 
concerns about art as both vain and deceptive. Certainly, although such 
a conclusion would seem to be in more or less direct opposition to 
Marin's affirmative reading of the dýnouement of Pygmalion, there is the 
sense that such concerns are immaterial because Pygmalion's tentative 
enquiry into the truth of art, if we can put it that way, has been 
dissolved in the resolution of 'plenitude' and its decidedly solipsistic 
implications. Marin is clearly right to suggest that Pygmalion means 
'moi' when he says 'toi", but that is not the same as admitting that his 
meaning pertains to the 'verite: the truth of 'un "toi' qui en verite est 
'Moi" is only the truth of 'moi' and therefore in no way can be said to be 
truth in the sense of 'hors de moi-' towards which Pygmalion"s dialectics 
would appear to be directed. The problem for Marin is, I would 
suggest, a na1ve version of that which we saw to be confronting Derrida 
in the previous section. In taking, rather surreptitiously, Derrida's 
analysis of " auto- affection' to be an end of the problematics of 'being in 
the world", rather than its beginning, Marin bypasses the whole issue of 
there being a lack of the other in the epistemological structures and 
representational strategies interpreted from Rousseau by Derrida. And 
yet, as we saw, it was precisely this lack, this impossibility of there 
being others present to us, that provided the urgency for Rousseau's 
continuing attempts to construct a poetics of presence: if theoriginal' 
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presence of the other is, as Rousseau holds it to be, the key to the 
subject"s possessing epistemic access to the world through the birth of 
the aesthetic and moral spheres, then an analysis that concludes with 
the sublimation of 'toi' (as other) in the pure identification of 'moi' with 
-4moi-', can in no way be said to progress beyond our initial problem of 
the value of art as the aesthetics and poetics of otherness. 
Marin's reading bears a curious similarity to that of Paul de Man. 
This is surprising. De Man's reading is not only opposed to the idea 
that Pygmalion's conclusion is in any sense a dialectical overcoming, but 
also his entire critical project is devoted to the deconstruction of notions 
such as presence, plenitude, and everything dependent on them. For de 
Man, as for Derrida, it is the impossibility of such fullness occurring in 
the "text" 463 that casts doubt on the veracity, if not the sincerity, of all 
attempts, whether philosophical or poetic, to conjure presence out of 
distance. 
De Man's focus on Pygmalion, however, is as a transitional text that 
marks Rousseau"s progress towards autobiographical writing: 
The situation of the scene, that of an author confronting his own finished work, 
corresponds to the actual predicament of Rousseau at that time, just as the position 
of Pygiiialion within the Rousseau corpus marks the transition from theoretical and 
fictional to autobiographical works. The fact that the text, as we understand it, 
asserts in fact the impossibility of making these facile generic distinctions should 
caution one against following all too confidently the hints provided by the 
convenient evidence of chronology. 464 
The fact that autobiography is, for De Man, a highly suspect genre, 465 
transfers the orientation towards it from 'writing about (one's) self' to 
463Where the term 'text' for both men is to be understood as metaphor for the structure 
of negative differentiation that provides the only possible epistemic access to the 
world and its objects. In Derrida's famous formulation, 'There is nothing outside of 
the text' - Derrida (1976), p. 158. It is interesting to note 
in our current context that this 
often cited phrase occurs as part of Derrida's discussion of Rousseau's desire to efface 
all traces of mediation between self and other. 
4t, 4 De Man (1979), pp. 175-6. 
465 In the previous quotation, de Man does not so much suggest that autobiography is, 
in itself, suspect, as cast suspicion on the usefulness of 
distinguishing between genres. 
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the philosophical necessity of coming to an understanding of the self as 
'the story we write for ourselves'. De Man's interpretation of Pygmalion, 
then, follows this pattern of revealing the self to be of but not in the 
dialectical patterns of its manoeuvring towards a hidden object, and so 
if we say that he reads the text as transition towards the 
autobiographical project, this is to be understood as a transition towards 
an understanding of the self as a product of figural language. 
Following his analysis of Pygmalion's series of negations of his 
perceived states of identity and non-identity, in which the rapturous 
conclusion is understood to be a purely regressive movement within 
this dialectical progression, de Man concludes with a question: 
[Wjhat remains after any 'self'-interested notions of selfhood, even at their most 
sublime or their most rigorous, have been negated[? ] Rousseau's refusal to grant 
authority to even this level of discourse, despite the fact that the dialectical 
development that leads up to it is controlled in all its stages, indicates the 
impossibility of replacing the epistemology of figural language by that of the self. 
From the point of view of truth and falsehood, the self is not a privileged metaphor 
in Rousseau. 466 
Despite, therefore, the complete opposition of de Man's reading to the 
positive experience of self-hood in the plenitude of sensitive auto- 
eroticism suggested by Marin, both readings put the capacity for truth 
and falsehood (de Man by positively denying this, Marin by making the 
question irrelevant) firmly beyond the self, that is, firmly beyond the 
capacity of the self by itself in the absence of others. 
In both these readings, the 'excessive' quality of Pygmalion is firmly 
restricted to operating within the problematics of Rousseau/pygmalion's 
being a self, that is within the aporia whose fundamental claustrophobia 
Rousseau seems at pains to dramatise: both take Derrida's problematics 
of auto-affection (auto-eroticism for Marin, auto-fiction for de Man) to 
be not just conclusive, but an end in itself. The fundamental question of 
the relationship between being a self and the grounding of this in the 
This, for him, will be the subject of Pygmalioti. See also 
de N lan (1984). 
466De Man(] 979), p. 187. 
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experience of there being others - that is, of our experience of these others 
as the ethical demand that provides the origin of selfhess - is ignored 
because of some previous commitment to the epistemological 
impossibility of there being others present to us "in the world"; a form of 
presence, that is to say, not contingent on the intentional act. 
But just because we have admitted that the presence of others is 
something which we ourselves play a part in constructing (poiesis), that 
does not mean in consequence that we forego the duty (pleasure) of 
making them present to us. The fact that this is a difficult project, and 
the fact that this difficulty escalates the more complex and "truthful" 
one's own notions of selfhood become, is certainly at stake in Pygmalion, 
but I think it would be difficult to conclude from this that the work's 
central message is that of giving up any further attempts. Surely the 
work's central message is that of the paramount importance of retaining 
the effort implicit in being as a state of other directedness? Surely, what 
the work succeeds in demonstrating is that without this effort, this 
work, there is nothing to prevent the interiority of self-consciousness 
collapsing in on itself and rendering being in time nothing but a 
sequence of passing from one paranoid state of delusion to another. 
Were one to find it necessary to bring the work's autobiographical 
content to prominence, I suggest it would be this element of prefiguring 
the path of Rousseau"s own paranoia that we take as central. 
In this respect the (Platonic) language of Pygmalion's appeal from the 
depths of his despair to Venus as the "giver of form' can be said to 
provide the answer to the question it asks. 
Et toi, sublime essence qui te cache aux sens, et te fais sentir aux coeurs! ame de 
Funivers, principe de toute existence; toi qui par I'amour donnes I'harmonie aux 
616mens, la vie ý la matiere, le sentiment aux corps, et la forme 6 tous les kres; feu 
sacr6! c6leste Venus, par qui tout se conserve et se reproduit sans cesse! Ah!, oii est 
ton 6quilibre? o6 est ta force expansive? oij est la loi de la nature dans le sentiment 
que j'6prouve? 4(, 7 
4t, -, OC 11, p. 1228. 
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The equilibrium - the state of being equal to itself - which Pygmalion 
lacks in earnest has at its heart the moral love whose essential other 
directedness he, in his desire for authenticity, has been understood to 
abandon. Pity, as love for the other, and grounded in the good of the us, 
is notably absent from the text, an absence all the more startling by 
virtue of its prominence as a theme in all Rousseau"s other writings of 
this period. It is replaced, simply, by self-pity, a form whose betrayal of 
itself renders the alienation of Pygmalion"s self from himself complete. 
This betrayal is enacted in the final scene. Any end to Pygmalion's 
search for the object of art is denied by his previous abandonment of the 
origin of art in virtue in favour of the attempt to authenticate art as 
beauty in itself. The end that Rousseau provides as the termination of 
Pygmalion's endless struggle thus bears witness to this fundamental 
betrayal of the object of art: Pygmalion takes possession of Galathee's 
body only by virtue of his forgetting that art, in its essential negativity, 
has no body capable of being possessed. Galath6e reveals this falseness 
in the sigh that escapes her, inevitably, as the sign of her negative being. 
The sigh thus signals the essential truth of art: in its being the necessarily 
I. tself of nothing, it reflects both the inevitability of our failure ever to 
possess it - to bring the other into presence - as well as the necessity of 
continuing the attempt to do precisely this. 
i 
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This thesis set out to explain the relation between the prescriptive 
elements of Rousseaus music theory and his moral philosophy. My 
principal purpose in this was to determine the extent to which 
Rousseau's musical aesthetics could be said to receive both their 
grounding and validation in the analysis of morality provided by his 
more general philosophical writings. 
The import of the investigation was understood, and thus the enquiry 
pursued, in two ways. Firstly, the demonstration of a genuine relation 
between the music theory and the philosophy would thereby add to and 
deepen the interest musicologists and literary historians have taken in 
this area of Rousseau"s work. Secondly, the investigation was 
considered as having a more general relevance. This revolved around 
the central question of what, if anything, is true about the putative 
relation Rousseau attempted to establish between music and morality. 
My conclusion in this respect was, again, twofold. For while it does not 
seem possible to relate the details of Rousseau"s musical aesthetics to 
the moral structure we found to underscore his philosophical work, it 
does nonetheless seem possible to retain the generalities of his account 
of music as consistent with this moral structure. 
In the analyses of the musical writings, and in particular of the 
Dictionnaire de Musique and Essai, we saw that a crucial element of 
Rousseau's understanding of music was his distinction between natural 
and imitative music. The distinction, while apparently mysterious in 
respect of its theoretical foundation, was held to be crucial because upon 
it were seen to be contingent all the prescriptive elements of Rousseau's 
musical aesthetics. In this way, the valorisation of imitation in music 
upheld not only the compositional and ontological priority of melody 
over harmony, but also the theory of unity of melody, the aesthetics of 
simplicity, and the emphasis on vocal and dramatic music at the 
expense of instrumental music. 
In turn, the distinction between imitative and non-imitative music 
was shown to be based on a theory of moral cause and effect which, 
in 
the musical writings alone, seemed circular in presentation. 
For while it 
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seemed to be established that the notion of the moral cause and effect of 
imitative music was grounded in an account, initially, of the accents of 
speech and later, more profoundly, in the idea of accent as a necessary 
symptom of the experience of "moral' passionate desire, the circularity 
of the account remained in evidence. This was because Rousseau's 
model, in deploying the idea of accent thus, was grounded in a system 
that was not, in itself, sufficient to explain the occurrence of such 'moral' 
passions in human psychology. We did see, however, that Rousseau 
suggested that the explanation of the moral cause and effect of music 
should be looked for in the way in which the perceiving subject 
becomes aware of other human beings and their interests. And from 
this distinctly moral (in the sense of ethical) characterisation of presence 
the valorisation of imitative music was understood to derive. 
Our investigation of the idea of presence was pursued in relation to 
Rousseau's account of man's emergence from the state of nature and the 
origin of the morality. We derived from this a powerful analysis of the 
relation between, and the nature of, the aesthetic and moral spheres. 
This analysis, while it was not shown to provide the philosophical 
ground for the construal of presence, as some have taken Rousseau to 
suggest, in terms of the fullness of being, was shown to establish the 
idea of presence in terms of a credible representation of the other in a 
discursive system; a representation, that is to say, sufficiently credible to 
sustain aesthetic engagement and to arouse moral activity. 
Far from being restricted to the voice and its accents, however, as 
Rousseau's strongly valorised narratives appear to suggest, this 
presence of the other was considered to be found equally in 
instrumental music, painting, poetry and, indeed, anywhere where the 
'imitative' realm has play. Presence, we argued - and partly on the 
strength of Rousseau's own argumentation - should be understood in 
terms of a kind of fissure in a narrative, in a discursive or musical 
continuum. 
Finally, we argued that imitative art has its origin not, as Rousseau 
suggests, in the voice as presence, but rather in a kind of negative pole 
of this which we characterised in terms of the 'soupir. This argument 
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was shaped as part of an interpretation of Rousseau's melodrama, 
Pygmalion, which we read as providing a dramatisation of precisely the 
kind of difficulties implied by Rousseau's moral valorisation of music 
and art. These difficulties - entailed by the project of taking art and its 
negative origin seriously - were shown to derive from the way in 
which the aesthetic and moral spheres are, properly speaking, severed 
from each other in art. The other human being that music and art is 
considered to signify as (moral) presence is, to express the matter 
simply, just not there. The moral agent whose sensibilities are aroused 
in the experience of art is, in the context of that experience, purely 
passive, and his experience thus becomes purely aesthetic and so 
amoral. 
An account of the importance of confronting these difficulties, and 
resisting the aestheticisation of (moral) reality that artistic experience is 
in danger of promoting, was shown also to be the subject of Pygmalion. 
The difficulties of art were initially construed in terms of the structure of 
aesthetic judgement, any certainty in which becomes impossible if the 
'obligations" to the otherness of art are eschewed. Subsequently, 
however, the implications of this uncertainty were shown in respect of a 
failure to engage with moral reality; a failure, that is to say, to be 
human. 
*** 
What implications do these conclusions have for our initial motivations 
in respect of the value of Rousseau"s music theory? Many of Rousseau's 
music-aesthetic prescriptions were shown to be incommensurate with 
the moral authentication he desired for them. Clearly, however, 
Rousseau's music theory does not thereby become insignificant. In the 
light of my account, I would suggest two ways in which its significance 
may be assessed. 
Firstly, in historical terms, we may say that it is Rousseau"s intention 
to provide a moral valorisation of music-aesthetic discourse - and not 
his degree of success in doing so - that accounts for the value of his 
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music theory. This intention was, after all, one of the principal 
motivations behind his attempt to provide a systematic theory of 
musical imitation. Moreover, his own sense of the philosophical and 
moral value of his account lend to his writings a force of eloquence and 
a singularity of judgement that is, to put it mildly, a rare treat for the 
historian of music theory. Similarly, the music theory"s significance in 
respect of the history of composition is more far reaching than has often 
been supposed; and although it has not been my aim to provide any 
account of this legacy of Rousseau's, my hope is that the presentation of 
my research will prove useful for the reconstruction of this history. 
Secondly, it must be said that Rousseau does indeed leave us with an 
extremely powerful philosophical account of music, the relevance of 
which to musicology - notwithstanding its limitations to the 
generalities of musical aesthetics - should be stressed. For if pursued, 
Rousseau-'s analysis lays the groundwork of a philosophy of music in 
which a great many of the institutional assumptions of contemporary 
musicology would find themselves bome out. In this, we should 
consider that Rousseau provides what amounts to an exceptionally 
powerful basis for considering and determining the relation between 
the aesthetic and the moral. We should also consider that music is 
accorded a privileged place in this relation between aesthetic and moral, 
not, as is often supposed, because of its putative origins in the vocal 
expression of passion, but, more importantly, simply in terms of its 
aesthetic opacity. Music is privileged, in Rousseau, because its value 
can be affirmed in spite of and perhaps also because of its inevitable 
failure to render itself transparent in respect of some determinate 
reference. The reference of music - nominally the other, but almost 
certainly the otherness of the self - is such that it provides, not an 
illusion of the real world, but a mirror through which we may catch 
sight of the workings of the mind in its efforts to engage the moral 
reality of that world. 
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